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Current day communication systems rely on protocols to provide secure 
communications among parties. Weaknesses in protocols, at first thought to be secure, 
have been found through deep analysis. There are many systems that have been designed 
to provide a means to test the various security characteristics of communication 
protocols. We present an evaluation methodology that can be used to evaluate protocol 
analysis systems based on their scope, correctness, performance, and usability 
characteristics. We apply portions of the methodology to a set of protocol analysis 
systems to show the evaluation methodology in action. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In networked communications there are numerous protocols that are layered on 
top of each other to provide confidential, reliable, and trusted communications across 
insecure and unreliable communication paths. There are numerous communication 
protocols that are used for various forms of communication. Some protocols do not make 
any claims or attempts to provide confidential, reliable, or trusted communications; other 
protocols make significant claims and attempt to provide some or all of these properties. 
As in other subject areas, an object’s ability to meet the specified requirements should not 
be taken “as is” but instead must be tested and analyzed; communication protocols are no 
different. There are examples of communication protocols that were thought to be secure 
but later found to be flawed. Protocol Analysis is the field of study primarily concerned 
with the analyzing and designing communication protocols and proving the security 
claims of the protocols. 
Protocol Analysis has been a field of interest for some time and has become an 
ever important field of study in today’s world. Numerous protocol analysis systems exist 
to aid the designer and evaluator in their efforts, such as the Cryptographic Protocol 
Shapes Analyzer (CPSA) [GUTT2006], ProVerif [BLAN2001], Spin [HOLZ1994], and 
SPEAR II [SAUL1999, SAUL2001b, SAUL2003]. Some analysis systems excel in 
analyzing a protocol’s ability to perform across a noisy channel, such as Spin; others are 
used to prove confidentiality and authenticity characteristics, such as CPSA, ProVerif, 
and SPEAR II. In this project we are interested in communication protocol analysis 
systems that can be used to prove confidentiality and authenticity characteristics of 
communication protocols. These types of protocols are commonly referred to as security 
protocols1. 
Just as communication protocols are analyzed and evaluated, so too must the 
protocol analyzers be analyzed and evaluated. Protocol analysis system evaluation efforts 
to date have mainly been focused on performance criteria [BASI2003, HOPP2000, 
                                                 
1 In this work we use the term protocol to mean security protocol unless otherwise noted. 
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LOWE1997] and to some degree usability [SAUL2001b]. We are not aware of any 
overarching evaluation methodology tailored to protocol analysis systems. 
The goal of this project was to devise an evaluation methodology that can be used 
to compare different protocol analysis systems. In this project we present the first 
evaluation methodology that can be used to evaluate and analyze protocol analysis 
systems. The evaluation methodology consists of criteria, methods, and weights. The 
criteria are the topics that the analysis systems are evaluated on. The methods are the 
testing mechanisms for the criteria. The weights include two things: the rating system for 
each criterion, and the weightings used between criteria. Figure 1 is a high level 
functional view of the evaluation methodology presented in this project. At the top of 
Figure 1 is the set of protocol analysis systems that are to be evaluated by the evaluation 
methodology user. The user evaluates a single protocol analysis system at a time. The 
user evaluates the analysis systems on four categories of criteria: scope, correctness, 
performance, and usability. The user inputs the results from the testing methods into the 
overall weighting function. The output from the weighting function is the ultimate output 
of the evaluation methodology. 
The results from the evaluation methodology can be used in a number of ways. 
First, protocol analysis system designers can use the evaluation results to analyze how 
different versions of their analysis system meet the needs of the end users. Secondly, 
evaluation results from separate protocol analysis systems can be compared and further 
analyzed. The comparative analysis of protocol systems can be used by evaluators to 
determine which protocol analysis system best meets their needs. 
One of the key aspects of the evaluation methodology we present is the ability of 
the methodology to address the needs of the evaluator through the weighting function. 
Different evaluators will use protocol analysis systems for different purposes and will 
thus have different needs that the analysis systems should meet. For example, an 
evaluator may be concerned with the ease at which students are able to specify protocols 
in the analysis system, or an evaluator may be concerned with the amount of resources an 
analysis system uses. The factors in the weighting function can be adapted to address the 
needs of a wide range of evaluators. The weighting factors we present are an example 
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based on the needs of a communications system manager, such as an Information 
Systems Security Manager (ISSM) [CNSS4009]. One of the responsibilities of a 
communications system manager is to decide which protocols will be implemented on the 
communications network. This responsibility should not be taken lightly by any manager 
and is growing in size because of the increasing number of protocols that are introduced 
to and published by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). A manager needs a 
protocol analysis system that can aid him in the decision making process. Analysis 
systems that do not aid the manager in making a decision among various communication 
protocols do not present the highest degree of usefulness to the communications system 
manager. Our example weights award more points to analysis systems that aid in the 
decision making process over analysis systems that do not aid in the decision making 
process. 
Another key aspect of the methodology we present is related to the “living” nature 
that we expect the methodology to have. In addition to the evaluation methodology itself, 
we present ways by which the methodology can be adapted to meet the needs of the 
growing protocol analysis field. We present informal reasons as to why the methodology 
would need to be adapted and processes for making sound adaptations. We additionally 
discuss the possibilities of comparing data collected under one version of the evaluation 
methodology with a different version. The modular manner in which we present the 
methodology, in part, allows the methodology to be adapted. 
In summary, the key result of this project is that we show that protocol analysis 
systems can be evaluated against the needs of an evaluator. The results returned by this 
evaluation methodology can be used for various purposes by different parties, and the 
methodology can be tailored to address the needs of a wide range of evaluators. 
Additionally, the mechanisms we present to adapt the evaluation methodology give the 
methodology the ability to be a living methodology that grows with the protocol analysis 
field. 
In Chapter II we discuss background information pertaining to the protocol 
analysis field and general, and information specific to the evaluation methodology we 
present. In Chapter III we present the details of the evaluation methodology. In Chapter 
 4 
IV we show the validity of the evaluation methodology by applying part of the 
methodology to a set of protocol analysis systems. Finally, we conclude and discuss 
future work in Chapter V. 
Set of Protocol Analysis Systems
Evaluation Methodology




























Figure 1: High Level Functional View of the Evaluation Methodology 
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II. BACKGROUND 
In this section we present requisite background information. We begin with an 
introduction to the protocol analysis field. We then discuss the evaluation efforts that 
have occurred to date. We end with a discussion as to why an evaluation methodology is 
needed. 
A. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS FIELD 
As with any field, there is a specialized language used within the protocol analysis 
community. Figure 2 serves as an introduction to the terminology used in the protocol 
analysis field; specifically Figure 2 is the simplified representation of the Needham-
Schroeder (NS) public-key encryption protocol [NEED1978]. 
A protocol consists of a series of transactions between the communicating parties; 
each transaction or step of the protocol is designated on a separate line as in the example. 
A step of a protocol is comprised of two components, the first being the communicating 
parties and the second the formatted message contents. A colon (:) is used to separate the 
communicating parties from the formatted message contents. An arrow (→ ) is used to 
separate the sender of the message from the receiver. For example, the first step in Figure 
2 states that A is sending the message to B. Within the community Alice (A) typically 
initiates the communications with Bob (B) the responder, third party servers (S) are also 
used within in some protocols. When an attack is found in a protocol, the attack is shown 
in the same format with infiltrator (I) inserted into the message listings, as exemplified in 
Figure 3; in literature the attacker or infiltrator is commonly named Eve, due to the act of 
eavesdropping. 
Messages can consist of a variety of terms, such as the names of the participating 
parties or principals, nonces (N), timestamps (T), keys (K), text, numbers, or other 
variables. There are operations that can be performed on message terms, the three most 
common are concatenation, encryption, and hashing. The concatenation of terms is 
typically denoted with a comma (,) between the concatenated terms. The encryption of 
terms is noted by enclosing the terms to be encrypted in brackets followed by the key 
used to perform the encryption. For example, the message in the first line of Figure 2, 
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{ },  A BA N K , means that the terms A and NA are concatenated and then encrypted with the 
key KB. Hashing is typically noted in a similar fashion as other mathematical functions 
like sine and cosine, where the inputs to the hash function are enclosed in parentheses; for 
example, { } ( ):  , , hash , A B AA B A N K A N→ . Other mathematical functions such as 
addition and xor also appear in protocols and are represented by the standard 





:  ,  





A B A N K
B A N N K













:  ,  
:  ,  
:  ,  









A I A N K
I B A N K
B I N N K
I A N N K
A I N K








Figure 3: Attack on Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol in Standard Protocol Notation2 
Over the years there have been many protocols developed, some provide security 
guaranties others do not. For instance the TCP/IP version 4 does not provide any security 
guaranties, nor does the NS protocol. There are protocols that do provide security 
guaranties, such as the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe (NSL) protocol [LOWE 1996]. The 
NS protocol was first shown to be secure through the use of BAN logic [BURR1990]; six 
years later and almost 20 years after the NS protocol was developed, Lowe found a flaw 
in the NS protocol using FDR [LOWE1996]. 
Just as there have been many protocols developed over the years there have been 
many theories for proving security protocols correct. Additionally, these theories have 
been incorporated into automated analysis systems such as CPSA and ProVerif. Today, 
                                                 
2 The attack on and fix to the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol was first published by 
Lowe in [LOWE1996]. 
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there are many protocols, and many analysis systems to analyze the protocols. The 
question arises as to how the protocol analysis systems themselves can be compared and 
evaluated. 
B. EVALUATION EFFORTS TO DATE 
Evaluation efforts of protocol analysis systems to date have not been as 
comprehensive as the evaluation methodology we present. The most abundant form of 
protocol analysis system evaluation efforts have focused on performance criteria, such as 
execution time and secondary memory requirements [BASI2003, HOPP2000, 
LOWE1997]. There has also been an effort to evaluate the usability of a protocol analysis 
system [SAUL2001b]. The key issue to note about these analysis efforts is that they were 
conducted independently, i.e., there was not a common set of criteria or testing methods 
used among these efforts. The independent nature of these evaluation efforts does not 
lead to results that can be easily compared. 
There have also been survey efforts that describe numerous protocol analysis 
systems [HEAL2004, LOPE2006, MEAD2003]. As with the previously mentioned 
evaluation efforts the various survey efforts have occurred independently of each other. 
Although these efforts have compared various protocol analysis systems in a single body 
of work, the survey nature of them does not lead to a clear determination of which 
analysis system would best meet the needs of system users. 
We also found that in general the evaluation efforts to date have not addressed the 
different user classes that might apply protocol analysis systems. We see a number of 
different user classes for protocol analysis systems; such as communications system 
managers, communication protocol designers, and educators. These classes of users 
clearly have varying needs for protocol analysis systems. To our knowledge these 
varying needs have not been addressed to date. 
C. THE NEED FOR AN EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
The evaluation efforts to date have failed to effectively compare and evaluate 
protocol analysis systems. The efforts have either been singular in nature that cannot be 
compared, or high-level summaries that are not detailed enough. In general, the 
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evaluation efforts to date have been ad-hoc. We address this by presenting a formal 
evaluation methodology that allows protocol analysis systems to be compared and 
evaluated in detail. 
We see a need for the evaluation methodology we present in this research. There 
are a number of reasons why we see this need. First, over the years the protocol analysis 
field has grown and continues to see new analysis systems and theories evolve. The 
continuing increase in the number of analysis systems clearly raises the need to determine 
which analysis systems should be used. Second, the evaluation efforts to date have been 
independent in nature. As previously mentioned, the independent nature of these efforts 
does not allow for comparative analysis of the evaluation results. Third, the survey efforts 
to date have not provided detailed enough information to determine which analysis 
systems should be used and which should not. Fourth, the varying needs of protocol 
analysis system user classes have not been addressed. We feel this is partly due to the 
lack of a means to assess protocol analysis systems based on the needs of the system user. 
We address the need for an evaluation methodology in this work. We present a 
methodology that is detailed, able to tailored, that produces comparable results, and is 
adaptable. The evaluation methodology provides greater detail than high level survey 
efforts. The methodology can be tailored to address the needs of the various analysis 
system user classes. The results from various runs of the methodology can be compared; 
allowing the evaluator to determine which analysis system best meets their needs. Lastly, 
the methodology we present can grow with the protocol analysis field and time. 
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III. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
In this section we present the evaluation methodology and the core components 
that are present in an evaluation methodology. The components are presented in a 
modular fashion to show that they can be discussed independent of each other and to aid 
in modifications to adapt the methodology to meet an expanding set of needs. We begin 
by defining and discussing the criteria that are relevant in performing an evaluation of 
protocol analysis systems, as the other components of the methodology are dependent on 
the criteria. We then present the methods that are used to evaluate the protocol analysis 
systems on the relevant criteria. The last core components of any evaluation methodology 
are the ratings and weights that are used within each criterion and in between the criteria. 
After we define the components of our evaluation methodology we discuss ways in 
which the methodology can be adapted and how results across some adaptations can be 
compared. 
A. CRITERIA 
The core behind an evaluation methodology is the criteria that comprise it. In this 
research we present criteria that are grouped into four main categories: scope, 
correctness, performance, and usability. An underlying design principle of the criteria we 
present here is that each of the criteria provides an independent way in which to evaluate 
a protocol analysis system. At first glance one would expect that the correctness criteria 
would be discussed first as correctness is often the most important characteristic of a 
process. We do not present the correctness criteria first; instead we present the scope 
criteria first. In order to fully understand the correctness of a protocol analysis system, an 
understanding of what a protocol system is intended to do is needed. The scope criteria 
address what protocol systems can do and are therefore presented before the correctness 
criteria3. 
                                                 




At the core of any system are the capabilities that the system supports and the 
systems underlying characteristics, we categorize a criterion of this nature a scope 
criterion. The scope criteria we present here are the core criteria for the presented 
evaluation methodology. 
a. Type Support 
The types that a protocol analysis system supports are inherently important 
in not only determining how to specify a protocol in the analysis system but also if the 
protocol can even be appropriately specified in the analysis system. Below is the list of 






• Symmetric Cryptographic Key 
• Asymmetric Public-Key Cryptographic Keys 
• Symmetric Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
• Asymmetric Signature/Verification Keys 
• Text 
• Number 
Each type is considered separately from the others in this evaluation 
methodology. We classify the support that a protocol analysis system provides for a type 
in one of three ways: native, non-native, or unable. Native type support means that the 
analysis system implements support for that type by design, meaning that no additional 
enhancements need to be made by the user to make use of the type. Non-native type 
support means that the analysis system does not implement the type natively but there is a 
way to implement the type in the analysis system. This definition of non-native includes 
both ways that use other native types to simulate another type and third party work that 
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adds support for that type in the analysis system. A type that is not supported by the 
analysis system and is not implemented via extensions to the analysis system is labeled as 
unable. We admit that given these definitions it is possible that a type that has the 
possibility to be non-natively supported in an analysis system but has not yet been 
implemented would fall under the “unable” definition. 
b. Operation Support 
In addition to types, the operations that a protocol analysis system 
supports correlate to the capabilities of the analysis system. Just as with types, the 
operations supported by an analysis system are inherently important in not only 
determining how to specify a protocol in the analysis system but also whether the 
protocol can even be appropriately specified in the analysis system. Below is the list of 
operations that are included in the evaluation methodology; this list was derived from 
[CLAR1997]. 
• Symmetric Cryptography 
• Symmetric MAC Generation/Verification 
• Asymmetric Encryption/Decryption 




We consider the operations listed separately from each other, but group 
reciprocal operations, such as asymmetric encryption and asymmetric decryption, 
together. As with types, operations can be supported in one of three ways: native, non-
native, unable. The definitions of native, non-native, and unable for operation support are 
the same as for type support. 
c. Session Type 
Session type refers to the breadth and depth of protocol instances that the 
protocol analysis system explores during the evaluation of the protocol. The session type 
criterion is used to evaluate the analysis system on the completeness of the protocol 
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instances it is able to explore during the evaluation of a communications protocol. 
Protocol analysis systems may be classified by one of three session types: fixed, 
bounded, infinite. The fixed set contains analysis systems that have a set limit to the 
number of states that will be explored during the evaluation of the communications 
protocol. The bounded set contains analysis systems that have the ability to explore states 
of the protocol up to the limitation of the test platform resources, such as main memory 
limitations. The infinite set contains analysis systems that have no limitations to the 
number of protocol states that are analyzed. 
d. Theoretical Testable Protocol Characteristics 
The main purpose of a protocol analysis system is to analyze a 
communications protocol in its ability to provide aspects of information security. An 
evaluation methodology designed for protocol analysis systems would not be complete 
without addressing the information security characteristics that a system analyzes. Below 
is a list of protocol characteristics that current protocol analysis systems address; the list 
is a union of characteristics we obtained through a literature review. We reviewed 
literature that discussed communication protocols [CLAR1996, NEED1978], literature 
about protocol analysis systems [GUTT2006, SAUL2001], and general literature about 






• Round Efficiency 
As with supported types we treat each of these characteristics separately 
within this evaluation methodology. The testability of each characteristic for a given 
protocol analysis system is categorized in one of three ways: native, non-native, or 
unable. Again, the definitions of native, non-native, and unable are consistent with the 
definitions presented for type support. 
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Of these characteristics, it is appropriate to explain the last two in greater 
detail as the first four are tenants of information assurance and hold a consistent meaning. 
Non-repudiation is defined by CNSSI 4009 as assuring that the sender of data is provided 
with proof of delivery and the recipient of data is provided with proof of the sender’s 
identity. Non-repudiation cannot exist without data integrity and authentication, and we 
hold that it is a viable information security characteristic that can be addressed by a 
protocol analysis system. 
We do not consider round efficiency a tenant of information assurance as it is 
specific to communication protocols. We consider round efficiency to fall under the 
availability tenant of information assurance. Some protocol analysis systems are able to 
make statements concerning the round efficiency of the communications protocol, 
SPEAR II is an example of one such system [SAUL1999, SAUL2001b, SAUL2003]. 
2. Correctness 
With an understanding of what protocol systems can analyze, we can now discuss 
what criteria can be used to evaluate the correctness of a protocol analysis system. 
Protocol analysis systems, as with any function, have two important aspects that must be 
understood before the data involved can be transformed into information. When looking 
at a function in general, one is interested in the inputs and the outputs. The key input to a 
protocol analysis system is the specification of the communications protocol itself. The 
key output is the evaluation of the protocol returned by the analysis system. Table 1 
depicts the possible combinations of results that a protocol analysis system can return 
when crossed with the security characteristic of the communications protocol. Table 1 is 
used for each of the testable protocol characteristics mentioned in the testable protocol 
characteristics criterion. The cells are labeled with an abbreviation for the protocol 
analysis system results followed by an abbreviation for the protocol. In general a protocol 
is either secure or insecure in regards to the testable protocol characteristic. A protocol is 
defined as secure (S) if it does not have a known flaw. A protocol is insecure (I) if a 
known flaw exists. The results returned from a protocol analysis system can be classified 
in one of four ways: secure, insecure with information, insecure without information, or 
inconclusive. We discuss the meaning of these classifications following the table. 
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Secure S-I S-S 
Protocol Analysis 
System Results 
Inconclusive N-I N-S 
Table 1: Protocol Analysis System Results x Protocol Possibilities 
An analysis system that returns an insecure result that is accompanied with 
amplifying information that shows how the protocol is insecure or presents an attack 
method against the protocol is classified as insecure with information (IW). If an analysis 
system returns an insecure result without any amplifying information or an attack method 
then the insecure without information (IO) classification is used. Secure (S) results are 
simply results from the protocol analysis system that state that the protocol is secure in 
regards to the associated characteristic. We consider inconclusive (N) results to be either 
a statement, or possibly a lack of statement, from the protocol analysis system that says 
that the tested characteristic of the protocol cannot be mathematically proved to be secure 
or insecure, or that the protocol analysis system fails to halt during the testing of the 
protocol. If an analysis system is unable to test a given characteristic then nothing can be 
said of which cell the system fits into; i.e., there is no cross product table for the analysis 
system in regards to the characteristic in question.  
There are three cells that warrant further discussion: the IW-S, IO-S, and S-I cells. 
We will first discuss the S-I cell, as it is of interest within the evaluation methodology, the 
IW-S and IO-S cells have additional importance outside of the methodology. The S-I cell 
is evidence of a false positive. In the S-I case the protocol is known to be insecure but the 
analysis system returns results that say the protocol is in fact secure, thus the analysis 
system is incorrect. 
The IW-S cell is the most important cell, this cell represents the situation where a 
protocol was previously thought to be secure but an analysis system returns results that 
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show how the protocol is actually insecure. When this situation arises there is immediate 
cause to notify others throughout the protocol analysis community and information 
security community in general. The IO-S cell is the cell of next importance; there are two 
cases that fall into this category; the first is if the analysis system is correct, the other 
when the analysis system is incorrect. In either case the human protocol analyzer will 
need to do further analysis to determine whether the analysis system is correct or not due 
to the lack of amplifying information provided by the analysis system. If the protocol can 
be shown to be insecure through further effort then this is also cause for notifying the 
community. 
With an understanding of correctness classifications we can now discuss the 
correctness criteria. We present two correctness criteria: a theoretical criterion and an 
observed criterion. There is a need to include both criteria. The most general example of 
the need for both criteria is associated with the set of protocols that an analysis system 
will halt on. There might not be a way to define the set of protocols that a given analysis 
system will or will not halt on. For instance the theoretical correctness results might say 
that an analysis system will fall in one of the inconclusive cells (i.e., the analysis might 
not halt); whereas the observed correctness results would show that the analysis system 
does in fact halt on a specific protocol. 
a. Theoretical Correctness 
The theoretical correctness criterion is based on research results. This 
gives the theoretical correctness criterion the ability to provide results that might not be 
apparent from the observed correctness criterion testing; the observed correctness 
criterion will be discussed in the next subsection. The goal of the theoretical correctness 
research is to determine which of the cases the evaluated protocol analysis system fits 
into through research done by the evaluator. Each of the testable protocol characteristics 
discussed in the Scope section are considered in the theoretical correctness research. The 
details about the research to be performed will be discussed in the METHODS section. 
 16 
b. Observed Correctness 
The observed correctness criterion is based on experimental results 
returned by the protocol analysis system. As with the theoretical correctness criterion, the 
list of testable protocol characteristics previously presented will each be tested by the 
evaluator. In the METHODS section we will discuss how to perform the testing. 
3. Performance 
In any system there exist a set of limited resources that are of concern to the users 
of the system. We present a set of performance criteria for resources whose scarcity are 
often of concern in computer systems and by protocol analysis system users. 
a. Execution Time 
System users often ask the question, “How long is it going to take for 
Process A to complete?” The execution time criterion partly answers this question. The 
execution time criterion encompasses only the time the protocol analysis system spends 
on analyzing a given protocol. The method for testing execution time will sufficiently 
address and account for the issues of variability in execution time and will be discussed 
with the other testing methods in the METHODS section. The execution time criterion 
does not include any installation time, setup time, user interaction time, or user analysis 
time. The installation and setup times are essentially one time occurrences and are not 
factored into the evaluation methodology. The user interaction and analysis times are 
more appropriate to include in as a Usability criterion and are discussed with other 
Usability criteria. 
b. Secondary Memory Requirement 
One of the more critical requirements that any computer program has is its 
secondary memory requirement, or the amount of hard disk space that the analysis system 
requires. The continual growth in storage capacity will not change the need to address 
secondary memory requirement concerns. The obvious unit to measure secondary 
memory requirements would be in bytes, as this is the standard unit of measure used in 
the computer industry as a whole. 
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c. Main Memory Requirement 
Another resource that is of concern in computer systems is main memory 
requirement, or RAM requirement. As with the secondary memory requirement criterion, 
the appropriate unit of measure for main memory requirement is the industry standard 
byte. 
4. Usability 
We will now discuss criteria that we categorize as usability criteria. Some of the 
usability criteria we present are objective in nature while others are subjective. The 
usability criteria we present go beyond the simple classification of text or graphical based 
systems; a user can be more productive with an effectively designed text based interface 
than a poorly designed graphical user interface. We present criteria that are based on 
functionality, errors counts, and lengths of time. These criteria evaluate a system better 
than a simple interface classification. 
We consider the first two usability criteria to be objective criteria and can be 
tested without the need for participants or test users. We consider the other six usability 
criteria subjective in nature and expect them to include participants in the testing 
methods. As before, we define the criteria here and present testing methods in the 
METHODS section. 
a. Automation 
Automation has been a part of computer systems since the introduction of 
batch programming. The problems solved by batch programming are not nearly as 
advanced as the problem of proving the security characteristics of a communications 
protocol, but none the less there are automated methods for proving such characteristics. 
The existence of automated protocol analysis systems validates the inclusion of the 
automation criterion. We consider three classes of automation: automated, automatable, 
and non-automatable. An automated system is a system that has an automated analysis 
mode built into the system by design. An automatable system is a system that does not 
have an automated analysis mode built in but the commands required to analyze a 
protocol could be automated a priori via a known automation tool. For example, if a 
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system required the same three steps to analyze any protocol but these steps are not 
automated within the analysis system and there exists a known tool to automate the steps 
then the protocol analysis system would be categorized as automatable4. Lastly, an 
analysis system that is not capable of being automated is categorized as non-automatable. 
b. Specification Comments 
Just as in computer code, comments are used inside a protocol 
specification to aid the reader in understanding. We consider three classes of comments: 
smart, flat, and unable. Smart comments are comments that have the ability to include 
links, such as hypertext, to information outside of the specification itself. Flat 
commenting systems are systems that do not afford the ability to include hot links within 
comments. A system that does not allow for any comments to be included in the 
specification classifies as unable. 
c. Syntax Errors During Protocol Specification 
The number of errors made while a protocol is being specified is 
indication of the usability of the system. We define syntax errors as syntactical errors that 
result from a user error while specifying the protocol. The exclusion of a semicolon at the 
end of a C++ statement is an example of a syntax error. The number of syntax errors is 
indicative of the analysis systems design to allow syntax errors to occur. The testing 
method for the syntax errors during protocol specification would need to address how this 
information is gathered in general for GUI and non-GUI analysis systems. 
d. Structural Errors During Protocol Specification 
The average programmer knows that just because a program compiles it 
does not mean that the program is correct; the same is true when specifying protocols. 
Just because an analysis system correctly parses a protocol specification does not mean 
that the protocol in question is correctly specified. A structural error is an error that 
results from the user specifying the protocol incorrectly. The number of structural errors 
is indicative of the analysis systems ability to support incorrectly specifying a protocol. 
                                                 
4 One such automation tool is Expect [LIBE1995]. 
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e. Specification Time 
Above we presented a performance criterion that is used to measure how 
long it takes the analysis system to complete the analysis of the protocol, however, there 
is more to protocol analysis than just the tasks performed for the analysis system. In order 
for the analysis system to perform its tasks it must first be provided with a protocol 
specification. The specification time criterion is the time it takes a user to specify a 
protocol. 
f. Results Analysis Time 
The final step in using a protocol analysis system is to review and 
understand the results returned by the analysis system. This is sometimes a trivial task 
and sometimes a daunting task. The results analysis time criterion is the time it takes a 
user to understand the results returned by the system. 
g. Participant Feedback 
Feedback from the analysis system user has the ability to provide insight 
of the system that might not be apparent through the other methodology criteria. The 
analysis system user is able to explain their reasoning and thought process. The opinions 
of the system users are of value. 
h. Experimenter Feedback 
Participant feedback itself does not fully capture the information pertinent 
to system evaluation. Including experimenter feedback allows for a more complete 
analysis of the system under evaluation. For instance, a participant might report that they 
did not feel any frustration when using the system; whereas the experimenter observed 
frustrated behavior from the participant. There are a few of reasons as to why the 
participant would not report the frustrated behavior. The participant might not have 
realized they were frustrated or might have merely forgotten to provide that feedback. 
Additionally, it is possible that the participant might have a bias towards the system under 
evaluation or the evaluator himself, and would curve their feedback accordingly. An 
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experimenter is able to provide another view of the situation through experimenter 
feedback. 
B. METHODS 
In this section we present the methods to be used to measure the previously 
defined evaluation criteria. The testing methods fall in one of two classes: research based, 
or experiment based. The research based testing methods all follow the same steps, which 
we will discuss in the next paragraph. The experiment based testing methods are unique 
to the criteria being tested and will be discussed in detail with the sub-section for the 
criteria. We end this section with a discussion of the test ordering. Before we begin our 
discussion of the testing methods we present the research based testing method that is 
used to test a number of criteria. 
Research based testing focuses on conducting a literature review; the goal of the 
literature review is to determine how the protocol analysis system fits the categories 
defined in the CRITERIA section. The first step in research based testing is to review the 
formal documentation provided by the developers for the analysis system. If a review of 
the formal documentation does not provide a clear determination as to how the analysis 
system should be categorized then the literature review will need to be expanded. The 
literature review should be expanded to include other scholarly articles and 
documentation not necessarily provided with the system. If an expanded literature review 
fails to produce a clear categorization, then as a last resort the protocol analysis system 
designers can be contacted5. If the system designers are unable to be contacted or are 
themselves unsure of how to categorize the analysis system, then the analysis system 
should be categorized with the lowest category6. For example, if the system could not be 
clearly categorized based on the literature review, the lowest category is unable, and the 
system designers cannot present a case as to why there system should be rated higher, 
then the system is categorized unable. Additionally, in a situation where information 
reviewed from one source conflicts with another the most current information should be 
used. 
                                                 
5 We use the term designer to include the original and current maintainers of the system. 
6 As discussed in the RATINGS AND WEIGHTS section. 
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With our discussion of the common testing methods complete we can now begin 
to discuss each testing method in more detail; we begin with pre-testing. 
1. Pre-Testing 
Before testing of protocol analysis systems can begin a test platform must be 
setup and configured. We consider pre-testing to include activities that occur before the 
testing methods of the evaluation methodology are conducted. The first step in pre-testing 
is to determine which protocol analysis systems are to be evaluated and determine their 
minimal requirements. This will lead the evaluator to a list of minimal requirements that 
the test platform(s) must meet in order to successfully complete the evaluation. Decisions 
such as which host operating systems the analysis system is designed for, minimal main 
memory requirements and minimal secondary memory requirements are representative 
minimal requirements that must be met by the test platform(s). If it is determined that 
multiple test platforms are needed to conduct the evaluation every feasible effort should 
be taken to mirror the test platform configurations7. Once it has been determined what 
components will make up the test platforms they can be purchased and assembled upon 
receipt. After the test platform and components have been assembled the operating 
systems can be installed and configured. The next step is to install and configure the 
protocol analysis systems that are to be evaluated. Finally, the system and analysis 
systems configurations must be recorded to facilitate analysis needs. Any issues or 
deviations from standard configurations should also be documented to facilitate analysis 
needs. The system and protocol analysis system configurations for our test platform are 
presented in APPENDIX A:. 
2. Scope Testing 
a. Type Support 
The testing method for the type support criterion follows the research 
based method. Each type in question is considered individually from the others. The goal 
                                                 
7 This has recently become an easier task as the Macintosh operating systems now run on x86 
architectures. 
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of the research is to determine the degree (native, non-native, or unable) in which the 
type is supported by the analysis system in question. 
b. Operation Support 
As with type support, the research based testing method is used for the 
operation support criterion. Each operation in question is considered individually from 
another. The goal of the research is to determine the degree in which (native, non-native, 
or unable) the type is supported by the analysis system in question. 
c. Session Type 
The testing method for the session type criterion also uses the research 
based method. The goal of the session type testing is to determine whether the protocol 
analysis system in question performs a fixed, bounded, or infinite state analysis. 
d. Theoretical Testable Protocol Characteristics 
The theoretical testable protocol characteristics criterion uses the research 
based testing method. As with the type support criterion, each of the testable protocol 
characteristics is considered separately. The goal of the research is determine the degree 
(native, non-native, or unable) in which that a characteristic is able to be tested by the 
analysis system. 
3. Correctness Testing 
a. Theoretical Correctness 
As expected based on the name, the theoretical correctness criterion 
follows the research based testing method. The goal of the theoretical correctness testing 
research is to determine which of the eight cases from Table 1 the protocol analysis tool 
fits in for each of the testable protocol characteristics. If the scope research determined 
that the analysis system does not test for the characteristic in question then the lowest 
rating is used8. 
                                                 
8 As discussed in the RATINGS AND WEIGHTS section. 
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b. Observed Correctness 
As with the theoretical correctness criterion, the goal of the observed 
correctness criterion is to determine which of the eight cases from Table 1 the protocol 
analysis tool fits in for each of the testable protocol characteristics. The observed 
correctness results are based on experiments rather than research. There are two 
additional points that must be discussed in regards to the observed correctness criterion: 
which protocols to implement, and how to comprise a single criterion rating for the 
analysis system. We present a set of three protocols that form the basis of determining the 
observed correctness criterion rating for a protocol analysis system. Each of the protocols 
should be implemented and run within the protocol analysis system; we discuss the rates 
for the correctness criteria in the RATINGS AND WEIGHTS section. In this evaluation 
methodology we implement the Needham-Schroeder [NEED1978], Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe [LOWE1996], and Kerberos communication protocols [RFC4120]. The Needham-
Schroeder protocol was chosen to test the analysis system for the possibility of a false 
positive9. The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol was chosen to test whether the 
analysis system can prove that a two principal communication is secure, and to see if the 
analysis system can handle asymmetric cryptography. The Kerberos protocol was chosen 
to test the ability of the analysis system to handle a client-server protocol as well 
symmetric cryptography. 
There are various ways in which results from the implemented protocols 
could be combined to determine a single observed correctness criterion rating. We use a 
minimum function to calculate the observed correctness result for a protocol analysis 
system under evaluation. The inputs to the minimum function are the cases from Table 1 
that are determined for each of the implemented protocols based on the results returned 
from the analysis system. The output from the function is the case with the lowest 
rating10. The use of the minimum function assigns the lowest observed rating to the 
protocol analysis system, which is consistent with the need to make sound decisions. 
                                                 
9 The Needham-Schroeder protocol is known to be flawed [LOWE1996] and is therefore a suitable 
choice to test for the possibility of a false-positive. 
10 As discussed in the RATINGS AND WEIGHTS section. 
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4. Performance Testing 
In this section we present the testing methods for performance criteria; the 
methods we present are for our POSIX based test platform11. When other platform types 
are used in future evaluation these testing methods will need to be adapted and validated 
on other types of platforms. Such adaptations can be performed by the evaluators; we 
present a method for enacting such adaptations in the METHODOLOGY 
ADAPTATIONS section. 
a. Execution Time 
We mentioned when defining the execution time criterion that it was an 
imperfect unit of measure and that the variability of the measurements must be accounted 
for. This is done by running 51 trials; 51 trials were chosen based on the need to use a 
Gosset t model for data analysis12. The time tool is used to gather timing data13. If a trial 
took longer than 60 hours to complete the trial is terminated and the value of 60 hours is 
used. Execution time data should be gathered for each of the implemented protocols (NS, 
NSL, and Kerberos). 
The systems tested already had automated modes of operation and did not 
require the use of automating tools such as Expect [LIBE1995]. If any of the systems to 
be tested and compared require the use of an automating tool then all the systems must be 
run under the same automating tool. Otherwise it would be inappropriate to compare data 
between systems that are not run under the automating tool and those that are. 
b. Secondary Memory Requirement 
The ls tool is used to gather secondary memory requirement data14. Data 
from the main directory and all subdirectories is gathered and totaled. 
                                                 
11 APPENDIX A: lists our test platform specifications in detail. 
12 The use of the Gosset t model will be further discussed in the RATINGS AND WEIGHTS 
section. 
13 The scripts used to gather the timing data are included in APPENDIX B:. 
14 The scripts used to gather the timing data are included in APPENDIX B:. 
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c. Main Memory Requirement 
The time tool is also used to gather main memory requirement data15. As 
with the execution time criterion, 51 trials were run as the Gosset t model is again used 
for data analysis. Additionally, data is collected for each of the implemented protocols. 
5. Usability Testing 
The Usability criteria consist of criteria that are purely objective and others that 
incorporate a due amount of subjectivity. As such there are two distinct types of testing 
methods presented, one for the objective criteria and another for the subjective criteria. 
a. Automation 
The automation criterion is an objective usability criterion that is suitable 
for testing via the research testing method. The goal of the automation research is to 
determine which of the automation categories the system under evaluation falls into. 
b. Specification Comments 
The question as to the kinds of comments allowed in the protocol 
specifications can also be answered via the research based testing method. As expected, 
the goal of specification comments research is to determine which type of comments the 
analysis system allows. 
c. Subjective Usability Criteria 
Instead of a detailed description of the testing methods for the subjective 
usability criteria we discuss some of the issues that should be addressed when the 
usability tests are designed and present our general ideas of how the testing could be 
conducted. Designing detailed subjective testing methods was beyond the scope of this 
project and should not be taken lightly. 
The first issue that we discuss is determining the participant classes that 
are to be used in the testing methods. The needs of the evaluator will play a part in 
determining which class of participants should be used in testing methods. For instance, 
                                                 
15 The scripts used to gather the timing data are included in APPENDIX B:. 
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if an educator is evaluating analysis systems to determine which system is best suited for 
classroom laboratory exercises, a “novice” participant class might be appropriate. On the 
other hand, a communications system manager would not be expected to assign the task 
of analyzing protocols to “novices,” and would instead use a participant class with a level 
of experience closer to the analyzers of his communications system. 
The human nature of the participants appropriately limits the usability 
testing methods to be non-destructive in nature [NIEL1993]. Destructive test methods are 
commonly applied to hardware products, for example drop testing a laptop. The use of 
test participants prohibits the use of such destructive testing methods. Although protocol 
analysis has caused headaches in its own right, we do not expect there to be an issue in 
designing non-destructive testing methods. Nielsen points out guidelines that should be 
followed when conducting user testing. 
As with participants there are various levels of expertise in experimenters. 
The testing methods need to account for the experience of the experimenters. The 
experimenters should be familiar with not only the testing methods but also the analysis 
system(s) being tested. Nielsen points out that extensive system knowledge is necessary 
because the experimenter needs to understand what participants are doing while they are 
using the system. This knowledge allows the experimenter to make reasonable inferences 
about the users. 
Perhaps the most significant non-human elements of the usability testing 
are the test tasks. The tasks must be designed to meet a number of criteria. Again, the test 
tasks must be non-destructive. The instructions for the tasks should be clear enough for 
the participants to understand them. A number of participants not understanding a task is 
indicative of an unclear task. Unclear tasks will require the participants to seek the help 
of the experimenter. This has two negative effects; 1. The participant will begin to feel 
frustrated, and 2. The results will begin to be for the experimenter and not the participant. 
The tasks need to be appropriately sized as well. The tasks should be small enough to be 
completed in the allotted time, but not too small as to be trivial [NIEL1993]. Nielsen 
stresses that the first task should be simple enough for any novice user to complete, thus 
raising the confidence of and relieving tension in the participant. 
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Nielsen points out and discusses four typical stages of usability testing: 
preparation, introduction, testing, debriefing. The preparation stage is similar in concept 
to the pre-testing we previously discussed. In the preparation stage the test room and 
equipment is prepared. The evaluator and experimenters also review the testing methods, 
system(s) to be evaluated, and discuss any concerns they might have. After the testing 
environment has been prepared the experimenters can begin the introduction. In the 
introduction the experimenters will cover the concepts of the tests with the participants. 
After all concerns of the participants have been addressed, the actual testing can begin. 
Once the testing has completed the participants and experimenters should be debriefed 
and given a chance to provide feedback. 
The last significant topic that is appropriate to discuss is the feedback 
mechanism for both the experimenters and participants. There are two main ways in 
which feedback can be provided: questionnaires, and interviews. Questionnaires and 
interviews indirectly test the analysis system, meaning that questionnaires and interviews 
focus on the opinions of the participants [NIEL1993]. This is contrary to the direct testing 
methods presented for the scope, correctness, and performance criteria that focus on the 
analysis system itself. Both questionnaires and interviews allow the evaluators to get 
feedback from the participants. A key issue in using questionnaires or interviews in an 
evaluation methodology is that the questions must be determined and standardized before 
hand. This does not mean that open ended questions cannot not be included in either a 
questionnaire or interview session. This does, however, mean that exploratory interviews 
should not be used; i.e., the interviewer should have a list of questions that should be 
discussed in the interview session, as opposed to beginning the interview without 
knowing what the interviewer is looking for. 
6. Post-Testing 
After all of the testing methods have been completed the next step is to determine 
the overall score for the system under evaluation. This is accomplished by inputting the 
results from the run testing methods into the overall weighting function. The overall 
weighting function will be further discussed in the RATINGS AND WEIGHTS section 
but it is sufficient at this point to mention that the function returns the overall evaluation 
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result, a numerical score, for the protocol analysis system under evaluation. Afterwards 
the returned evaluation can be analyzed. As with any analysis the more data that is 
collected increases the value of the analysis performed. Analyzing the results for a single 
system will provide valuable analysis for that specific system. When the evaluation 
results from multiple systems are compared, the analysis performed can provide even 
greater value to the evaluator. The final step in the evaluation process is a feedback loop, 
where the evaluation analysis serves as a means to adapt the analysis systems to better 
address the needs of the evaluator. A newly adapted analysis system can then be 
evaluated again to see the results of the system designers’ efforts. 
7. Test Ordering 
We now present order in which to run the evaluation testing methods. Figure 4 
depicts the required test ordering. There are only two requirements that the test ordering 
must meet. The first is that the pre-testing must occur before the criteria testing methods 
and before the post-testing. The second requirement is that the post-testing must be 
performed after the pre-testing and after the criteria testing methods. The specific 
ordering of the criteria test methods is left up to the evaluator. The lack of strict ordering 
requirements allows the evaluator to order the tests based on the situational needs. Figure 
4 also shows that the criteria tests can be run in parallel. 
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Figure 4: Required Testing Order 
Figure 5 presents a recommended testing order. The order presented in Figure 5 
meets the two test ordering requirements. We recommend that the research based testing 
methods be performed the experiment based testing methods. Performing the research 
based testing methods before the experiment based testing methods gives the evaluator a 
better understanding of what to expect when running the experiment based tests. For 
example, through research an evaluator could determine that the class of protocols that 
the analysis system halts on is unknown. This information could be used by the evaluator 
to help determine whether the system is taking a long time to complete the analysis or 
that the system will likely not halt. The ordering within in the research and experiment 
based boxes in Figure 5 are also recommendations; i.e., it is recommended that the 
experiment based correctness and performance testing be completed for usability testing. 
As before, this ordering allows for insight during the usability testing derived from the 



















Figure 5: Recommended Testing Order 
C. RATINGS AND WEIGHTS 
The weights and ratings that make up any evaluation methodology are arguably 
the most interesting and contested. The ratings are the schemes used within each of the 
criteria. The weights are used in the overall weighting function to stress the importance of 
certain criteria over other criteria. The CRITERIA and METHODS sections were 
objective in nature, whereas this section is subjective in nature. The ratings and weights 
we present here are an example tailored to the needs a communications system manager. 
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The ratings and weights can be tailored to better meet the needs of a different evaluator16. 
For instance, the ratings and weights can be tailored to meet the needs of an educator 
interesting in using protocol analysis systems in a classroom laboratory setting. The 
ability to tailor the evaluation methodology to the needs of the evaluator is one of the key 
aspects of this evaluation methodology. 
In this section we first present the rating system that we used within each 
criterion. We then present the weight that we assigned to each criterion to determine our 
overall evaluation result of the protocol analysis system. 
Table 2 depicts the rating order and the point values associated with a rate for 
criteria that use a rating system as a scoring mechanism17. 
Rating Ordering Point Value 
High Highest 9 
Medium  3 
Low  1 
Unacceptable Lowest -1 
Table 2: Criterion Rating 
The immediate question that arises is how the point values listed were chosen. 
The ordering of the point values is not likely to be questioned as the highest order rating 
also has the highest associated point value and the lowest ordered rating has the lowest 
associated point value. It is interesting to note that the unacceptable rate is assigned a 
negative point value; this not only penalizes an analysis system for an unacceptable 
rating but opens the possibility for an analysis system to achieve an overall negative 
score. The point values are derived from the Quality Function Deployment (QFD) 
concept [HJOR1992], where the point values 9, 3, and 1 are used. QFD is a design 
process whose goal is to incorporate the needs of the customer throughout the product 
design process. The criteria of an evaluation methodology can be viewed as the “what’s” 
of QFD planning matrices, such as House of Quality (HoQ) diagrams. The ratings used 
                                                 
16 Tailoring the ratings and weights used in the evaluation methodology is considered an 
adaptation to the methodology, and is discussed more in the METHODOLOGY ADAPTATIONS section. 
17 These point values were chosen before any testing methods were run or results analyzed. 
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can be thought of as the corresponding “how’s.” Incorporating concepts such as QFD into 
the design of an evaluation methodology extend the usefulness of the methodology. We 
intend this evaluation methodology to not only be used by users of protocol analysis 
systems but also by the protocol analysis system designers. Showing how this evaluation 
methodology can be mapped to QFD concepts can aid developers in understanding how 
to better design protocol analysis systems to meet the needs of the analyzer. 
1. Scope 
a. Type Support 
Table 3 presents our example rates associated with the classifications for 
types supported by analysis systems. A type that is natively supported by a protocol 
analysis system is rated high because of the minimal effort required to implement 
concepts that require the use of the type in question. A non-natively supported type is 
rated medium due to the increased effort that is required to implement concepts that 
require the type in question. If a type is unable to be supported in a protocol analysis 
system a low rating is assigned. As previously mentioned, each type is considered 
individually; the weightings used between criteria will be discussed later in Section 
III.C.5 Overall Weightings. 




Table 3: System Type Support Criterion Rating 
b. Operation Support 
The example operation support rating system mirrors the type support 
rating system as depicted in Table 4. The reasoning behind the operation support ratings 
is the same as those presented for the type support rating system. 
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Table 4: System Operation Support Criterion Rating 
c. Session Type 
Table 5 presents the example rating system for the session type criterion. A 
system that supports infinite sessions has the possibility to explore more states than either 
a bounded or fixed analysis system. Similarly, a bounded system has the possibility to 
explore more states than a fixed protocol analysis system. The ratings in Table 5 reflect 
the above statements. 




Table 5: System Session Type Criterion Rating 
d. Theoretical Testable Protocol Characteristics 
The rating system employed for the testable protocol characteristic 
criterion is similar to the other criteria that use the native, non-native, and unable classes. 
The same reasoning presented in the type support rating system discussion applies to the 
example theoretical testable protocol characteristics rating system depicted in Table 6. 




Table 6: System Theoretical Testable Protocol Characteristics Criterion Rating 
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2. Correctness 
The correctness of an algorithm is often its most important characteristic. It is 
often the case that an algorithm will not be used if it is found to be flawed. However, our 
example evaluation rating scheme does allow for the acceptance of a system with the 
presence of flaws. Table 7 summarizes the approach taken by our example 
communications system manager evaluator; this approach is the basis for both the 
theoretical and observed correctness criteria. As a reminder, the testing methods 
presented in the METHODS section assigned the lowest rating based on the results of the 




























Table 7: System Correctness Criterion Rating 
Any scenario that has the potential to lead a manager to an unsafe decision is 
deemed unacceptable and the protocol analysis system will be penalized in this 
evaluation. It is clear that regardless of who is using the protocol analysis system or for 
what purposes, a system that returns a false positive is unacceptable, as depicted in Table 
7. A false positive from an analysis system could lead the communications system 
manager to make an unsafe decision, which is a direct contradiction of the responsibility 
of a manager. A case that is also grounds for giving the analysis system an “unacceptable” 
correctness rating is if the system, through the evaluation, is determined to fit the N-I 
case from Table 1. This situation also has the possibility of leading the manager to make 
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an unsafe decision and is thus rated accordingly. The N-I case is similar to the S-I case, in 
that the analysis system fails to identify a known flaw in the protocol. The lack of 
identifying a flaw in the N-I case will not lead the manager away from making an unsafe 
decision. 
A protocol analysis system is assigned a low rating if it is determined by the 
testing method to fit in the N-S case. Analysis systems that fit this scenario will not lead 
to an unsafe decision but will not aid in the decision making process either. This point is 
an area in which this rating system may differ from a rating system designed to meet the 
needs of a different evaluator. By focusing on the managers view this rating system 
favors systems that aid in the decision making process, over absolute correctness. The 
“medium” correctness criteria rate is evidence of this fact. 
An analysis system is assigned a medium correctness rating if the testing method 
determines that the analysis system fits into IO-I or IO-S case. As previously mentioned 
the IO-S case could be a false negative. The “medium” rating of a system that has been 
determined to allow for false negatives is another point in which this rating system may 
differ from schemes designed for other evaluators. From the decision making perspective 
a false negative will not lead to an unsafe decision and therefore a system that fits this 
category will not be penalized by this methodology. On the other hand, the fact that the 
analysis system does not provide any amplifying information limits the use of a higher 
rating. 
The final correctness criteria rating a protocol analysis system can achieve is 
“high.” This is achieved when the methodology determines that the analysis system fits in 
any of the IW-I, IW-S, or S-S cases. In the IW-I case the protocol analysis system 
correctly identifies the protocol as insecure and provides amplifying information as to 
why the protocol is insecure, thus greatly aiding in the decision making process. As 
mentioned in the CRITERIA section, the IW-S case provides information that is not only 
pertinent to the evaluator (communications system manager in our case) but to the 
protocol analysis community in general. In the S-S case the analysis system correctly 
identifies the protocol is secure, again aiding in the decision making process. 
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3. Performance 
a. Execution Time 
Before we can discuss the rating system used for the execution time 
criterion we must first address the variability of the data collected by the testing method. 
In Figure 6 we present the formula used to determine the high end (CI+), or longest 
running time, of the 95% confidence interval. Our rating system first uses statistics 
(Gosset’s t model) to place an upper-bound on the mean execution time, then translates 
this upper-bound into a rating. Gosset’s t model was chosen over other models because 
the actual population mean is not known; instead only a sample mean is available. 
Gosset’s t model appropriately accounts for the variability that occurs between separate 
trials. The high value (CI+) was chosen as there is only a 2.5% chance that the actual 
population mean will be above the calculated high value. The value for tα was retrieved 
from a standard statistics table in [DEVE2005], and correlates to a 95% confidence 
interval based on the number of trials (n) ran in the test method. The sample mean is 
denoted by X  and is the average of the trial data, each trial is represented as iX . The SE 
function is known as the standard error function. The s formula is the standard formula 













































Figure 6: System Execution Time CI+ Calculation 
With an understanding of how variability in execution time was accounted 
for we can now discuss the rating system for the execution time criterion. The rating 
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system used is similar to rating systems used for other criteria; the difference is that there 
are more ratings used, as evident in Table 8. The CI+ value serves as the input into the 
execution time rating system. In general, the time intervals are based on common office 
time intervals; these time intervals are consistent with the needs of our example 
evaluator, the communications system manager. The high rating is along the lines of a trip 
to the coffee machine or a stretch break. The medium-high rating is equivalent to a lunch 
break or meeting. The medium value is equivalent to a half-day. The medium-low rating 
is representative of a process that is run overnight. The low rating is the time frame of a 
process that is allowed to run over the weekend. If an analysis system fails to return 
results or takes longer than 60 hours to return results a nil rating is assigned. 
CI+ Execution Time Rating Point Value 
CI+ < 5 min High 9 
5 <= CI+ < 60 min Medium-High 5 
1 hr <= CI+ < 4 hr Medium 3 
4 hr <= CI+ < 12 hr Medium-Low 2 
12 hr <= CI+ < 60 hr Low 1 
CI+ >= 60 hr Nil 0 
Table 8: System Execution Time Criterion Rating 
b. Secondary Memory Requirement 
In Table 9 we present the protocol analysis system Secondary Memory 
Requirement (SMR) criterion ratings. The data collected from the testing method is 
summed to form a grand total SMR value. Regardless of storage capacity, systems that 
require less main memory are preferred to those that require greater main memory 
requirements. As main memory storage capacity increases it is likely that the boundary 
values used as separation points between the ratings will increase, we discuss these and 
other criteria adaptations in the METHODOLOGY ADAPTATIONS section. The main 
memory requirement rating divisions are based on current day disk storage sizes. 
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Secondary Memory Requirement (SMR) Rating 
 MMR < 512 MB High 
512 MB <= MMR < 1024 MB Medium 
MMR >= 1024 MB Low 
Table 9: System Secondary Memory Requirement Criterion Rating 
c. Main Memory Requirement 
The same equations and values used for the execution time criterion used 
for the execution time criterion are used for the main memory requirement. This is 
because the Gosset t model was again needed to account for the variability between the 
trials, and the same number of trials was run for the two criteria. The obvious exception is 
that the maximum memory usage data served as the Xi values, as opposed to the 
execution time data. 
Table 10 presents the boundary values and associated rates for a protocol 
analysis system’s main memory requirements. As with the secondary memory 
requirement criteria systems that have lower main memory requirements are rated higher 
than those with greater main memory requirements. As with the secondary memory 
requirement the boundary values presented in Table 10 are expected to be adjusted as the 
storage capacity of main memory shifts over time. The rating divisions for the main 
memory requirement are based on current day common DIMM sizes. If the analysis 
system must be stopped before the protocol analysis completes then the lowest rating 
should be used, and “Failed to Halt” should be used in data reports. 
Main Memory Requirement (MMR) Rating 
SMR < 512 MB High 
512 MB <= SMR < 1024 MB Medium 
SMR >= 1024 MB Low 




Table 11 lists the rating system for the automation criteria. An automated 
analysis system is desired by many users in the protocol analysis field, to include a 
communications system administrator. An analysis system that is automated is given a 
high rating. A protocol analysis system that is automatable is given a medium rating. 





Table 11: System Automation Criterion Rating 
b. Specification Comments 
In Table 12 we present the specification comments criterion rating scheme. 
Smart comments provide greater functionality than flat comments and are rated higher 
than flat comments. Similarly, flat comments provide commenting functions that are not 
present in systems without commenting features. Therefore, smart comments, flat 
comments, and no comments are assigned the ratings of high, medium, and low 
respectively. 
Specification Comment Type Rating 
Smart Comments High 
Flat Comments Medium 
No Comments Low 
Table 12: System Specification Comments Criterion Rating 
c. Subjective Usability Criteria 
At this point in our research we do not have enough material to discuss 
rating systems for the subjective usability criteria. Specifically, more can be said about 
the subjective criteria rating systems once the testing methods are presented in a more 
formal manner. 
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5. Overall Weightings 
Now that we have discussed the individual rating system used by each of the 
criteria the manner in which the overall score is determined can be discussed. The 
weightings used between the criteria serve as a way to signify which criteria are more 
important to the evaluator than others. It is important to note that extensive gathering and 
compiling of data before the overall weightings are defined leaves the weightings open to 
excessive bias. It is very hard to remove all bias from an evaluation especially in regards 
to the weightings used between criteria. Defining the weightings after significant data are 
gathered or any data are analyzed results in a higher probability of injecting bias into the 
evaluation than is necessary. If such an action were to take place the weightings would 
need to be thoroughly reviewed and determined to be unbiased. We realize that some 
degree of testing and prototyping is necessary in any project, and that such actions risk 
introducing bias into the project. We took great measures during the prototyping of the 
methodology in order to limit bias. For example, we did not perform any data analysis 
until after the overall weightings had been determined. Additionally, during the design of 
the document ultimately used to track evaluation data, dummy values were used instead 
of actual test data. Further, the experimental testing methods were validated on an earlier 
version of CPSA than was used in the evaluation18. 
We present the discussion of the overall weightings by the criteria categories; the 
weightings discussed are used in a collective manner to weight all the evaluation criteria 
amongst them selves. Our example weightings are based on the needs of a 
communications system manager. The discussions are presented in the same order in 
which the criteria were previously presented. Each criterion is independently assigned a 
weighting factor; the score for each criterion is calculated by multiplying the weighting 
factor by the associated rating factor discussed previously. The scores for the criteria are 
summed together to make the overall evaluation result of the evaluation methodology. 
The low and high scores are easily calculated and serve as basis points to be used by the 
evaluator. Inputting the high rating point values for all criteria into the overall weighting 
                                                 
18 CPSA v0.70 was used in the validation of the experimental testing methods, whereas CPSA 
v0.81 was used in the actual evaluation process. 
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function results in a maximum achievable score, our values result in a maximum score of 
1962. Inputting the low rating point values into the overall weighting function results in a 
minimum score, our values result in a minimum score of 81. 
a. Scope Criteria Weightings 
Table 13 presents the weighting assignments for the scope criteria. The 
scope criteria address the fundamental capabilities of a protocol analysis system. Thus, in 
general the scope criteria are assigned high weighting factors by our example evaluator. 
The value of a protocol analysis system is highly dependent on the class of 
protocols that can be specified in the system. The types and operations that are available 
in the analysis system are directly correlated to the ability to specify a protocol in the 
system. In practice there are types and operations that can be used to simulate other types 
and operations. The types and operations that are weighted with a 9 are crucial to being 
able to specify even the most basic protocols. The types and operations with a 3 are 
typically implemented through the user of other types and operations, such as those 
weighted with a 9. The types and operations weighted with a 1 can also be implemented 
through the use of other types and operations. Again, these weightings are based on the 
needs of a communications system manager. 
The type of session that is supported by the analysis system plays a large 
role in the depth of analysis that the system performs. Therefore, the session type is given 
a weighting factor of 9. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this work, we are interested in protocol 
analysis systems designed to analyze the security characteristics of communication 
protocols. Confidentiality, integrity, and authentication are the three security 
characteristics that security protocols address; and are therefore weighted with a 9. The 
concept of non-repudiation is addressed by some protocols in some fashion, but not to an 
extent that the full definition of non-repudiation is achieved. The current lack of protocols 
that attempt to meet the full definition of non-repudiation limited us to weight non-
repudiation at 3, as opposed to a higher value. Security protocols rely on low layer 
protocols to address availability; for example, the Kerberos protocol is implemented on 
TCP/IP based networks throughout the world. Since security protocols are not designed 
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to address availability concerns the availability criteria is weighted low, a 1. The round 
efficiency criterion is also weighted with a 1, this is due to the general lack of concern in 
regards to how round efficient protocols are. Saul points out that protocol efficiency has 
not been an issue of great concern due to the small number of steps in communication 
protocols and a communications system manager is not overly concerned with the 




Type Support - 
 Message 9 
 Principal 9 
 Nonce 9 
 Timestamp 3 
 Symmetric Cryptographic Key 9 
 Asymmetric Cryptographic Keys 9 
 Symmetric MAC 3 
 Text 3 
 Number 1 
Operation Support - 
 Symmetric Cryptography 9 
 Symmetric MAC Generation/Verification 3 
 Asymmetric Encryption/Decryption 9 
 Asymmetric Signature/Verification 3 
 Hashing 9 
 Addition 3 
 Concatenation 3 
Session Type 9 
Theoretical Testable Protocol Characteristics - 
 Confidentiality 9 
 Integrity 9 
 Authentication 9 
 Availability 1 
 Non-repudiation 3 
 Round Efficiency 1 
Table 13: Scope Criteria Overall Weightings 
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b. Correctness Criteria Weightings 
The overall weightings for the correctness criteria are presented in Table 
14. The correctness weightings are the same as the theoretical testable protocol 
characteristics, and follow the same reasoning. 
Criteria Weighting 
Theoretical Correctness - 
 Confidentiality 9 
 Integrity 9 
 Authentication 9 
 Availability 1 
 Non-repudiation 3 
 Round Efficiency 1 
Observed Correctness - 
 Confidentiality 9 
 Integrity 9 
 Authentication 9 
 Availability 1 
 Non-repudiation 3 
 Round Efficiency 1 
Table 14: Correctness Criteria Overall Weightings 
c. Performance Criteria Weightings 
Table 15 depicts the overall weightings for the performance criteria. The 
performance criteria of greatest interest to our example evaluator are the execution time 
criteria. However, when compared to the other criteria of the evaluation methodology the 
execution time criteria are only weighted with the moderate factor of 3, because analysis 
system execution time is not the primary concern of a communications system manager. 
The memory requirement criteria are of even lower concern to the communications 
system manager. As the capacity of memory increases and the price per GB decreases the 
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memory requirements of software becomes less important. The current capacities and 
prices are already at levels that warrant the low weighting factor we use. 
Criteria Weighting 
Execution Time - 
 NS Protocol 3 
 NSL Protocol 3 
 Kerberos Protocol 3 
Secondary Memory Requirement 1 
Main Memory Requirement - 
 NS Protocol 1 
 NSL Protocol 1 
 Kerberos Protocol 1 
Table 15: Performance Criteria Overall Weightings 
d. Usability Criteria Weightings 
The objective usability criteria weightings are presented in Table 16. Both 
are given a moderate weighting value of 3. We agree that the usability of any system is 




Specification Comments 3 
Table 16: Objective Usability Criteria Overall Weightings 
D. METHODOLOGY ADAPTATIONS 
As previously mentioned, the components of the evaluation methodology were 
presented in a modular manner in part to facilitate adaptations to the methodology. In this 
section we will discuss some of the adaptations that we have envisioned. We agree that 
there are valid reasons for adapting the methodology beyond the ones we discuss here. 
Any adaptation to the evaluation methodology should be appropriately documented. 
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1. Criteria 
In the criteria section we presented a set of criteria and discussed why they are 
appropriate to evaluate protocol analysis systems. We understand that the set presented 
might not address all of the interests of every evaluator. Additionally, we expect that 
future protocol analysis systems will require more or different criteria to best evaluate 
and compare analysis systems. 
The first step in adding a criterion to the evaluation methodology is to review the 
current criteria in the evaluation methodology. This review serves two purposes. The first 
is to ensure that the proposed new criterion is not already included in the methodology as 
a single criterion. This relates back to the concept that each criterion be independent of 
others. Secondly, the review serves to determine if the data already gathered for multiple 
criteria in the evaluation methodology can be combined to answer the question posed by 
the proposed criterion. 
Once it has been determined that there is a need for the proposed criterion it can 
be determined in which category that the new criterion belongs in. It is possible that the 
new criterion will require the addition of a new criteria category; we will discuss the 
adding of a criteria category later. After the new criterion has been placed in the 
appropriate category the testing methods can be determined for the desired test platforms. 
The order in relation to other testing methods that the new testing method should be run 
in must also be determined. There might not be a specific point in the overall evaluation 
that the new testing method should be run. 
There is one more area that must be addressed before the new criterion can be 
added to the evaluation methodology. Before the new criterion can be added the rating 
mechanism for the criterion must be defined. Additionally, the criterion must be weighted 
in the overall weighting function. 
After the weightings have been defined the new criterion can now be used in the 
evaluation methodology. If the new criterion is truly independent of the other criteria then 
the entire methodology does not need to be rerun on already evaluated protocol analysis 
systems. Instead, only the method pertinent to the new criterion needs to be run. The data 
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collected from previous evaluations can be used to determine the new overall evaluation 
that includes the weighting method with the new criterion. 
Adding a new criteria category is not nearly as involved as the addition of a new 
criterion, as the adding of a new category is more of an administrative task. However, 
there is still a procedure to follow. Just as with adding a new criterion, the first step in 
adding a new criteria category is to review the evaluation methodology. The reason for 
this review is to determine whether the topic that the new category is to encompass is not 
already covered by another category. Once it has been determined that there is a need for 
the proposed category the category is added to the evaluation methodology. The adding 
of a new category to the evaluation methodology is mainly an organization issue, so the 
documentation that discusses how to perform the methodology should be updated to 
include the new methodology. 
2. Methods 
There are three adaptations that we envision regarding the testing methods. The 
first two involve the testing methods themselves; the third involves the order in which the 
methods are performed. We will discuss all three in this section. 
The first adaptation we envision is the adapting of the testing methods to other 
platforms. The testing methods that are likely candidates for this type of modification are 
the performance criteria testing methods. In this project we presented POSIX based 
testing methods for the criteria. Specifically, our testing methods were run on a Fedora 
Core 5™ based platform19. Minor adaptations to the methods we presented in the 
METHODS section might need to be made if another POSIX operating system is used. It 
is likely that more than minor adaptations will be needed if the testing methods are ported 
to a completely different platform, such as an Alpha based platform. Minor adaptations 
should not require modifications to other parts of the evaluation methodology. The first 
step in adapting a testing method is to review the testing method being ported to 
understand what the method is providing and how the method works. This review should 
help in the design of the adapted testing method. The next step is to review the 
                                                 
19 The specific details about the test platform configuration are presented in APPENDIX A:. 
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functionality that is present on the new test platform, in order to see how the testing 
method could be implemented on the new platform. After the initial reviewing is done the 
draft version of the testing method can be constructed. The draft version of the testing 
method should then be reviewed, tested for correctness, and modified as needed. Once 
the adapted method is stable it can then be incorporated into the evaluation methodology. 
The second reason we envision for adapting a testing method is more general than 
adapting the method for a different platform. The testing method itself can be modified 
for a number of valid reasons. A likely reason that a testing method would be altered is if 
a better method to gather the data required by the criterion is found. An example would 
be to use a resource analysis tool that provides better data than the currently used tool. 
Changing the manner in which the usability criteria are evaluated, such as changing from 
the use of a questionnaire to using observing proctors, is a specific example of a 
modification that fits the second reason. It is possible that a modification of this nature 
will require changes to other parts of the evaluation methodology, such as a change in the 
order the testing methods are performed. A testing method modification might also 
require a modification to the rating mechanism for the criterion, which we will discuss in 
the next section. As with the other modifications discussed the first step is to review the 
current testing method to see what portions of the method need to be modified. It is 
possible that some portions of the testing method might not need to be changed. If 
appropriate, the functionality of the test platform should also be reviewed to determine 
how to best implement the new testing method. The next step is to construct a draft 
version of the new testing method. Before the new test method is incorporated into the 
evaluation methodology it should be reviewed, tested for correctness, and modified as 
needed. The order of the testing methods should also be reviewed to determine if there is 
a more appropriate testing order given the incorporation of the new testing method. 
Lastly, an update to an existing test method is not the only reason that the testing 
order might be modified. Logistical reasons or other limiting factors might justify a 
modification to the order in which the testing methods are run. We presented a nominal 
testing order that is flexible enough to allow for a variety of specific testing orders. If a 
one-time modification to the testing order is made in an evaluation session then it is 
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sufficient to note the modification in the report of the evaluation results. In the case of a 
permanent modification to the testing order more effort is required. As with other 
modifications discussed the first step is to review the current testing order described by 
the evaluation methodology to determine if the proposed permanent adaptation is needed 
or a one time adjustment is appropriate. If it is determined that the new order is needed a 
draft version of the new ordering should be produced next. The draft ordering should then 
be reviewed, tested for correctness, and modified as needed. Finally, the new test 
ordering can be implemented into the evaluation methodology. 
3. Ratings and Weights 
The most interesting and powerful adaptations to the evaluation methodology will 
likely occur within the weights and ratings. The ability to adapt this methodology to best 
suit the needs of the evaluator is one of the key strengths of this evaluation methodology. 
We will first discuss why and how the criteria ratings can be modified and then discuss 
why and how the overall weightings can be modified. 
We previously mentioned that the rating mechanism of a criterion should be 
reviewed when the testing method is modified. We envision another reason for modifying 
ratings and a way to compare previously collected evaluation data with new evaluation 
data. The most likely reason for criteria rating modifications, specifically performance 
criteria, is the passing of time. We mentioned that there will always be a limiting of 
resources that a computer system must conform to. However, these limits continue to be 
increased so the rating mechanisms of today might not be suitable in the future. For 
example, we presented a boundary of 1 GB in the main memory requirement criterion, in 
five years it is likely that a 1 GB boundary will be too low. Instead of using the older 
rating limits the limits should and can be updated. As expected the first step in modifying 
a rating mechanism is to review the current rating mechanism. The purpose of this is to 
determine what modifications are needed before the draft version of the new rating 
mechanism is produced. The draft version can then be reviewed, tested for correctness, 
and adjusted as needed. Finally, the new rating mechanism can be incorporated into the 
evaluation methodology. In the main memory example we presented above it would 
likely be the case that data used in an older version of the rating mechanism could be 
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used in the new rating mechanism without the need to run the test method again. The old 
data would simply serve as an input to the new rating mechanism and the overall 
evaluation of the protocol analysis system updated as well. This provides a clear way to 
compare earlier data to newer data, where the most current and same rating mechanisms 
are used on all data and the testing methods are not unnecessarily rerun for older data. 
The ability to modify the overall weightings of the evaluation methodology 
allows the methodology to be adapted to the needs of a wide variety of evaluators. The 
weightings we presented are consistent with the needs of a communication system 
administrator. The specific needs of a system administrator are not inline with the needs 
of other protocol analysis system users. For instance, the weightings can be altered to 
better address the academic needs of an educator in the classroom. The first step is to 
review the weightings in the evaluation methodology to see which weightings should be 
adjusted. Then the draft version of the new overall weightings can be produced. The draft 
version should be reviewed to see that the evaluator needs are met and adjusted as 
appropriate. Finally, the overall weightings can be implemented into the evaluation 
methodology. It should be noted that we omitted the testing of the new weightings from 
this modification procedure. We did this to avoid any biasing that might occur if actual 
data was used to justify the appropriateness of the weightings. Using data from actual 
protocol analysis systems would lend the evaluator to tune the weightings to show a 
preference to a system that the evaluator already prefers. 
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IV. EXAMPLE EVALUATIONS 
In this section we present the results from running the evaluation methodology 
presented in Chapter III. Each discussion begins with a background of the analysis 
system and then discusses the evaluation results. The results data will be presented and 
discussed in the same order that the evaluation methodology criteria were presented in 
Chapter III for consistency. 
A. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOL SHAPES ANALYZER 
The Cryptographic Protocol Shapes Analyzer (CPSA) is a protocol analysis 
system designed by The MITRE Corporation for the National Security Agency. CPSA is 
based on strand space theory [THAY1999]. CPSA is a text-based system designed for use 
on POSIX based platforms and can be used in either an interactive mode or batch mode. 
Our experiments used CPSA in the batch mode. 
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1. Scope 
a. Type Support 
Table 17 shows the results from the research conducted during the review 
of CPSA. 
Type Source Supported 
Message Formal Documentation Native 
Principal Formal Documentation Native 
Nonce Formal Documentation Native 
Timestamp Extended Literature Review Non-Native 
Symmetric Cryptographic 
Key 
Formal Documentation Native 
Asymmetric Cryptographic 
Keys 
Formal Documentation Native 
Symmetric MAC Formal Documentation Native 
Text Formal Documentation Native 
Number Extended Literature Review Non-Native 
Table 17: CPSA Type Support Criterion Results 
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b. Operation Support 
Table 18 shows the results from the research conducted during the review 
of CPSA. 
Operation Source Supported 
Symmetric Cryptography Formal Documentation Native 
Symmetric MAC 
Generation/Verification 
Formal Documentation Native 
Asymmetric 
Encryption/Decryption 
Formal Documentation Native 
Asymmetric 
Signature/Verification 
Formal Documentation Non-Native 
Hashing Formal Documentation Native 
Addition Extended Literature Review Non-Native 
Concatenation Formal Documentation Native 
Table 18: CPSA Operation Support Criterion Results 
c. Session Type 
From the formal documentation for CPSA it is apparent that CPSA 
supports infinite sessions. 
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d. Theoretical Testable Protocol Characteristics 





Confidentiality Formal Documentation Native 
Integrity Formal Documentation Unable 
Authentication Formal Documentation Native 
Availability Formal Documentation Unable 
Non-Repudiation Formal Documentation Unable 
Round Efficiency Formal Documentation Unable 
Table 19: CPSA Theoretical Testable Protocol Characteristics Criterion Results 
2. Correctness 
a. Theoretical Correctness 





Confidentiality Formal Documentation N-I 
Integrity Formal Documentation Unable 
Authentication Formal Documentation N-I 
Availability Formal Documentation Unable 
Non-Repudiation Formal Documentation Unable 
Round Efficiency Formal Documentation Unable 
Table 20: CPSA Theoretical Correctness Criterion Results 
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b. Observed Correctness 
Table 21 shows the results from the analysis of the data returned from 
CPSA. The N-S determination is because CPSA failed to halt, given the allotted time, on 





NS Full 2 Implementation 





Integrity Formal Documentation Unable 
Authentication 
NS Full 2 Implementation 





Availability Formal Documentation Unable 
Non-Repudiation Formal Documentation Unable 
Round Efficiency Formal Documentation Unable 
Table 21: CPSA Observed Correctness Criterion Results 
3. Performance 
a. Execution Time 
Table 22 summarizes the execution time results collected for CPSA. We 
note that CPSA failed to halt on the Kerberos input. 
Protocol Execution Time (CI+ value) 
NS 5.49 sec 
NSL 13.94 sec 
Kerberos 60+ hr 
Table 22: CPSA Execution Time Criterion Results 
b. Secondary Memory Requirement 
The total secondary memory required for CPSA is 8.348 MB. 
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c. Main Memory Requirement 
Table 23 is the summary of the secondary memory requirement results for 
CPSA. 
Protocol Main Memory Requirement (CI+ value) 
NS 0 KB 
NSL 0 KB 
Kerberos Failed to Halt 
Table 23: CPSA Main Memory Requirement Criterion Results 
4. Usability 
a. Automation 
The formal documentation for CPSA describes how to use CPSA in both 
the interactive and batch modes. The ability to operate in a batch mode is evidence that 
CPSA is automated. 
b. Specification Comments 
The review of the formal documentation for CPSA shows that flat 
comments are allowed within protocol specifications. Specifications begin with (* and 
end with *). 
5. Overall 
Overall CPSA achieved a score of 1133 using our evaluation ratings and 
weightings. 
B. PROVERIF 
ProVerif is a protocol analysis system primarily designed by Bruno Blanchet, 
with support from Matín Abadi and Cédric Fournet [ABAD2003, ABAD2004, 
ABAD2005, BLAN2001]. ProVerif accepts two types of input grammars: horn clauses, 
and spi calculus. In practice ProVerif translates spi calculus specifications into horn 
clauses. We implemented the test protocols in the spi calculus grammar. 
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1. Scope 
a. Type Support 
The summary of the type support results for ProVerif are presented in 
Table 24. 
Type Source Supported 
Message Formal Documentation Native 
Principal Formal Documentation Native 
Nonce Formal Documentation Native 
Timestamp Formal Documentation Non-Native 
Symmetric Cryptographic 
Key 
Formal Documentation Native 
Asymmetric Cryptographic 
Keys 
Formal Documentation Native 
Symmetric MAC Formal Documentation Native 
Text Formal Documentation Native 
Number Formal Documentation Non-Native 
Table 24: ProVerif Type Support Criterion Results 
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b. Operation Support 
Table 25 presents the summary of the operation support data for ProVerif. 
Operation Source Supported 
Symmetric Cryptography Formal Documentation Native 
Symmetric MAC 
Generation/Verification 
Formal Documentation Native 
Asymmetric 
Encryption/Decryption 
Formal Documentation Native 
Asymmetric 
Signature/Verification 
Formal Documentation Native 
Hashing Formal Documentation Native 
Addition Extended Literature Review Non-Native 
Concatenation Formal Documentation Native 
Table 25: ProVerif Operation Support Criterion Results 
c. Session Type 
Through the review of ProVerif’s formal documentation it is clear that 
ProVerif supports infinite session types. 
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d. Theoretical Testable Protocol Characteristics 





Confidentiality Formal Documentation Native 
Integrity Formal Documentation Unable 
Authentication Formal Documentation Native 
Availability Formal Documentation Unable 
Non-Repudiation Formal Documentation Unable 
Round Efficiency Formal Documentation Unable 
Table 26: ProVerif Theoretical Testable Protocol Characteristics Criterion Results 
2. Correctness 
a. Theoretical Correctness 




Confidentiality Formal Documentation N-I 
Integrity Formal Documentation Unable 
Authentication Formal Documentation N-I 
Availability Formal Documentation Unable 
Non-Repudiation Formal Documentation Unable 
Round Efficiency Formal Documentation Unable 
Table 27: ProVerif Theoretical Correctness Criterion Results 
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b. Observed Correctness 





NS Full 2 Implementation 





Integrity Formal Documentation Unable 
Authentication 
NS Full 2 Implementation 





Availability Formal Documentation Unable 
Non-Repudiation Formal Documentation Unable 
Round Efficiency Formal Documentation Unable 
Table 28: ProVerif Observed Correctness Criterion Results 
3. Performance 
a. Execution Time 
Table 29 presents the execution time data for ProVerif. 
Protocol Execution Time (CI+ value) 
NS 0.09 sec 
NSL 0.05 sec 
Kerberos 0.03 sec 
Table 29: ProVerif Execution Time Criterion Results 
b. Secondary Memory Requirement 
The total secondary memory required for ProVerif is 6.124 MB. 
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c. Main Memory Requirement 
Table 30 presents the secondary memory requirement data for ProVerif. 
Protocol Main Memory Requirement (CI+ value) 
NS 0 KB 
NSL 0 KB 
Kerberos 0 KB 
Table 30: ProVerif Main Memory Requirement Criterion Results 
4. Usability 
a. Automation 
The formal documentation for ProVerif describes that it is automated 
analysis system. 
b. Specification Comments 
The review of the formal documentation for ProVerif shows that flat 
comments are allowed within protocol specifications. Specifications begin with (* and 
end with *). 
5. Overall 
Overall ProVerif achieved a score of 1186 using our evaluation ratings and 
weightings. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work we developed the first evaluation methodology for protocol analysis 
systems. We began by discussing why there is a need for an evaluation methodology for 
protocol analysis systems based on the current state of the field. We then went into 
deeper discussions about the evaluation methodology itself. 
We spoke of the four categories of criteria that comprise the evaluation 
methodology: scope, correctness, performance, and usability. For each of the categories 
we defined the criteria that are used to evaluate protocol analysis systems on. We then 
moved to our discussion of the testing methods. We first described pre-testing actions 
that needed to occur before criteria testing could begin. We then discussed the testing 
method for each of the evaluation criterion. We then presented the post-testing actions 
that needed to occur after the evaluation criteria had been tested. We also presented 
requirements and recommendations to the ordering of the testing methods. We then 
switched to the subjective part of the evaluation methodology, the ratings and weightings 
section. We first presented the rating system for each of the criterion, before discussing 
the overall weighting function. 
With the three main parts of the methodology defined: criteria, methods, and 
ratings and weightings; we discussed how the “living” nature of the methodology can be 
realized. We presented processes to adapt the methodology and reasons as to why the 
methodology should be adapted. One of the key aspects of the methodology is its ability 
to adapt to the needs of the evaluator. Additionally, the methodology we present has the 
ability to grow with the protocol analysis field and the passage of time. Over time the 
results produced through the use of this methodology will benefit the evaluators and the 
protocol analysis field in general. 
Finally, we presented two example evaluations of CPSA and ProVerif, to show 
that the evaluation methodology could in fact be used and produce data. 
A. FUTURE WORK 
The next obvious step to take is to complete the definition of the subjective 
usability testing methods using the process discussed in III.D METHODOLOGY 
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ADAPTATIONS. Along with the testing methods, the rating systems for each of the 
subjective usability criteria should be defined. Finally, the overall weighting function can 
be adapted to incorporate the subjective usability criteria. 
Currently we use standard constant definitions of confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication, and availability. In practice, some protocol analysis systems have 
different definitions of these terms. A more elaborate rating system may be able to 
account for these differences across analysis systems. 
In the beginning of this work we mentioned that this evaluation methodology 
should be thought of as a “living” methodology. As the protocol analysis field continues 
to grow so should this methodology. Additionally, the passage of time will also cause a 
need to review and update the methodology. We envision that the evaluation 
methodology will be reviewed and updated about every five to seven years. 
Regardless of when the above proposals are implemented the evaluation 
methodology can still be used “as is”. The simplest work that can be done is to evaluate 
more protocol analysis systems under the current methodology20. As mentioned 
previously, the data from the evaluation methodology can be used by a variety of people. 
The data from different evaluators can be shared, thus increasing the value of evaluation 
efforts. 
We have mentioned throughout this work that a key aspect of this methodology is 
its ability to adapt; especially the methodology’s ability to adapt to the needs of the 
evaluator. New weighting functions can be developed to address the needs of different 
evaluators, such as educators, or professional analysis organizations like the IETF. 
 
                                                 
20 In APPENDIX D: we present a list of current protocol analysis systems. 
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APPENDIX A: TEST PLATFORM CONFIGURATION 
In this appendix we present our test platform configuration information. 
A. PLATFORM SPECIFICATIONS 
 Platform Manufacturer: Dell 
 Platform:   Optiplex GX270 
 BIOS Version:   A04 
 Processor Manufacturer: Intel 
 Processor Family:  Pentium 4 (x86) 
 Processor Speed:  3.0 GHz 
 Bus Speed:   800 MHz 
 Level 2 Cache:  1 MB 
 RAM Type:   DDR SDRAM 
 RAM Size:   2 GB (4 x 512 MB) 
 Memory Speed:  333 MHz 
 Hyper-threading was enabled in the BIOS. 
B. FEDORA CONFIGURATION 
 OS Manufacturer:  Red Hat 
 OS Version:   Fedora Core 5™ (2.6.18-2200.fc5smp) 
 Patched as of Date:  15 November 2006 
 Primary Partition Size: 18 GB 
 Swap Partition Size:  2 GB 
The cups software was not updated due to other system configuration conflicts; 
the cups version of the system was 1:1.2.5-1.fc5.4.i386, the cups-libs version of the 
system was 1:1.2.5-1.fc5.4.i386. 
1. CPSA Configuration 
System Manufacturer:  The MITRE Corporation 
System Full Name:  Cryptographic Protocol Shapes Analyzer (CPSA) 
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System Version:  0.81 
The standard installation and configuration as per the formal documentation were 
used for CPSA. 
2. ProVerif Configuration 
 System Manufacturer:  Bruno Blanchet and Martín Abadi 
 System Full Name:  ProVerif 
 System Version:  1.13pl7 
ProVerif requires that Objective Caml (OCaml) be installed on the system, 
OCaml version 3.09.3 was installed. 
C. WINDOWS CONFIGURATION 
 OS Manufacturer:  Microsoft 
 OS Version:   Windows XP SP2 
 Patched as of Date:  15 November 2006 
 Primary Partition Size: 20 GB 
 Virtual Memory Size:  2 GB 
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APPENDIX B: FILE LISTINGS 
Here we present the testing scripts and specifications that were used in this 
evaluation. 
Listing 1 is the master script file that was used to call the other test scripts. 
#!/bin/bash 
# File:  master.sh 
# Created By: Chris W. Hoffmeister 
# Created On: 25 Jan 2007 
# Modified On: - 
# Modified By: - 
# Description: Master script that runs all test scripts and 
appropriately 
#              redirects stderr 
 







# CPSA test scripts 
# Observed Correctness Criteria Scripts 
cpsa -b < $specsdir/cpsa/NS_simple_2_cpsa.cpsa > 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NS_simple_2_cpsa_corr.txt 
cpsa -b < $specsdir/cpsa/NS_full_2_cpsa.cpsa > 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NS_full_2_cpsa_corr.txt 
cpsa -b < $specsdir/cpsa/NSL_simple_2_cpsa.cpsa > 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NSL_simple_2_cpsa_corr.txt 
cpsa -b < $specsdir/cpsa/NSL_full_2_cpsa.cpsa > 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NSL_full_2_cpsa_corr.txt 
# Performance Criteria Scripts 
# Secondary Memory Requirement Script 
$scriptsdir/./cpsa_second_mem.sh 
# Execution Time and Main Memory Requirement Scripts 
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$scriptsdir/./NS_simple_2_cpsa.sh $exectrials 2>> 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NS_simple_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
$scriptsdir/./NS_full_2_cpsa.sh $exectrials 2>> 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NS_full_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
$scriptsdir/./NSL_simple_2_cpsa.sh $exectrials 2>> 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NSL_simple_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
$scriptsdir/./NSL_full_2_cpsa.sh $exectrials 2>> 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NSL_full_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
 
# ProVerif test scripts 
# Observed Correctness Criteria Scripts 
$proverifdir/./analyzer $specsdir/proverif/NS_simple_2_proverif_pi.txt 
> $resultsdir/proverif/NS_simple_2_proverif_pi_corr.txt 
$proverifdir/./analyzer -in pi 
$specsdir/proverif/NS_full_2_proverif_pi.txt > 
$resultsdir/proverif/NS_full_2_proverif_pi_corr.txt 
$proverifdir/./analyzer -in pi 
$specsdir/proverif/NSL_simple_2_proverif_pi.txt > 
$resultsdir/proverif/NSL_simple_2_proverif_pi_corr.txt 
$proverifdir/./analyzer -in pi 
$specsdir/proverif/NSL_full_2_proverif_pi.txt > 
$resultsdir/proverif/NSL_full_2_proverif_pi_corr.txt 
$proverifdir/./analyzer -in pi 
$specsdir/proverif/kerberos_proverif_pi.txt > 
$resultsdir/proverif/kerberos_proverif_pi_corr.txt 
# Performance Criteria Scripts 
# Secondary Memory Requirement Script 
$scriptsdir/./proverif_second_mem.sh 
# Execution Time and Main Memory Requirement Scripts 
$scriptsdir/./NS_simple_2_proverif_pi.sh $exectrials 2>> 
$resultsdir/proverif/NS_simple_2_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
$scriptsdir/./NS_full_2_proverif_pi.sh $exectrials 2>> 
$resultsdir/proverif/NS_full_2_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
$scriptsdir/./NSL_simple_2_proverif_pi.sh $exectrials 2>> 
$resultsdir/proverif/NSL_simple_2_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
$scriptsdir/./NSL_full_2_proverif_pi.sh $exectrials 2>> 
$resultsdir/proverif/NSL_full_2_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
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$scriptsdir/./kerberos_proverif_pi.sh $exectrials 2>> 
$resultsdir/proverif/kerberos_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
Listing 1: Master Test Script 
A. CPSA 
1. Protocol Specifications 
a. NS Simple 2 
Listing 2 is the CPSA batch mode specification of the simple version of 
NS protocol 2 from [NEED1978]. 
(* 
 * File:         NS_simple_2_cpsa.cpsa 
 * Created By:   Chris W. Hoffmeister 
 * Created On:   21 Jan 2007 
 * Modified By:  - 
 * Modified On:  - 
 * Description:  Simplified specification for the Needham-Schroeder 
Protocol 2, 
 *               from [NEED1978] for the Cryptographic Protocol Shapes 
Analyzer 
 *               (CPSA) protocol analysis system. This specification is 
meant 









 * Initiator Role, Alice 
 *) 
    role init(A:name; B:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
        non=(privk(A)) 
        uniq=(Na) 
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        messages=( 
            + {A, Na}pubk(B); 
            - {Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
            + {Nb}pubk(B); 
        ); 
    ) 
 
(* 
 * Responder Role, Bob 
 *) 
    role resp(A:name; B:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
        non=(privk(B)) 
        uniq=(Nb) 
        messages=( 
            - {A, Na}pubk(B); 
            + {Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
            - {Nb}pubk(B); 
        ) 




 * Analyzer Commands 
 *) 
(* 
 * Test the initiator role, Alice 
 *) 
create init[3] 













Listing 2: CPSA Batch Mode NS Simple 2 Protocol Specification 
b. NS Full 2 
Listing 3 is the NS Full 2 protocol specification for the batch mode of 
CPSA [NEED1978]. 
(* 
 * File:         NS_full_2_cpsa.cpsa 
 * Created By:   Chris W. Hoffmeister 
 * Created On:   21 Jan 2007 
 * Modified By:  - 
 * Modified On:  - 
 * Description:  Full specification for the Needham-Schroeder Protocol 
2, from 
 *               [NEED1978] for the Cryptographic Protocol Shapes 
Analyzer 
 *               (CPSA) protocol analysis system. This specification is 
meant 









 * Initiator Role, Alice 
 *) 
    role init(A:name; B:name; S:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
        non=(privk(A)) 
        uniq=(Na) 
        messages=( 
            + (A, B); 
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            - {B, pubk(B)}privk(S); 
            + {A, Na}pubk(B); 
            - {Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
            + {Nb}pubk(B); 
        ) 
    ) 
 
(* 
 * Responder Role, Bob 
 *) 
    role resp(A:name; B:name; S:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
        non=(privk(B)) 
        uniq=(Nb) 
        messages=( 
            - {A, Na}pubk(B); 
            + (B, A); 
            - {A, pubk(A)}privk(S); 
            + {Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
            - {Nb}pubk(B); 
        ) 
    ) 
 
(* 
 * Server Role, Server 
 *) 
    role serv(A:name; B:name; S:name)=( 
        non=(privk(S)) 
        uniq=() 
        messages=( 
            - (A, B); 
            + {B, pubk(B)}privk(S); 
            - (B, A); 
            + {A, pubk(A)}privk(S); 
        ) 





 * Analyzer Commands 
 *) 
(* 
 * Test the initiator role, Alice 
 *) 
create init[5] 





 * Test the responder role, Bob 
 *) 
create resp[5] 




Listing 3: CPSA Batch Mode NS Full 2 Protocol Specification 
c. NSL Simple 2 
Listing 4 is the batch mode specification of the NSL Simple 2 protocol for 
CPSA [LOWE1996]. 
(* 
 * File:         NSL_simple_2_cpsa.cpsa 
 * Created By:   Chris W. Hoffmeister 
 * Created On:   21 Jan 2007 
 * Modified By:  - 
 * Modified On:  - 
 * Description:  Simplified specification for the Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe 
 *               Protocol from [LOWE1996] for the Cryptographic 
Protocol 
 *               Shapes Analyzer (CPSA) protocol analysis system. This 











 * Initiator Role, Alice 
 *) 
    role init(A:name; B:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
        non=(privk(A)) 
        uniq=(Na) 
        messages=( 
            + {A, Na}pubk(B); 
            - {B, Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
            + {Nb}pubk(B); 
        ); 
    ) 
 
(* 
 * Responder Role, Bob 
 *) 
    role resp(A:name; B:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
        non=(privk(B)) 
        uniq=(Nb) 
        messages=( 
            - {A, Na}pubk(B); 
            + {B, Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
            - {Nb}pubk(B); 
        ) 








 * Test the initiator role, Alice 
 *) 
create init[3] 





 * Test the responder role, Bob 
 *) 
create resp[3] 




Listing 4: CPSA Batch Mode NSL Simple 2 Protocol Specification 
d. NSL Full 2 
Listing 5 is the batch mode specification of the NSL Full 2 protocol for 
CPSA [LOWE1996]. 
(* 
 * File:         NSL_full_2_cpsa.cpsa 
 * Created By:   Chris W. Hoffmeister 
 * Created On:   21 Jan 2007 
 * Modified By:  - 
 * Modified On:  - 
 * Description:  Full specification for the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe 
Protocol 
 *               from [LOWE1996] for the Cryptographic Protocol Shapes 
Analyzer 
 *               (CPSA) protocol analysis system. This specification is 
meant 










 * Initiator Role, Alice 
 *) 
    role init(A:name; B:name; S:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
        non=(privk(A)) 
        uniq=(Na) 
        messages=( 
            + (A, B); 
            - {B, pubk(B)}privk(S); 
            + {A, Na}pubk(B); 
            - {B, Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
            + {Nb}pubk(B); 
        ) 
    ) 
 
(* 
 * Responder Role, Bob 
 *) 
    role resp(A:name; B:name; S:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
        non=(privk(B)) 
        uniq=(Nb) 
        messages=( 
            - {A, Na}pubk(B); 
            + (B, A); 
            - {A, pubk(A)}privk(S); 
            + {B, Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
            - {Nb}pubk(B); 
        ) 
    ) 
 
(* 
 * Server Role, Server 
 *) 
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    role serv(A:name; B:name; S:name)=( 
        non=(privk(S)) 
        uniq=() 
        messages=( 
            - (A, B); 
            + {B, pubk(B)}privk(S); 
            - (B, A); 
            + {A, pubk(A)}privk(S); 
        ) 




 * Analyzer Commands 
 *) 
(* 
 * Test the initiator role, Alice 
 *) 
create init[5] 





 * Test the responder role, Bob 
 *) 
create resp[5] 




Listing 5: CPSA Batch Mode NSL Full 2 Protocol Specification 
e. Kerberos 




 * File:         kerberos_cpsa.cpsa 
 * Created By:   Chris W. Hoffmeister 
 * Created On:   21 Jan 2007 
 * Modified By:  - 
 * Modified On:  - 
 * Description:  Specification for the Kerberos V5 Protocol from RFC 
4120 of 
 *               July 2005 for the Cryptographic Protocol Shapes 
Analyzer 
 *               (CPSA) protocol analysis system. This specification is 
meant 









 * User Role, Alice 
 *) 
    role user(A:name; B:name; KAS:name; TGS:name; Nak:nonce; Nat:nonce; 
              Tk:nonce; Tat:nonce; Tt:nonce; Tab:nonce; Kat:sessk; 
Kab:sessk)=( 
        non=(ltk(A;KAS)) 
        uniq=(Nak; Nat; Tat; Tab) 
        messages=( 
            + A, TGS, Nak; 
            - A, {A, Kat, Tk}ltk(KAS;TGS), {TGS, Kat, Nak, 
Tk}ltk(A;KAS); 
            + B, Nat, {A, Kat, Tk}ltk(KAS;TGS), {A, Tat}Kat; 
            - A, {A, Kab, Tt}ltk(B;TGS), {B, Kab, Nat, Tt}Kat; 
            + {A, Kab, Tt}ltk(B;TGS), {A, Tab}Kab; 
            - {Tab}Kab; 
        ) 




 * Application Server Role, Bob 
 *) 
    role appserv(A:name; B:name; TGS:name; Tt:nonce; Tab:nonce; 
Kab:sessk)=( 
        non=(ltk(B;TGS)) 
        uniq=() 
        messages=( 
            - {A, Kab, Tt}ltk(B;TGS), {A, Tab}Kab; 
            + {Tab}Kab; 
        ) 
    ) 
 
(* 
 * Authentication Server Role 
 *) 
    role authserv(A:name; KAS:name; TGS:name; Nak:nonce; Tk:nonce; 
Kat:sessk)=( 
        non=(ltk(A;KAS); ltk(KAS;TGS)) 
        uniq=(Tk; Kat) 
        messages=( 
            - A, TGS, Nak; 
            + A, {A, Kat, Tk}ltk(KAS;TGS), {TGS, Kat, Nak, 
Tk}ltk(A;KAS); 
        ) 
    ) 
 
(* 
 * Ticket Distribution Server Role 
 *) 
    role ticserv(A:name; B:name; KAS:name; TGS:name; Nat:nonce; 
Tk:nonce; 
                 Tat:nonce; Tt:nonce; Kat:sessk; Kab:sessk)=( 
        non=(ltk(KAS;TGS); ltk(B;TGS)) 
        uniq=(Tt; Kab) 
        messages=( 
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            - B, Nat, {A, Kat, Tk}ltk(KAS;TGS), {A, Tat}Kat; 
            + A, {A, Kab, Tt}ltk(B;TGS), {B, Kab, Nat, Tt}Kat; 
        ) 













Listing 6: CPSA Batch Mode Kerberos Protocol Specification 
2. Performance Criteria Test Scripts 
a. Execution Time & Main Memory Requirement 
Listing 7 is the test script to run the execution time and main memory 
requirements tests for CPSA for the NS simple 2 protocol. 
#!/bin/bash 
# File:        NS_simple_2_cpsa.sh 
# Created By:  Chris W. Hoffmeister 
# Created On:  25 Jan 2007 
# Modified By: - 
# Modified On: - 
# Description: Shell script to test Execution Time of 
NS_simple_2_cpsa.cpsa 
 
# Setup variables 
resultsdir=/share/thesis/data/results 
specsdir=/share/thesis/data/specifications 
trials=5 # Default number of experiments to run 
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# Determines if the number of trials was passed in 
if [ $# -eq 1 ] 
then 
# Number of trials was passed in 
    trials=$1 
fi 
 
echo "Begin Test: Execution Time: CPSA-NS Simple 2" > 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NS_simple_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
date >> $resultsdir/cpsa/NS_simple_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
 
# Perform trials 
for ((trial=0; trial<trials; trial=trial+1)) do 
    echo "Trial:  $trial" >> $resultsdir/cpsa/NS_simple_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
    # We're not concerned with the output, merely the execution time 
    # Have to explicitly map to time function, other wise 
/bin/bash/time will be used 
    /usr/bin/time -f "Command:        %C\nUser Time:      
%U(sec)\nSystem Time:    %S(sec)\nMaximum Memory: %M(KB)\nExit Status:    
%x" cpsa -b < $specsdir/cpsa/NS_simple_2_cpsa.cpsa > /dev/null 
done 
 
echo "End Test:   Execution Time: CPSA-NS Simple 2" >> 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NS_simple_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
Listing 7: CPSA Batch Mode NS Simple 2 Protocol Test Script 
Listing 8 is the NS Full 2 protocol execution time and main memory 
requirement test script for CPSA. 
#!/bin/bash 
# File:        NS_full_2_cpsa.sh 
# Created By:  Chris W. Hoffmeister 
# Created On:  25 Jan 2007 
# Modified By: - 
# Modified On: - 




# Setup variables 
resultsdir=/share/thesis/data/results 
specsdir=/share/thesis/data/specifications 
trials=5 # Default number of experiments to run 
 
# Determines if the number of trials was passed in 
if [ $# -eq 1 ] 
then 
# Number of trials was passed in 
    trials=$1 
fi 
 
echo "Begin Test: Execution Time: CPSA-NS Full 2" > 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NS_full_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
date >> $resultsdir/cpsa/NS_full_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
 
# Perform trials 
for ((trial=0; trial<trials; trial=trial+1)) do 
    echo "Trial:  $trial" >> $resultsdir/cpsa/NS_full_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
    # We're not concerned with the output, merely the execution time 
    # Have to explicitly map to time function, other wise 
/bin/bash/time will be used 
    /usr/bin/time -f "Command:        %C\nUser Time:      
%U(sec)\nSystem Time:    %S(sec)\nMaximum Memory: %M(KB)\nExit Status:    
%x" cpsa -b < $specsdir/cpsa/NS_full_2_cpsa.cpsa > /dev/null 
done 
 
echo "End Test:   Execution Time: CPSA-NS Full 2" >> 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NS_full_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
Listing 8: CPSA Batch Mode NS Full 2 Protocol Test Script 
Listing 9 is the NSL Simple 2 protocol execution time and main memory 
requirement test script for CPSA. 
#!/bin/bash 
# File:        NSL_simple_2_cpsa.sh 
# Created By:  Chris W. Hoffmeister 
# Created On:  25 Jan 2007 
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# Modified By: - 
# Modified On: - 
# Description: Shell script to test Execution Time of 
NSL_simple_2_cpsa.cpsa 
 
# Setup variables 
resultsdir=/share/thesis/data/results 
specsdir=/share/thesis/data/specifications 
trials=5 # Default number of experiments to run 
 
# Determines if the number of trials was passed in 
if [ $# -eq 1 ] 
then 
# Number of trials was passed in 
    trials=$1 
fi 
 
echo "Begin Test: Execution Time: CPSA-NSL Simple 2" > 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NSL_simple_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
date >> $resultsdir/cpsa/NSL_simple_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
 
# Perform trials 
for ((trial=0; trial<trials; trial=trial+1)) do 
    echo "Trial:  $trial" >> 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NSL_simple_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
    # We're not concerned with the output, merely the execution time 
    # Have to explicitly map to time function, other wise 
/bin/bash/time will be used 
    /usr/bin/time -f "Command:        %C\nUser Time:      
%U(sec)\nSystem Time:    %S(sec)\nMaximum Memory: %M(KB)\nExit Status:    
%x" cpsa -b < $specsdir/cpsa/NSL_simple_2_cpsa.cpsa > /dev/null 
done 
 
echo "End Test:   Execution Time: CPSA-NSL Simple 2" >> 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NSL_simple_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
Listing 9: CPSA Batch Mode NSL Simple 2 Protocol Test Script 
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Listing 10 is the NSL Full 2 protocol execution time and main memory 
requirement test script for CPSA. 
#!/bin/bash 
# File:        NSL_full_2_cpsa.sh 
# Created By:  Chris W. Hoffmeister 
# Created On:  25 Jan 2007 
# Modified By: - 
# Modified On: - 
# Description: Shell script to test Execution Time of 
NSL_full_2_cpsa.cpsa 
 
# Setup variables 
resultsdir=/share/thesis/data/results 
specsdir=/share/thesis/data/specifications 
trials=5 # Default number of experiments to run 
 
# Determines if the number of trials was passed in 
if [ $# -eq 1 ] 
then 
# Number of trials was passed in 
    trials=$1 
fi 
 
echo "Begin Test: Execution Time: CPSA-NSL Full 2" > 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NSL_full_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
date >> $resultsdir/cpsa/NSL_full_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
 
# Perform trials 
for ((trial=0; trial<trials; trial=trial+1)) do 
    echo "Trial:  $trial" >> $resultsdir/cpsa/NSL_full_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
    # We're not concerned with the output, merely the execution time 
    # Have to explicitly map to time function, other wise 
/bin/bash/time will be used 
    /usr/bin/time -f "Command:        %C\nUser Time:      
%U(sec)\nSystem Time:    %S(sec)\nMaximum Memory: %M(KB)\nExit Status:    




echo "End Test:   Execution Time: CPSA-NSL Full 2" >> 
$resultsdir/cpsa/NSL_full_2_cpsa_exec.txt 
Listing 10: CPSA Batch Mode NSL Full 2 Protocol Test Script 
b. Secondary Memory Requirement 
Listing 11 is the secondary memory requirement test script for CPSA. 
#!/bin/bash 
# File:  cpsa_second_mem.sh 
# Created By: Chris W. Hoffmeister 
# Created On: 06 Feb 2007 
# Modified On: - 
# Modified By: - 
# Description: Script that runs ls to determine CPSA size on disk 
 




# Perform experiment 
ls -lkR $tooldir | grep -F "$tooldir 
total " > $resultsdir/cpsa/cpsa_second_mem.txt 
Listing 11: CPSA Secondary Memory Requirement Test Script 
B. PROVERIF 
1. Protocol Specifications 
a. NS Full 2 
Listing 12 is the spi calculus NS Full 2 protocol specification for ProVerif. 
(************************************************************* 
 *                                                           * 
 *       Cryptographic protocol verifier                     * 
 *                                                           * 
 *       Bruno Blanchet and Xavier Allamigeon                * 
 *                                                           * 
 *       Copyright (C) INRIA, LIENS, MPII 2000-2006          * 
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    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
modify 
    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published 
by 
    the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or 
    (at your option) any later version. 
 
    This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
    GNU General Public License for more details (in file LICENSE). 
 
    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
    along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software 
    Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-






Needham-Schroeder public key protocol 
 
Message 1: A -> S : (A, B) 
Message 2: S -> A : { pkB, B }skS 
Message 3: A -> B : { Na, A }pkB 
Message 4: B -> S : (B, A) 
Message 5: S -> B : { pkA, A }skS 
Message 6: B -> A : { Na, Nb }pkA 
Message 7: A -> B : { Nb }pkB 
 









reduc decrypt(encrypt(x,pk(y)),y) = x. 
 
(* Host names 
   The server has a table (host name, public key), which we 
   represent by the function getkey. *) 
 
fun host/1. 
private reduc getkey(host(x)) = x. 
 
(* Signatures *) 
 
fun sign/2. 
reduc checksign(sign(x,y),pk(y)) = x. 
reduc getmess(sign(x,y)) = x. 
 
(* Shared-key cryptography *) 
 
fun sencrypt/2. 
reduc sdecrypt(sencrypt(x,y),y) = x. 
 






private free secretANa, secretANb, secretBNa, secretBNb. 
query attacker:secretANa; 
      attacker:secretANb; 
      attacker:secretBNa; 
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      attacker:secretBNb. 
query ev:endBparam(x) ==> ev:beginBparam(x). 
query ev:endBfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6) ==> 
ev:beginBfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6). 
query ev:endAparam(x) ==> ev:beginAparam(x). 
query ev:endAfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6) ==> 
ev:beginAfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6). 
query evinj:endBparam(x) ==> evinj:beginBparam(x). 
query evinj:endBfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6) ==> 
evinj:beginBfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6). 
query evinj:endAparam(x) ==> evinj:beginAparam(x). 
query evinj:endAfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6) ==> 
evinj:beginAfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6). 
 
let processA =   
 (* Choose the other host *) 
 in(c,hostX);  
 event beginBparam(hostX);  
 (* Message 1: Get the public key certificate for the other host 
*) 
 out(c, (hostA, hostX)); 
 (* Messafe 2 *) 
 in(c, ms);  
 let (pkX,=hostX) = checksign(ms,pkS) in 
        (* Message 3 *) 
 new Na;  
        out(c, encrypt((Na, hostA), pkX)); 
        (* Message 6 *) 
        in(c, m);  
 let (=Na, NX2) = decrypt(m, skA) in 
 event beginBfull(Na, hostA, hostX, pkX, pkA, NX2); 
        (* Message 7 *) 
        out(c, encrypt(NX2, pkX)); 
        (* OK *) 
 if hostX = hostB then 
 event endAparam(hostA); 
 event endAfull(Na, hostA, hostX, pkX, pkA, NX2); 
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 out(c, sencrypt(secretANa, Na)); 
 out(c, sencrypt(secretANb, NX2)). 
 
let processB =  
        (* Message 3 *) 
 in(c, m); 
 let (NY, hostY) = decrypt(m, skB) in 
 event beginAparam(hostY); 
 (* Message 4: Get the public key certificate for the other host 
*) 
        out(c, (hostB, hostY)); 
 (* Message 5 *) 
 in(c,ms); 
        let (pkY,=hostY) = checksign(ms,pkS) in 
        (* Message 6 *) 
 new Nb; 
 event beginAfull(NY, hostY, hostB, pkB, pkY, Nb); 
 out(c, encrypt((NY, Nb), pkY)); 
        (* Message 7 *) 
 in(c, m3); 
        if Nb = decrypt(m3, skB) then 
 (* OK *) 
        if hostY = hostA then 
 event endBparam(hostB); 
 event endBfull(NY, hostY, hostB, pkB, pkA, Nb); 
 out(c, sencrypt(secretBNa, NY)); 
 out(c, sencrypt(secretBNb, Nb)). 
 
let processS =  in(c,m);  
         let (a,b) = m in 
  let sb = getkey(b) in 
                out(c,sign((sb,b),skS)). 
 
process new skA; let pkA = pk(skA) in 
        out(c, pkA); 
        new skB; let pkB = pk(skB) in 
        out(c, pkB); 
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 new skS; let pkS = pk(skS) in 
 out(c, pkS); 
 let hostA = host(pkA) in 
 out(c, hostA); 
 let hostB = host(pkB) in 
 out(c, hostB); 
 ((!processA) | (!processB) | (!processS)) 
Listing 12: ProVerif Spi Calculus NS Full 2 Protocol Specification 
b. NSL Full 2 
Listing 13 is the spi calculus NSL Full 2 protocol specification for 
ProVerif. 
(************************************************************* 
 *                                                           * 
 *       Cryptographic protocol verifier                     * 
 *                                                           * 
 *       Bruno Blanchet and Xavier Allamigeon                * 
 *                                                           * 
 *       Copyright (C) INRIA, LIENS, MPII 2000-2006          * 





    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
modify 
    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published 
by 
    the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or 
    (at your option) any later version. 
 
    This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
    GNU General Public License for more details (in file LICENSE). 
 
    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
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    along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software 
    Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-






Needham-Schroeder public key protocol 
Corrected version by Lowe 
 
Message 1: A -> S : (A, B) 
Message 2: S -> A : { B, pkB }_skS 
Message 3: A -> B : { N_A, A }_pkB 
Message 4: B -> S : (B, A) 
Message 5: S -> B : { A, pkA }_skS 
Message 6: B -> A : { N_A, N_B, B }_pkA 
Message 7: A -> B : { N_B }_pkB 
 








reduc decrypt(encrypt(x,pk(y)),y) = x. 
 
(* Host names 
   The server has a table (host name, public key), which we 
   represent by the function getkey. *) 
 
fun host/1. 
private reduc getkey(host(x)) = x. 
 




reduc checksign(sign(x,y),pk(y)) = x. 
reduc getmess(sign(x,y)) = x. 
 
(* Shared-key cryptography *) 
 
fun sencrypt/2. 
reduc sdecrypt(sencrypt(x,y),y) = x. 
 






private free secretANa, secretANb, secretBNa, secretBNb. 
query attacker:secretANa; 
      attacker:secretANb; 
      attacker:secretBNa; 
      attacker:secretBNb. 
query ev:endBparam(x) ==> ev:beginBparam(x). 
query ev:endBfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6) ==> 
ev:beginBfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6). 
query ev:endAparam(x) ==> ev:beginAparam(x). 
query ev:endAfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6) ==> 
ev:beginAfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6). 
query evinj:endBparam(x) ==> evinj:beginBparam(x). 
query evinj:endBfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6) ==> 
evinj:beginBfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6). 
query evinj:endAparam(x) ==> evinj:beginAparam(x). 
query evinj:endAfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6) ==> 
evinj:beginAfull(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6). 
 
let processA =   
 (* Choose the other host *) 
 in(c,hostX); 
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 event beginBparam(hostX); 
 (* Message 1: Get the public key certificate for the other host 
*) 
 out(c, (hostA, hostX)); 
 (* Message 2 *) 
 in(c, ms); 
 let (pkX,=hostX) = checksign(ms,pkS) in 
        (* Message 3 *) 
 new Na;  
        out(c, encrypt((Na, hostA), pkX)); 
 (* Message 6 *) 
        in(c, m);  
        let (=Na, NX2, =hostX) = decrypt(m, skA) in 
 event beginBfull(Na, hostA, hostX, pkX, pkA, NX2); 
 (* Message 7 *) 
        out(c, encrypt(NX2, pkX)); 
        (* OK *) 
 if hostX = hostB then 
 event endAparam(hostA); 
 event endAfull(Na, hostA, hostX, pkX, pkA, NX2); 
 out(c, sencrypt(secretANa, Na)); 
 out(c, sencrypt(secretANb, NX2)). 
 
let processB = 
        (* Message 3 *) 
 in(c, m);  
 let (NY, hostY) = decrypt(m, skB) in 
 event beginAparam(hostY); 
 (* Message 4: Get the public key certificate for the other host 
*) 
        out(c, (hostB, hostY)); 
 (* Message 5 *) 
 in(c,ms); 
        let (pkY,=hostY) = checksign(ms,pkS) in 
        (* Message 6 *) 
 new Nb; 
 event beginAfull(NY, hostY, hostB, pkB, pkY, Nb); 
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 out(c, encrypt((NY, Nb, hostB), pkY)); 
        (* Message 7 *) 
 in(c, m3); 
        if Nb = decrypt(m3, skB) then 
 (* OK *) 
        if hostY = hostA then 
 event endBparam(hostB); 
 event endBfull(NY, hostY, hostB, pkB, pkA, Nb); 
 out(c, sencrypt(secretBNa, NY)); 
 out(c, sencrypt(secretBNb, Nb)). 
 
let processS =  in(c,m);  
         let (a,b) = m in 
  let sb = getkey(b) in 
                out(c,sign((sb,b),skS)). 
 
process new skA; let pkA = pk(skA) in 
        out(c, pkA); 
        new skB; let pkB = pk(skB) in 
        out(c, pkB); 
 new skS; let pkS = pk(skS) in 
 out(c, pkS); 
 let hostA = host(pkA) in 
 out(c, hostA); 
 let hostB = host(pkB) in 
 out(c, hostB); 
 ((!processA) | (!processB) | (!processS)) 
Listing 13: ProVerif Spi Calculus NSL Full 2 Protocol Specification 
c. Kerberos 
Listing 14 is the spi calculus Kerberos protocol specification for ProVerif. 
(* 
 * File: kerberos_proverif_pi.txt 
 * Created By: Chris W. Hoffmeister 
 * Created On: 08 Mar 2007 
 * Modified By: - 
 * Modified On: - 
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 * Description: Specification for the Kerberos V5 Protocol from RFC 
4120 of 




 * Environment setup 
 *) 
param attacker = active. 
param keyCompromise = none. 
param traceDisplay = long. 
 
(* 












 *Shared-key cryptography 
 *) 
fun ShareEnc/2. 
reduc ShareDec(ShareEnc(Msg,SharedKey),SharedKey) = Msg. 
 
(* 
 * Secrecy assupmtions 
 *) 
not ltkAKAS. (*Long-term key between User (Alice) and Authentication 
Server*) 
not ltkKASTGS. (*Long-term key between Auth Server and Ticket Server*) 
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 * Queries 
 *) 
private free AttackSuccess. (*Label for Confidentiality Test*) 
query attacker:AttackSuccess. (*Confindentiality Test*) 
(*Authtenication Tests*) 
query evinj:ProtocolCompleteUser(User, Kuaps) ==>  
  evinj:ProtocolTicServ2(User, Kuaps) & evinj:ProtocolAuthServ(User, 
Katgs). 
query evinj:ProtocolTicServ1(User, Kutgs) ==>  
  evinj:ProtocolAuthServ(User, Kutgs). 
query evinj:ProtocolAppServ(User, Kuaps) ==>  
  evinj:ProtocolTicServ2(User, Kuaps). 
 
(* 




 * User Role, Alice 
 *) 
let PrcsUser = ( 
    new Nak; (*Nonce between User and Authentication Server*) 
    out(chnl, (UserA, TicServA, Nak)); (*Step 1: User -> AuthServ*) 
    in(chnl, (UserX, AuthServTicServ, AuthServUser)); 
      (*Step 2: AuthServ -> User*) 
    let (=UserA) = UserX in ( 
        let (=TicServA, Kat, =Nak, Tk) = ShareDec(AuthServUser, 
ltkAKAS) in ( 
            new Nat; (*Nonce between User and Ticket Server*) 
            new Tat; (*New timestamp from User*) 
            out(chnl, (AppServX, Nat, AuthServTicServ,  
              ShareEnc((UserA, Tat), Kat))); (*Step 3: User -> 
TicServ*) 
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            in(chnl, (=UserA, TicServAppServ, TicServUser)); 
              (*Step 4: TicServ -> User*) 
            let (=AppServX, Kab, =Nat, Tt) = ShareDec(TicServUser, Kat) 
in ( 
                new Tab; (*New timestamp form User*) 
                out(chnl, (TicServAppServ, ShareEnc((UserA, Tab), 
Kab))); 
                  (*Step 5: User -> AppServ*) 
                in(chnl, AppServUser); (*Step 6: AppServ -> User*) 
                let (=Tab) = ShareDec(AppServUser, Kab) in ( 
                    event ProtocolCompleteUser(UserA, Kab); 
                    out(chnl, ShareEnc(AttackSuccess, Kab)) 
                ) 
            ) 
        ) 




 * Application Server Role, Bob 
 *) 
let PrcsAppServ = ( 
    in(chnl, (TicServAppServ, UserAppServ)); (*Step 5: User -> 
AppServ*) 
    let (UserX, Kxaps, Tx) = ShareDec(TicServAppServ, ltkAPSTGS) in ( 
        let (=UserX, Txaps) = ShareDec(UserAppServ, Kxaps) in ( 
            out(chnl, ShareEnc(Txaps, Kxaps)); (*Step 6: AppServ -> 
User*) 
            event ProtocolAppServ(UserX, Kxaps) 
        ) 




 * Authentication Server Role 
 *) 
let PrcsAuthServ = ( 
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    in(chnl, UserAuthServ); (*Step 1: User -> AuthServ*) 
    let (UserX, TicServX, Nxk) = UserAuthServ in ( 
        new Kxt; (*New shared key between User and Ticket Distribution 
Server*) 
        new Tk; (*New timestamp from Authentication Server*) 
        out(chnl, (UserX, ShareEnc((UserX, Kxt, Tk), ltkKASTGS),  
          ShareEnc((TicServX, Kxt, Nxk, Tk), ltkAKAS))); 
          (*Step 2: AuthServ -> User*) 
        event ProtocolAuthServ(UserX, Kxt) 




 * Ticket Distribution Server Role 
 *) 
let PrcsTicServ = ( 
    in(chnl, (AppServX, Nxt, AuthServTicServ, UserTicServ)); 
      (*Step 3: User -> TicServ*) 
    let (UserX, Kxt, Tk) = ShareDec(AuthServTicServ, ltkKASTGS) in ( 
        let (=UserX, Txt) = ShareDec(UserTicServ, Kxt) in ( 
            event ProtocolTicServ1(UserX, Kxt); 
            new Kxaps; (*New shared key between User and Application 
Server*) 
            new Tt; (*New timestamp from Ticket Server*) 
            out(chnl, (UserX, ShareEnc((UserX, Kxaps, Tt), ltkAPSTGS),  
              ShareEnc((AppServX, Kxaps, Nxt, Tt), Kxt))); 
              (*Step 4: TicServ -> User*) 
            event ProtocolTicServ2(UserX, Kxaps) 
        ) 




 * Protocol Instantiation 
 *) 
process 
    new ltkAKAS; 
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    new ltkKASTGS; 
    new ltkAPSTGS; 
    ((!PrcsUser) | (!PrcsAuthServ) | (!PrcsTicServ) | (!PrcsAppServ)) 
Listing 14: ProVerif Spi Calculus Kerberos Protocol Specification 
2. Performance Test Scripts 
a. Execution Time & Main Memory Requirement 
Listing 15 is the execution time and main memory requirement for 
ProVerif for the NS Full 2 protocol. 
#!/bin/bash 
# File:        NS_full_2_proverif_pi.sh 
# Created By:  Chris W. Hoffmeister 
# Created On:  05 Mar 2007 
# Modified By: - 
# Modified On: - 
# Description: Shell script to test Execution Time of 
NS_full_2_proverif_pi.txt 
 




trials=5 # Default number of experiments to run 
 
# Determines if the number of trials was passed in 
if [ $# -eq 1 ] 
then 
# Number of trials was passed in 
    trials=$1 
fi 
 
echo "Begin Test: Execution Time: Proverif-NS Full 2" > 
$resultsdir/proverif/NS_full_2_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
date >> $resultsdir/proverif/NS_full_2_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
 
# Perform trials 
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for ((trial=0; trial<trials; trial=trial+1)) do 
    echo "Trial:  $trial" >> 
$resultsdir/proverif/NS_full_2_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
    # We're not concerned with the output, merely the execution time 
    # Have to explicitly map to time function, other wise 
/bin/bash/time will be used 
    /usr/bin/time -f "Command:        %C\nUser Time:      
%U(sec)\nSystem Time:    %S(sec)\nMaximum Memory: %M(KB)\nExit Status:    
%x" $proverifdir/./analyzer -in pi 
$specsdir/proverif/NS_full_2_proverif_pi.txt > /dev/null 
done 
 
echo "End Test:   Execution Time: Proverif-NS Full 2" >> 
$resultsdir/proverif/NS_full_2_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
Listing 15: ProVerif Spi Calculus NS Full 2 Protocol Test Script 
Listing 16 is the execution time and main memory requirement test script 
for ProVerif for the NSL Full 2 protocol. 
#!/bin/bash 
# File:        NSL_full_2_proverif_pi.sh 
# Created By:  Chris W. Hoffmeister 
# Created On:  05 Mar 2007 
# Modified By: - 
# Modified On: - 
# Description: Shell script to test Execution Time of 
NSL_full_2_proverif_pi.txt 
 




trials=5 # Default number of experiments to run 
 
# Determines if the number of trials was passed in 
if [ $# -eq 1 ] 
then 
# Number of trials was passed in 
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    trials=$1 
fi 
 
echo "Begin Test: Execution Time: Proverif-NSL Full 2" > 
$resultsdir/proverif/NSL_full_2_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
date >> $resultsdir/proverif/NSL_full_2_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
 
# Perform trials 
for ((trial=0; trial<trials; trial=trial+1)) do 
    echo "Trial:  $trial" >> 
$resultsdir/proverif/NSL_full_2_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
    # We're not concerned with the output, merely the execution time 
    # Have to explicitly map to time function, other wise 
/bin/bash/time will be used 
    /usr/bin/time -f "Command:        %C\nUser Time:      
%U(sec)\nSystem Time:    %S(sec)\nMaximum Memory: %M(KB)\nExit Status:    
%x" $proverifdir/./analyzer -in pi 
$specsdir/proverif/NSL_full_2_proverif_pi.txt > /dev/null 
done 
 
echo "End Test:   Execution Time: Proverif-NSL Full 2" >> 
$resultsdir/proverif/NSL_full_2_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
Listing 16: ProVerif Spi Calculus NSL Full 2 Protocol Test Script 
Listing 17 is the execution time and main memory requirement test script 
for ProVerif for the Kerberos protocol. 
#!/bin/bash 
# File:        kerberos_proverif_pi.sh 
# Created By:  Chris W. Hoffmeister 
# Created On:  05 Mar 2007 
# Modified By: - 
# Modified On: - 
# Description: Shell script to test Execution Time of 
kerberos_proverif_pi.txt 
 





trials=5 # Default number of experiments to run 
 
# Determines if the number of trials was passed in 
if [ $# -eq 1 ] 
then 
# Number of trials was passed in 
    trials=$1 
fi 
 
echo "Begin Test: Execution Time: Proverif-Kerberos" > 
$resultsdir/proverif/kerberos_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
date >> $resultsdir/proverif/kerberos_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
 
# Perform trials 
for ((trial=0; trial<trials; trial=trial+1)) do 
    echo "Trial:  $trial" >> 
$resultsdir/proverif/kerberos_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
    # We're not concerned with the output, merely the execution time 
    # Have to explicitly map to time function, other wise 
/bin/bash/time will be used 
    /usr/bin/time -f "Command:        %C\nUser Time:      
%U(sec)\nSystem Time:    %S(sec)\nMaximum Memory: %M(KB)\nExit Status:    
%x" $proverifdir/./analyzer -in pi 
$specsdir/proverif/kerberos_proverif_pi.txt > /dev/null 
done 
 
echo "End Test:   Execution Time: Proverif-Kerberos" >> 
$resultsdir/proverif/kerberos_proverif_pi_exec.txt 
Listing 17: ProVerif Spi Calculus Kerberos Protocol Test Script 
b. Secondary Memory Requirement 
Listing 18 is the secondary memory requirement test script for ProVerif. 
#!/bin/bash 
# File:  proverif_second_mem.sh 
# Created By: Chris W. Hoffmeister 
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# Created On: 06 Feb 2007 
# Modified On: - 
# Modified By: - 
# Description: Script that runs ls to determine ProVerif size on disk 
 




# Perform experiment 
ls -lkR $tooldir | grep -F "$tooldir 
total " > $resultsdir/proverif/proverif_second_mem.txt 
Listing 18: ProVerif Secondary Memory Requirement Test Script 
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APPENDIX C: EVALUATION DATA 
Here we present the raw data that was collected during the evaluation of CPSA 
and ProVerif and the calculated data used in the evaluation methodology. 
A. CPSA 
1. Observed Correctness Criteria 
a. Confidentiality & Authentication 
Listing 19 is the collected data for CPSA for the simplified version of the 
NS protocol. The gray background portions of the listing show that CPSA identified that 
there exists a weakness in the protocol. Specifically the highlighted sections show that a 
man in the middle attack exists in the NS protocol. 
CPSA> (* 
>  * File:         NS_simple_2_cpsa.cpsa 
>  * Created By:   Chris W. Hoffmeister 
>  * Created On:   21 Jan 2007 
>  * Modified By:  - 
>  * Modified On:  - 
>  * Description:  Simplified specification for the Needham-Schroeder 
Protocol 2, 
>  *               from [NEED1978] for the Cryptographic Protocol 
Shapes Analyzer 
>  *               (CPSA) protocol analysis system. This specification 
is meant 
>  *               to be run via the batch mode of CPSA. 
>  *) 
>  
> (* 
>  * Protocol Specification 
>  *) 
> protocol ns_simple_2=( 
>  
> (* 
>  * Initiator Role, Alice 
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>  *) 
>     role init(A:name; B:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
>         non=(privk(A)) 
>         uniq=(Na) 
>         messages=( 
>             + {A, Na}pubk(B); 
>             - {Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
>             + {Nb}pubk(B); 
>         ); 
>     ) 
>  
> (* 
>  * Responder Role, Bob 
>  *) 
>     role resp(A:name; B:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
>         non=(privk(B)) 
>         uniq=(Nb) 
>         messages=( 
>             - {A, Na}pubk(B); 
>             + {Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
>             - {Nb}pubk(B); 
>         ) 




>  * Analyzer Commands 
>  *) 
> (* 
>  * Test the initiator role, Alice 
>  *) 
> create init[3] 
instantiated strand 
 
CPSA:ns_simple_2*> non privk(B) (* Assume the single instance of the 
responder is honest *) 




unrealized input(A:name;Na:nonce;B:name;Nb:nonce) = 
( 
   strands = ( 
      original = init(A;B;Na;Nb)[3]; 
      ); 
    
   non = (privk(A);privk(B)); 
   uniq = (Na); 
   safe = (); 
   order = ( 
       
      ); 
   ) 
 
CPSA:ns_simple_2*> discover 
realized output(B:name;A:name;Na:nonce;Nb:nonce) = 
( 
   strands = ( 
      original = init(A;B;Na;Nb)[3]; 
      resp-1 = resp(A;B;Na;Nb)[2]; 
      ); 
    
   non = (privk(A);privk(B)); 
   uniq = (Na;Nb); 
   safe = (privk(A);privk(B);Na;Nb); 
   order = ( 
      original[1] <= resp-1[1]; 
      resp-1[2] <= original[2]; 
      ); 
   ) 
 
CPSA:ns_simple_2*> (* 
>  * Test the responder role, Bob 
>  *) 




CPSA:ns_simple_2*> non privk(A) (* Assume the single instance of the 
initiator is honest *) 
added to non 
 
CPSA:ns_simple_2*> printskel 
unrealized input(A:name;Na:nonce;B:name;Nb:nonce) = 
( 
   strands = ( 
      original = resp(A;B;Na;Nb)[3]; 
      ); 
    
   non = (privk(B);privk(A)); 
   uniq = (Nb); 
   safe = (); 
   order = ( 
       
      ); 
   ) 
 
CPSA:ns_simple_2*> discover 
realized output(B:name;A:name;Na:nonce;B1:name;Nb:nonce) = 
( 
   strands = ( 
      original = resp(A;B;Na;Nb)[3]; 
      init-1 = init(A;B1;Na;Nb)[3]; 
      ); 
    
   non = (privk(B);privk(A)); 
   uniq = (Nb;Na); 
   safe = (privk(B);privk(A)); 
   order = ( 
      original[2] <= init-1[2]; 
      init-1[1] <= original[1]; 
      init-1[3] <= original[3]; 
      ); 
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   ) 
Listing 19: CPSA NS Simple 2 Observed Correctness Test Data 
Listing 20 is the data collected for CPSA for the full version of the NS 
protocol. Again the gray background portion of the listing shows that CPSA identified 
that there exists a weakness in the protocol. The highlighted portions also show that Alice 
and Bob need not use the exact same servers to get each others certificates. 
CPSA> (* 
>  * File:         NS_full_2_cpsa.cpsa 
>  * Created By:   Chris W. Hoffmeister 
>  * Created On:   21 Jan 2007 
>  * Modified By:  - 
>  * Modified On:  - 
>  * Description:  Full specification for the Needham-Schroeder 
Protocol 2, from 
>  *               [NEED1978] for the Cryptographic Protocol Shapes 
Analyzer 
>  *               (CPSA) protocol analysis system. This specification 
is meant 
>  *               to be run via the batch mode of CPSA. 
>  *) 
>  
> (* 
>  * Protocol Specification 
>  *) 
> protocol ns_full_2=( 
>  
> (* 
>  * Initiator Role, Alice 
>  *) 
>     role init(A:name; B:name; S:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
>         non=(privk(A)) 
>         uniq=(Na) 
>         messages=( 
>             + (A, B); 
>             - {B, pubk(B)}privk(S); 
>             + {A, Na}pubk(B); 
 110 
>             - {Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
>             + {Nb}pubk(B); 
>         ) 
>     ) 
>  
> (* 
>  * Responder Role, Bob 
>  *) 
>     role resp(A:name; B:name; S:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
>         non=(privk(B)) 
>         uniq=(Nb) 
>         messages=( 
>             - {A, Na}pubk(B); 
>             + (B, A); 
>             - {A, pubk(A)}privk(S); 
>             + {Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
>             - {Nb}pubk(B); 
>         ) 
>     ) 
>  
> (* 
>  * Server Role, Server 
>  *) 
>     role serv(A:name; B:name; S:name)=( 
>         non=(privk(S)) 
>         uniq=() 
>         messages=( 
>             - (A, B); 
>             + {B, pubk(B)}privk(S); 
>             - (B, A); 
>             + {A, pubk(A)}privk(S); 
>         ) 




>  * Analyzer Commands 
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>  *) 
> (* 
>  * Test the initiator role, Alice 
>  *) 
> create init[5] 
instantiated strand 
 
CPSA:ns_full_2*> non privk(B) (* Assume the single instance of the 
responder is honest *) 
added to non 
 
CPSA:ns_full_2*> printskel 
unrealized input(S:name;A:name;Na:nonce;B:name;Nb:nonce) = 
( 
   strands = ( 
      original = init(A;B;S;Na;Nb)[5]; 
      ); 
    
   non = (privk(A);privk(B)); 
   uniq = (Na); 
   safe = (); 
   order = ( 
       
      ); 
   ) 
 
CPSA:ns_full_2*> discover 
realized output(S:name;B:name;S1:name;A:name;Na:nonce;Nb:nonce) = 
( 
   strands = ( 
      original = init(A;B;S;Na;Nb)[5]; 
      resp-1 = resp(A;B;S1;Na;Nb)[4]; 
      ); 
    
   non = (privk(A);privk(B)); 
   uniq = (Na;Nb); 
   safe = (privk(A);privk(B);Na;Nb); 
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   order = ( 
      original[3] <= resp-1[1]; 
      resp-1[4] <= original[4]; 
      ); 
   ) 
 
CPSA:ns_full_2*> (* 
>  * Test the responder role, Bob 
>  *) 
> create resp[5] 
instantiated strand 
 
CPSA:ns_full_2*> non privk(A) (* Assume the single instance of the 
initiator is honest *) 
added to non 
 
CPSA:ns_full_2*> printskel 
unrealized input(S:name;A:name;Na:nonce;B:name;Nb:nonce) = 
( 
   strands = ( 
      original = resp(A;B;S;Na;Nb)[5]; 
      ); 
    
   non = (privk(B);privk(A)); 
   uniq = (Nb); 
   safe = (); 
   order = ( 
       
      ); 






   strands = ( 
      original = resp(A;B;S;Na;Nb)[5]; 
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      init-1 = init(A;B1;S1;Na;Nb)[5]; 
      ); 
    
   non = (privk(B);privk(A)); 
   uniq = (Nb;Na); 
   safe = (privk(B);privk(A)); 
   order = ( 
      original[4] <= init-1[4]; 
      init-1[3] <= original[1]; 
      init-1[5] <= original[5]; 
      ); 
   ) 
Listing 20: CPSA NS Full 2 Observed Correctness Test Data 
Listing 21 lists the data from the CPSA NSL Simple 2 Observed 
Correctness Test. The gray background section shows that the only strands possible are 
from the expected participants and therefore that the protocol is secure. 
CPSA> (* 
>  * File:         NSL_simple_2_cpsa.cpsa 
>  * Created By:   Chris W. Hoffmeister 
>  * Created On:   21 Jan 2007 
>  * Modified By:  - 
>  * Modified On:  - 
>  * Description:  Simplified specification for the Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe 
>  *               Protocol from [LOWE1996] for the Cryptographic 
Protocol 
>  *               Shapes Analyzer (CPSA) protocol analysis system. 
This 
>  *               specification is meant to be run via the batch mode 
of CPSA. 
>  *) 
>  
> (* 
>  * Protocol Specification 
>  *) 




>  * Initiator Role, Alice 
>  *) 
>     role init(A:name; B:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
>         non=(privk(A)) 
>         uniq=(Na) 
>         messages=( 
>             + {A, Na}pubk(B); 
>             - {B, Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
>             + {Nb}pubk(B); 
>         ); 
>     ) 
>  
> (* 
>  * Responder Role, Bob 
>  *) 
>     role resp(A:name; B:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
>         non=(privk(B)) 
>         uniq=(Nb) 
>         messages=( 
>             - {A, Na}pubk(B); 
>             + {B, Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
>             - {Nb}pubk(B); 
>         ) 




>  * Analyzer Commands 
>  *) 
> (* 
>  * Test the initiator role, Alice 
>  *) 




CPSA:nsl_simple_2*> non privk(B) (* Assume the single instance of the 
responder is honest *) 
added to non 
 
CPSA:nsl_simple_2*> printskel 
unrealized input(A:name;Na:nonce;B:name;Nb:nonce) =  
   ( 
   strands = ( 
      original = init(A;B;Na;Nb)[3]; 
      ); 
    
   non = (privk(A);privk(B)); 
   uniq = (Na); 
   safe = (); 
   order = ( 
       
      ); 
   ) 
 
CPSA:nsl_simple_2*> discover 
realized output(A:name;B:name;Na:nonce;Nb:nonce) =  
   ( 
   strands = ( 
      original = init(A;B;Na;Nb)[3]; 
      resp-1 = resp(A;B;Na;Nb)[2]; 
      ); 
    
   non = (privk(A);privk(B)); 
   uniq = (Na;Nb); 
   safe = (privk(A);privk(B);Na;Nb); 
   order = ( 
      original[1] <= resp-1[1]; 
      resp-1[2] <= original[2]; 
      ); 




>  * Test the responder role, Bob 
>  *) 
> create resp[3] 
instantiated strand 
 
CPSA:nsl_simple_2*> non privk(A) (* Assume the single instance of the 
initiator is honest *) 
added to non 
 
CPSA:nsl_simple_2*> printskel 
unrealized input(A:name;Na:nonce;B:name;Nb:nonce) =  
   ( 
   strands = ( 
      original = resp(A;B;Na;Nb)[3]; 
      ); 
    
   non = (privk(B);privk(A)); 
   uniq = (Nb); 
   safe = (); 
   order = ( 
       
      ); 
   ) 
 
CPSA:nsl_simple_2*> discover 
realized output(A:name;Na:nonce;B:name;Nb:nonce) =  
   ( 
   strands = ( 
      original = resp(A;B;Na;Nb)[3]; 
      init-1 = init(A;B;Na;Nb)[3]; 
      ); 
    
   non = (privk(B);privk(A)); 
   uniq = (Nb;Na); 
   safe = (privk(B);privk(A);Nb;Na); 
   order = ( 
      original[2] <= init-1[2]; 
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      init-1[1] <= original[1]; 
      init-1[3] <= original[3]; 
      ); 
   ) 
 
Listing 21: CPSA NSL Simple 2 Observed Correctness Test Data 
Listing 22 lists the data from the CPSA NSL Full 2 Observed Correctness 
Test. The gray background section shows that the only strands possible are from the 
expected participants and therefore that the protocol is secure. As expected the 
highlighted section also shows that Alice and Bob do not need to use the same certificate 
server. 
CPSA> (* 
>  * File:         NSL_full_2_cpsa.cpsa 
>  * Created By:   Chris W. Hoffmeister 
>  * Created On:   21 Jan 2007 
>  * Modified By:  - 
>  * Modified On:  - 
>  * Description:  Full specification for the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe 
Protocol 
>  *               from [LOWE1996] for the Cryptographic Protocol 
Shapes Analyzer 
>  *               (CPSA) protocol analysis system. This specification 
is meant 
>  *               to be run via the batch mode of CPSA. 
>  *) 
>  
> (* 
>  * Protocol Specification 
>  *) 
> protocol nsl_full_2=( 
>  
> (* 
>  * Initiator Role, Alice 
>  *) 
>     role init(A:name; B:name; S:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
>         non=(privk(A)) 
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>         uniq=(Na) 
>         messages=( 
>             + (A, B); 
>             - {B, pubk(B)}privk(S); 
>             + {A, Na}pubk(B); 
>             - {B, Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
>             + {Nb}pubk(B); 
>         ) 
>     ) 
>  
> (* 
>  * Responder Role, Bob 
>  *) 
>     role resp(A:name; B:name; S:name; Na:nonce; Nb:nonce)=( 
>         non=(privk(B)) 
>         uniq=(Nb) 
>         messages=( 
>             - {A, Na}pubk(B); 
>             + (B, A); 
>             - {A, pubk(A)}privk(S); 
>             + {B, Na, Nb}pubk(A); 
>             - {Nb}pubk(B); 
>         ) 
>     ) 
>  
> (* 
>  * Server Role, Server 
>  *) 
>     role serv(A:name; B:name; S:name)=( 
>         non=(privk(S)) 
>         uniq=() 
>         messages=( 
>             - (A, B); 
>             + {B, pubk(B)}privk(S); 
>             - (B, A); 
>             + {A, pubk(A)}privk(S); 
>         ) 
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>  * Analyzer Commands 
>  *) 
> (* 
>  * Test the initiator role, Alice 
>  *) 
> create init[5] 
instantiated strand 
 
CPSA:nsl_full_2*> non privk(B) (* Assume the single instance of the 
responder is honest *) 
added to non 
 
CPSA:nsl_full_2*> printskel 
unrealized input(S:name;A:name;Na:nonce;B:name;Nb:nonce) =  
   ( 
   strands = ( 
      original = init(A;B;S;Na;Nb)[5]; 
      ); 
    
   non = (privk(A);privk(B)); 
   uniq = (Na); 
   safe = (); 
   order = ( 
       
      ); 
   ) 
 
CPSA:nsl_full_2*> discover 
realized output(S:name;S1:name;A:name;B:name;Na:nonce;Nb:nonce) =  
   ( 
   strands = ( 
      original = init(A;B;S;Na;Nb)[5]; 
      resp-1 = resp(A;B;S1;Na;Nb)[4]; 
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      ); 
    
   non = (privk(A);privk(B)); 
   uniq = (Na;Nb); 
   safe = (privk(A);privk(B);Na;Nb); 
   order = ( 
      original[3] <= resp-1[1]; 
      resp-1[4] <= original[4]; 
      ); 
   ) 
 
CPSA:nsl_full_2*> (* 
>  * Test the responder role, Bob 
>  *) 
> create resp[5] 
instantiated strand 
 
CPSA:nsl_full_2*> non privk(A) (* Assume the single instance of the 
initiator is honest *) 
added to non 
 
CPSA:nsl_full_2*> printskel 
unrealized input(S:name;A:name;Na:nonce;B:name;Nb:nonce) =  
   ( 
   strands = ( 
      original = resp(A;B;S;Na;Nb)[5]; 
      ); 
    
   non = (privk(B);privk(A)); 
   uniq = (Nb); 
   safe = (); 
   order = ( 
       
      ); 




realized output(S:name;S1:name;A:name;Na:nonce;B:name;Nb:nonce) =  
   ( 
   strands = ( 
      original = resp(A;B;S;Na;Nb)[5]; 
      init-1 = init(A;B;S1;Na;Nb)[5]; 
      ); 
    
   non = (privk(B);privk(A)); 
   uniq = (Nb;Na); 
   safe = (privk(B);privk(A);Nb;Na); 
   order = ( 
      original[4] <= init-1[4]; 
      init-1[3] <= original[1]; 
      init-1[5] <= original[5]; 
      ); 
   ) 
Listing 22: CPSA NSL Full 2 Observed Correctness Test Data 
2. Performance Criteria 
a. Execution Time 
Table 31 presents the execution time data collected for the full version of 
the NS Protocol 2 as discussed in [NEED1978] for CPSA. From this the CI+ value for the 


















0 5.48 10 5.49 20 5.49 30 5.49 40 5.6 
1 5.48 11 5.49 21 5.5 31 5.49 41 5.48 
2 5.47 12 5.49 22 5.48 32 5.48 42 5.48 
3 5.49 13 5.5 23 5.49 33 5.49 43 5.48 
4 5.47 14 5.48 24 5.49 34 5.49 44 5.48 
5 5.48 15 5.49 25 5.47 35 5.49 45 5.5 
6 5.48 16 5.5 26 5.47 36 5.48 46 5.49 
7 5.47 17 5.5 27 5.51 37 5.48 47 5.49 
8 5.48 18 5.48 28 5.48 38 5.48 48 5.48 
9 5.48 19 5.49 29 5.48 39 5.49 49 5.47 
- - - - - - - - 50 5.48 
Table 31: CPSA NS Full 2 Execution Criterion Test Data 
Table 32 presents the execution time data collected for the full version of 
the NSL Protocol 2 as discussed in [LOWE1996] for CPSA. From this the CI+ value for 


















0 5.48 10 5.49 20 5.49 30 5.49 40 5.6 
1 5.48 11 5.49 21 5.5 31 5.49 41 5.48 
2 5.47 12 5.49 22 5.48 32 5.48 42 5.48 
3 5.49 13 5.5 23 5.49 33 5.49 43 5.48 
4 5.47 14 5.48 24 5.49 34 5.49 44 5.48 
5 5.48 15 5.49 25 5.47 35 5.49 45 5.5 
6 5.48 16 5.5 26 5.47 36 5.48 46 5.49 
7 5.47 17 5.5 27 5.51 37 5.48 47 5.49 
8 5.48 18 5.48 28 5.48 38 5.48 48 5.48 
9 5.48 19 5.49 29 5.48 39 5.49 49 5.47 
- - - - - - - - 50 5.48 
Table 32: CPSA NSL Full 2 Execution Criterion Test Data 
b. Secondary Memory Requirement 
Listing 23 presents the secondary memory requirement data collected for 






























Listing 23: CPSA Secondary Memory Requirement Criterion Test Data 
c. Main Memory Requirement 
Table 33 presents the main memory requirement data collected for the full 
version of the NS Protocol 2 as discussed in [NEED1978] for CPSA. From this the CI+ 



















0 0 10 0 20 0 30 0 40 0 
1 0 11 0 21 0 31 0 41 0 
2 0 12 0 22 0 32 0 42 0 
3 0 13 0 23 0 33 0 43 0 
4 0 14 0 24 0 34 0 44 0 
5 0 15 0 25 0 35 0 45 0 
6 0 16 0 26 0 36 0 46 0 
7 0 17 0 27 0 37 0 47 0 
8 0 18 0 28 0 38 0 48 0 
9 0 19 0 29 0 39 0 49 0 
- - - - - - - - 50 0 
Table 33: CPSA NS Full 2 Main Memory Requirement Criterion Test Data 
Table 34 presents the main memory requirement data collected for the full 
version of the NSL Protocol 2 as discussed in [LOWE1996] for CPSA. From this the CI+ 



















0 0 10 0 20 0 30 0 40 0 
1 0 11 0 21 0 31 0 41 0 
2 0 12 0 22 0 32 0 42 0 
3 0 13 0 23 0 33 0 43 0 
4 0 14 0 24 0 34 0 44 0 
5 0 15 0 25 0 35 0 45 0 
6 0 16 0 26 0 36 0 46 0 
7 0 17 0 27 0 37 0 47 0 
8 0 18 0 28 0 38 0 48 0 
9 0 19 0 29 0 39 0 49 0 
- - - - - - - - 50 0 
Table 34: CPSA NSL Full 2 Main Memory Requirement Criterion Test Data 
B. PROVERIF 
1. Observed Correctness Criteria 
a. Confidentiality & Authentication 
Listing 24 is the collected data for Proverif for the full version of the NS 
protocol. The gray background portions of the listing show that Proverif identified that 
there exists a weakness in the protocol. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_40,v_40 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_42,y_43) -> attacker:x_42 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_44,y_45) & attacker:y_45 -> attacker:x_44 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_46,y_47) & attacker:pk(y_47) -> attacker:x_46 
Rule 4: attacker:v_49 & attacker:v_48 -> attacker:encrypt(v_49,v_48) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_51 & attacker:v_50 -> attacker:sign(v_51,v_50) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_52 -> attacker:host(v_52) 
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Rule 7: attacker:v_53 -> attacker:pk(v_53) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_54,pk(y_55)) & attacker:y_55 -> 
attacker:x_54 
Rule 9: attacker:v_57 & attacker:v_56 -> attacker:sencrypt(v_57,v_56) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_59 & attacker:v_58 -> attacker:(v_59,v_58) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_61,v_60) -> attacker:v_61 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_63,v_62) -> attacker:v_62 
Rule 13: mess:v_65,v_64 & attacker:v_65 -> attacker:v_64 
Rule 14: attacker:v_67 & attacker:v_66 -> mess:v_67,v_66 
Rule 15: attacker:c[] 
Rule 16: attacker:new_name[v_68] 
Rule 17: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 18: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 19: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 20: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 21: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 22: attacker:v_71 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_71) 









,sid_91],v_92),pk(skA[])) & attacker:sign((v_90,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]) 





,sid_94],v_95),pk(skA[])) & attacker:sign((v_93,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]) 






,sid_97],v_98),pk(skA[])) & attacker:sign((v_96,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]) 
& attacker:host(pk(skB[])) -> attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_98) 




_113,v_114),skS[]),encrypt((v_115,v_114),pk(skB[])),sid_116]), ms_26 = 
sign((v_113,v_114),skS[]), m_23 = encrypt((v_115,v_114),pk(skB[])), 









pk(skB[])),sid_122]), m3_28 = 
encrypt(Nb[sign((v_120,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]),encrypt((v_121,host(pk(s
kA[]))),pk(skB[])),sid_122],pk(skB[])), ms_26 = 
sign((v_120,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]), m_23 = 









pk(skB[])),sid_125]), m3_28 = 
encrypt(Nb[sign((v_123,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]),encrypt((v_124,host(pk(s
kA[]))),pk(skB[])),sid_125],pk(skB[])), ms_26 = 
sign((v_123,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]), m_23 = 






Rule 32: attacker:(v_131,host(x_132)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_132,host(x_132)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skS[] 







kB[])),sid_621]), ms_26 = sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]), m_23 
= 
encrypt((Na[sign((pk(skB[]),host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]),host(pk(skB[])),end






RESULT evinj:endAfull(x1_34,x2_35,x3_36,x4_37,x5_38,x6_39) ==> 
evinj:beginAfull(x1_34,x2_35,x3_36,x4_37,x5_38,x6_39) is true. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_639,v_639 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_641,y_642) -> attacker:x_641 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_643,y_644) & attacker:y_644 -> 
attacker:x_643 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_645,y_646) & attacker:pk(y_646) -> 
attacker:x_645 
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Rule 4: attacker:v_648 & attacker:v_647 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_648,v_647) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_650 & attacker:v_649 -> attacker:sign(v_650,v_649) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_651 -> attacker:host(v_651) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_652 -> attacker:pk(v_652) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_653,pk(y_654)) & attacker:y_654 -> 
attacker:x_653 
Rule 9: attacker:v_656 & attacker:v_655 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_656,v_655) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_658 & attacker:v_657 -> attacker:(v_658,v_657) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_660,v_659) -> attacker:v_660 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_662,v_661) -> attacker:v_661 
Rule 13: mess:v_664,v_663 & attacker:v_664 -> attacker:v_663 
Rule 14: attacker:v_666 & attacker:v_665 -> mess:v_666,v_665 
Rule 15: attacker:c[] 
Rule 16: attacker:new_name[v_667] 
Rule 17: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 18: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 19: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 20: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 21: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 22: attacker:v_670 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_670) 























attacker:sign((v_695,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]) & attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
-> attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_697) 
Rule 28: begin:beginAparam(v_705), m_23 = 
encrypt((v_704,v_705),pk(skB[])), sid_99 = sid_706 & 
attacker:encrypt((v_704,v_705),pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skB[])),v_705) 
Rule 29: attacker:sign((v_712,v_713),skS[]) & begin:beginAparam(v_713), 
ms_26 = sign((v_712,v_713),skS[]), m_23 = 








begin:beginAparam(host(pk(skA[]))), m3_28 = 
encrypt(Nb[sign((v_719,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]),encrypt((v_720,host(pk(s
kA[]))),pk(skB[])),sid_721],pk(skB[])), ms_26 = 
sign((v_719,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]), m_23 = 







begin:beginAparam(host(pk(skA[]))), m3_28 = 
encrypt(Nb[sign((v_722,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]),encrypt((v_723,host(pk(s
kA[]))),pk(skB[])),sid_724],pk(skB[])), ms_26 = 
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sign((v_722,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]), m_23 = 




Rule 32: attacker:(v_730,host(x_731)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_731,host(x_731)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skS[] 
Starting query evinj:endAparam(x_638) ==> evinj:beginAparam(x_638) 
goal reachable: begin:beginAparam(host(pk(skA[]))), ms_26 = 
sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]), m_23 = 
encrypt((Na[sign((pk(skB[]),host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]),host(pk(skB[])),end
sid_1219],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(skB[])), sid_99 = sid_1220 -> 
end:endsid_1219,endAparam(host(pk(skA[]))) 
RESULT evinj:endAparam(x_638) ==> evinj:beginAparam(x_638) is true. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_1233,v_1233 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_1235,y_1236) -> attacker:x_1235 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_1237,y_1238) & attacker:y_1238 -> 
attacker:x_1237 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_1239,y_1240) & attacker:pk(y_1240) -> 
attacker:x_1239 
Rule 4: attacker:v_1242 & attacker:v_1241 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_1242,v_1241) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_1244 & attacker:v_1243 -> 
attacker:sign(v_1244,v_1243) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_1245 -> attacker:host(v_1245) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_1246 -> attacker:pk(v_1246) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_1247,pk(y_1248)) & attacker:y_1248 -> 
attacker:x_1247 
Rule 9: attacker:v_1250 & attacker:v_1249 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_1250,v_1249) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_1252 & attacker:v_1251 -> attacker:(v_1252,v_1251) 
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Rule 11: attacker:(v_1254,v_1253) -> attacker:v_1254 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_1256,v_1255) -> attacker:v_1255 
Rule 13: mess:v_1258,v_1257 & attacker:v_1258 -> attacker:v_1257 
Rule 14: attacker:v_1260 & attacker:v_1259 -> mess:v_1260,v_1259 
Rule 15: attacker:c[] 
Rule 16: attacker:new_name[v_1261] 
Rule 17: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 18: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 19: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 20: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 21: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 22: attacker:v_1264 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_1264) 





k(skA[])),v_1280,v_1279,pk(skA[]),v_1282), m_32 = 
encrypt((Na[sign((v_1279,v_1280),skS[]),v_1280,sid_1281],v_1282),pk(skA
[])), ms_30 = sign((v_1279,v_1280),skS[]), hostX_29 = v_1280, sid_69 = 
sid_1281 & 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((v_1279,v_1280),skS[]),v_1280,sid_1281],v_128







84],v_1285),pk(skA[])), ms_30 = sign((v_1283,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]), 













87],v_1288),pk(skA[])), ms_30 = sign((v_1286,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]), 




attacker:host(pk(skB[])) -> attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_1288) 
Rule 27: attacker:encrypt((v_1295,v_1296),pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skB[])),v_1296) 


























Rule 32: attacker:(v_1324,host(x_1325)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_1325,host(x_1325)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 













skA[]))),pk(skB[])),endsid_1852]),pk(skA[])), ms_30 = 
sign((pk(y_1850),host(pk(y_1850))),skS[]), hostX_29 = host(pk(y_1850)), 


































skA[]))),pk(skB[])),endsid_1941]),pk(skA[])), ms_30 = 
sign((pk(y_1935),host(pk(y_1935))),skS[]), hostX_29 = host(pk(y_1935)), 
sid_69 = sid_1932 





          duplicate attacker:sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]) 
          duplicate 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_1935),host(pk(y_1935))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_1935)),sid_1932],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(skB[])) 
        duplicate attacker:sign((pk(y_1935),host(pk(y_1935))),skS[]) 
        duplicate attacker:host(pk(y_1935)) 
      hypothesis attacker:y_1935 
    duplicate attacker:pk(skB[]) 
  rule 32 attacker:sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]) 
    2-tuple attacker:(v_1870,host(pk(skA[]))) 
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      any attacker:v_1870 
      duplicate attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
  rule 4 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_1935),host(pk(y_1935))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_1935)),sid_1932],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(skB[])) 
    2-tuple 
attacker:(Na[sign((pk(y_1935),host(pk(y_1935))),skS[]),host(pk(y_1935))
,sid_1932],host(pk(skA[]))) 
      0-th 
attacker:Na[sign((pk(y_1935),host(pk(y_1935))),skS[]),host(pk(y_1935)),
sid_1932] 
        rule 8 
attacker:(Na[sign((pk(y_1935),host(pk(y_1935))),skS[]),host(pk(y_1935))
,sid_1932],host(pk(skA[]))) 
          rule 23 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_1935),host(pk(y_1935))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_1935)),sid_1932],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(y_1935)) 
            rule 32 attacker:sign((pk(y_1935),host(pk(y_1935))),skS[]) 
              2-tuple attacker:(v_1878,host(pk(y_1935))) 
                any attacker:v_1878 
                duplicate attacker:host(pk(y_1935)) 
            rule 6 attacker:host(pk(y_1935)) 
              rule 7 attacker:pk(y_1935) 
                hypothesis attacker:y_1935 
          hypothesis attacker:y_1935 
      rule 6 attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
        rule 17 attacker:pk(skA[]) 
    rule 18 attacker:pk(skB[]) 
 
A more detailed output of the traces is available with 
  param traceDisplay = long. 

































































-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_2117,v_2117 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_2119,y_2120) -> attacker:x_2119 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_2121,y_2122) & attacker:y_2122 -> 
attacker:x_2121 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_2123,y_2124) & attacker:pk(y_2124) -> 
attacker:x_2123 
Rule 4: attacker:v_2126 & attacker:v_2125 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_2126,v_2125) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_2128 & attacker:v_2127 -> 
attacker:sign(v_2128,v_2127) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_2129 -> attacker:host(v_2129) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_2130 -> attacker:pk(v_2130) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_2131,pk(y_2132)) & attacker:y_2132 -> 
attacker:x_2131 
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Rule 9: attacker:v_2134 & attacker:v_2133 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_2134,v_2133) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_2136 & attacker:v_2135 -> attacker:(v_2136,v_2135) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_2138,v_2137) -> attacker:v_2138 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_2140,v_2139) -> attacker:v_2139 
Rule 13: mess:v_2142,v_2141 & attacker:v_2142 -> attacker:v_2141 
Rule 14: attacker:v_2144 & attacker:v_2143 -> mess:v_2144,v_2143 
Rule 15: attacker:c[] 
Rule 16: attacker:new_name[v_2145] 
Rule 17: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 18: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 19: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 20: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 21: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 22: begin:beginBparam(v_2148), hostX_29 = v_2148, sid_69 = 
sid_2149 & attacker:v_2148 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_2148) 
Rule 23: attacker:sign((v_2155,v_2156),skS[]) & 
begin:beginBparam(v_2156), ms_30 = sign((v_2155,v_2156),skS[]), 





6),pk(skA[])) & attacker:sign((v_2163,v_2164),skS[]) & 
begin:beginBparam(v_2164), m_32 = 
encrypt((Na[sign((v_2163,v_2164),skS[]),v_2164,sid_2165],v_2166),pk(skA
[])), ms_30 = sign((v_2163,v_2164),skS[]), hostX_29 = v_2164, sid_69 = 





begin:beginBparam(host(pk(skB[]))), m_32 = 
encrypt((Na[sign((v_2167,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]),host(pk(skB[])),sid_21
68],v_2169),pk(skA[])), ms_30 = sign((v_2167,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]), 









begin:beginBparam(host(pk(skB[]))), m_32 = 
encrypt((Na[sign((v_2170,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]),host(pk(skB[])),sid_21
71],v_2172),pk(skA[])), ms_30 = sign((v_2170,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]), 
hostX_29 = host(pk(skB[])), sid_69 = sid_2171 & 
attacker:host(pk(skB[])) -> attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_2172) 
Rule 27: attacker:encrypt((v_2179,v_2180),pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skB[])),v_2180) 
























Rule 32: attacker:(v_2208,host(x_2209)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_2209,host(x_2209)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skS[] 
Starting query evinj:endBparam(x_2116) ==> evinj:beginBparam(x_2116) 




skA[]))),pk(skB[])),endsid_2742]),pk(skA[])), ms_30 = 
sign((pk(y_2740),host(pk(y_2740))),skS[]), hostX_29 = host(pk(y_2740)), 
sid_69 = sid_2741 & begin:beginBparam(host(pk(y_2740))), ms_30 = 
sign((pk(y_2740),host(pk(y_2740))),skS[]), hostX_29 = host(pk(y_2740)), 
sid_69 = sid_2741 & attacker:y_2740 -> 
end:endsid_2742,endBparam(host(pk(skB[]))) 
rule 29 end:endsid_2827,endBparam(host(pk(skB[]))) 

















          duplicate attacker:sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]) 
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          duplicate 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_2821),host(pk(y_2821))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_2821)),sid_2818],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(skB[])) 
        duplicate attacker:sign((pk(y_2821),host(pk(y_2821))),skS[]) 




skA[]))),pk(skB[])),endsid_2827]),pk(skA[])), ms_30 = 
sign((pk(y_2821),host(pk(y_2821))),skS[]), hostX_29 = host(pk(y_2821)), 
sid_69 = sid_2818 
        duplicate attacker:host(pk(y_2821)) 
      hypothesis attacker:y_2821 
    duplicate attacker:pk(skB[]) 
  rule 32 attacker:sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]) 
    2-tuple attacker:(v_2756,host(pk(skA[]))) 
      any attacker:v_2756 
      duplicate attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
  rule 4 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_2821),host(pk(y_2821))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_2821)),sid_2818],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(skB[])) 
    2-tuple 
attacker:(Na[sign((pk(y_2821),host(pk(y_2821))),skS[]),host(pk(y_2821))
,sid_2818],host(pk(skA[]))) 
      0-th 
attacker:Na[sign((pk(y_2821),host(pk(y_2821))),skS[]),host(pk(y_2821)),
sid_2818] 
        rule 8 
attacker:(Na[sign((pk(y_2821),host(pk(y_2821))),skS[]),host(pk(y_2821))
,sid_2818],host(pk(skA[]))) 
          rule 23 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_2821),host(pk(y_2821))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_2821)),sid_2818],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(y_2821)) 
            rule 32 attacker:sign((pk(y_2821),host(pk(y_2821))),skS[]) 
              2-tuple attacker:(v_2764,host(pk(y_2821))) 
                any attacker:v_2764 
                duplicate attacker:host(pk(y_2821)) 
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            hypothesis begin:beginBparam(host(pk(y_2821))), ms_30 = 
sign((pk(y_2821),host(pk(y_2821))),skS[]), hostX_29 = host(pk(y_2821)), 
sid_69 = sid_2818 
            rule 6 attacker:host(pk(y_2821)) 
              rule 7 attacker:pk(y_2821) 
                hypothesis attacker:y_2821 
          hypothesis attacker:y_2821 
      rule 6 attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
        rule 17 attacker:pk(skA[]) 
    rule 18 attacker:pk(skB[]) 
 
A more detailed output of the traces is available with 
  param traceDisplay = long. 
























































An attack has been found. 
RESULT evinj:endBparam(x_2116) ==> evinj:beginBparam(x_2116) is false. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_3003,v_3003 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_3005,y_3006) -> attacker:x_3005 
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Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_3007,y_3008) & attacker:y_3008 -> 
attacker:x_3007 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_3009,y_3010) & attacker:pk(y_3010) -> 
attacker:x_3009 
Rule 4: attacker:v_3012 & attacker:v_3011 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_3012,v_3011) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_3014 & attacker:v_3013 -> 
attacker:sign(v_3014,v_3013) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_3015 -> attacker:host(v_3015) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_3016 -> attacker:pk(v_3016) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_3017,pk(y_3018)) & attacker:y_3018 -> 
attacker:x_3017 
Rule 9: attacker:v_3020 & attacker:v_3019 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_3020,v_3019) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_3022 & attacker:v_3021 -> attacker:(v_3022,v_3021) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_3024,v_3023) -> attacker:v_3024 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_3026,v_3025) -> attacker:v_3025 
Rule 13: mess:v_3028,v_3027 & attacker:v_3028 -> attacker:v_3027 
Rule 14: attacker:v_3030 & attacker:v_3029 -> mess:v_3030,v_3029 
Rule 15: attacker:c[] 
Rule 16: attacker:new_name[v_3031] 
Rule 17: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 18: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 19: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 20: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 21: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 22: attacker:v_3034 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_3034) 


























attacker:host(pk(skB[])) -> attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_3061) 





























Rule 32: attacker:(v_3094,host(x_3095)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_3095,host(x_3095)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 















RESULT ev:endAfull(x1_2997,x2_2998,x3_2999,x4_3000,x5_3001,x6_3002) ==> 
ev:beginAfull(x1_2997,x2_2998,x3_2999,x4_3000,x5_3001,x6_3002) is true. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_3584,v_3584 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_3586,y_3587) -> attacker:x_3586 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_3588,y_3589) & attacker:y_3589 -> 
attacker:x_3588 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_3590,y_3591) & attacker:pk(y_3591) -> 
attacker:x_3590 
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Rule 4: attacker:v_3593 & attacker:v_3592 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_3593,v_3592) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_3595 & attacker:v_3594 -> 
attacker:sign(v_3595,v_3594) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_3596 -> attacker:host(v_3596) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_3597 -> attacker:pk(v_3597) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_3598,pk(y_3599)) & attacker:y_3599 -> 
attacker:x_3598 
Rule 9: attacker:v_3601 & attacker:v_3600 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_3601,v_3600) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_3603 & attacker:v_3602 -> attacker:(v_3603,v_3602) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_3605,v_3604) -> attacker:v_3605 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_3607,v_3606) -> attacker:v_3606 
Rule 13: mess:v_3609,v_3608 & attacker:v_3609 -> attacker:v_3608 
Rule 14: attacker:v_3611 & attacker:v_3610 -> mess:v_3611,v_3610 
Rule 15: attacker:c[] 
Rule 16: attacker:new_name[v_3612] 
Rule 17: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 18: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 19: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 20: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 21: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 22: attacker:v_3615 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_3615) 
























attacker:host(pk(skB[])) -> attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_3642) 
Rule 28: begin:beginAparam(v_3649) & 
attacker:encrypt((v_3650,v_3649),pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skB[])),v_3649) 
Rule 29: attacker:sign((v_3657,v_3658),skS[]) & 



















Rule 32: attacker:(v_3675,host(x_3676)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_3676,host(x_3676)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
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ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skS[] 
Starting query ev:endAparam(x_3583) ==> ev:beginAparam(x_3583) 
goal reachable: begin:beginAparam(host(pk(skA[]))) -> 
end:endAparam(host(pk(skA[]))) 
RESULT ev:endAparam(x_3583) ==> ev:beginAparam(x_3583) is true. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_4093,v_4093 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_4095,y_4096) -> attacker:x_4095 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_4097,y_4098) & attacker:y_4098 -> 
attacker:x_4097 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_4099,y_4100) & attacker:pk(y_4100) -> 
attacker:x_4099 
Rule 4: attacker:v_4102 & attacker:v_4101 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_4102,v_4101) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_4104 & attacker:v_4103 -> 
attacker:sign(v_4104,v_4103) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_4105 -> attacker:host(v_4105) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_4106 -> attacker:pk(v_4106) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_4107,pk(y_4108)) & attacker:y_4108 -> 
attacker:x_4107 
Rule 9: attacker:v_4110 & attacker:v_4109 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_4110,v_4109) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_4112 & attacker:v_4111 -> attacker:(v_4112,v_4111) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_4114,v_4113) -> attacker:v_4114 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_4116,v_4115) -> attacker:v_4115 
Rule 13: mess:v_4118,v_4117 & attacker:v_4118 -> attacker:v_4117 
Rule 14: attacker:v_4120 & attacker:v_4119 -> mess:v_4120,v_4119 
Rule 15: attacker:c[] 
Rule 16: attacker:new_name[v_4121] 
Rule 17: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 18: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 19: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 20: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 21: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 22: attacker:v_4124 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_4124) 
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attacker:host(pk(skB[])) -> attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_4148) 
Rule 27: attacker:encrypt((v_4155,v_4156),pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skB[])),v_4156) 


























Rule 32: attacker:(v_4184,host(x_4185)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_4185,host(x_4185)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 













































          duplicate attacker:sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]) 
          duplicate 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_4792),host(pk(y_4792))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_4792)),sid_4789],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(skB[])) 
        duplicate attacker:sign((pk(y_4792),host(pk(y_4792))),skS[]) 
        duplicate attacker:host(pk(y_4792)) 
      hypothesis attacker:y_4792 
    duplicate attacker:pk(skB[]) 
  rule 32 attacker:sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]) 
    2-tuple attacker:(v_4727,host(pk(skA[]))) 
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      any attacker:v_4727 
      duplicate attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
  rule 4 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_4792),host(pk(y_4792))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_4792)),sid_4789],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(skB[])) 
    2-tuple 
attacker:(Na[sign((pk(y_4792),host(pk(y_4792))),skS[]),host(pk(y_4792))
,sid_4789],host(pk(skA[]))) 
      0-th 
attacker:Na[sign((pk(y_4792),host(pk(y_4792))),skS[]),host(pk(y_4792)),
sid_4789] 
        rule 8 
attacker:(Na[sign((pk(y_4792),host(pk(y_4792))),skS[]),host(pk(y_4792))
,sid_4789],host(pk(skA[]))) 
          rule 23 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_4792),host(pk(y_4792))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_4792)),sid_4789],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(y_4792)) 
            rule 32 attacker:sign((pk(y_4792),host(pk(y_4792))),skS[]) 
              2-tuple attacker:(v_4735,host(pk(y_4792))) 
                any attacker:v_4735 
                duplicate attacker:host(pk(y_4792)) 
            rule 6 attacker:host(pk(y_4792)) 
              rule 7 attacker:pk(y_4792) 
                hypothesis attacker:y_4792 
          hypothesis attacker:y_4792 
      rule 6 attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
        rule 17 attacker:pk(skA[]) 
    rule 18 attacker:pk(skB[]) 
 
A more detailed output of the traces is available with 
  param traceDisplay = long. 





























































An attack has been found. 
RESULT ev:endBfull(x1_4087,x2_4088,x3_4089,x4_4090,x5_4091,x6_4092) ==> 
ev:beginBfull(x1_4087,x2_4088,x3_4089,x4_4090,x5_4091,x6_4092) is 
false. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_4973,v_4973 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_4975,y_4976) -> attacker:x_4975 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_4977,y_4978) & attacker:y_4978 -> 
attacker:x_4977 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_4979,y_4980) & attacker:pk(y_4980) -> 
attacker:x_4979 
Rule 4: attacker:v_4982 & attacker:v_4981 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_4982,v_4981) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_4984 & attacker:v_4983 -> 
attacker:sign(v_4984,v_4983) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_4985 -> attacker:host(v_4985) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_4986 -> attacker:pk(v_4986) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_4987,pk(y_4988)) & attacker:y_4988 -> 
attacker:x_4987 
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Rule 9: attacker:v_4990 & attacker:v_4989 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_4990,v_4989) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_4992 & attacker:v_4991 -> attacker:(v_4992,v_4991) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_4994,v_4993) -> attacker:v_4994 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_4996,v_4995) -> attacker:v_4995 
Rule 13: mess:v_4998,v_4997 & attacker:v_4998 -> attacker:v_4997 
Rule 14: attacker:v_5000 & attacker:v_4999 -> mess:v_5000,v_4999 
Rule 15: attacker:c[] 
Rule 16: attacker:new_name[v_5001] 
Rule 17: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 18: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 19: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 20: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 21: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 22: begin:beginBparam(v_5004) & attacker:v_5004 -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_5004) 
Rule 23: attacker:sign((v_5011,v_5012),skS[]) & 





2),pk(skA[])) & attacker:sign((v_5019,v_5020),skS[]) & 














begin:beginBparam(host(pk(skB[]))) & attacker:host(pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_5028) 
Rule 27: attacker:encrypt((v_5035,v_5036),pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skB[])),v_5036) 























Rule 32: attacker:(v_5064,host(x_5065)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_5065,host(x_5065)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skS[] 
Starting query ev:endBparam(x_4972) ==> ev:beginBparam(x_4972) 
goal reachable: begin:beginBparam(host(pk(y_5489))) & attacker:y_5489 -
> end:endBparam(host(pk(skB[]))) 
rule 29 end:endBparam(host(pk(skB[]))) 
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          duplicate attacker:sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]) 
          duplicate 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_5561),host(pk(y_5561))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_5561)),sid_5558],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(skB[])) 
        duplicate attacker:sign((pk(y_5561),host(pk(y_5561))),skS[]) 
        hypothesis begin:beginBparam(host(pk(y_5561))) 
        duplicate attacker:host(pk(y_5561)) 
      hypothesis attacker:y_5561 
    duplicate attacker:pk(skB[]) 
  rule 32 attacker:sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]) 
    2-tuple attacker:(v_5496,host(pk(skA[]))) 
      any attacker:v_5496 
      duplicate attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
  rule 4 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_5561),host(pk(y_5561))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_5561)),sid_5558],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(skB[])) 




      0-th 
attacker:Na[sign((pk(y_5561),host(pk(y_5561))),skS[]),host(pk(y_5561)),
sid_5558] 
        rule 8 
attacker:(Na[sign((pk(y_5561),host(pk(y_5561))),skS[]),host(pk(y_5561))
,sid_5558],host(pk(skA[]))) 
          rule 23 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_5561),host(pk(y_5561))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_5561)),sid_5558],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(y_5561)) 
            rule 32 attacker:sign((pk(y_5561),host(pk(y_5561))),skS[]) 
              2-tuple attacker:(v_5504,host(pk(y_5561))) 
                any attacker:v_5504 
                duplicate attacker:host(pk(y_5561)) 
            hypothesis begin:beginBparam(host(pk(y_5561))) 
            rule 6 attacker:host(pk(y_5561)) 
              rule 7 attacker:pk(y_5561) 
                hypothesis attacker:y_5561 
          hypothesis attacker:y_5561 
      rule 6 attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
        rule 17 attacker:pk(skA[]) 
    rule 18 attacker:pk(skB[]) 
 
A more detailed output of the traces is available with 
  param traceDisplay = long. 

























































An attack has been found. 
RESULT ev:endBparam(x_4972) ==> ev:beginBparam(x_4972) is false. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_5736,v_5736 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_5738,y_5739) -> attacker:x_5738 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_5740,y_5741) & attacker:y_5741 -> 
attacker:x_5740 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_5742,y_5743) & attacker:pk(y_5743) -> 
attacker:x_5742 
Rule 4: attacker:v_5745 & attacker:v_5744 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_5745,v_5744) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_5747 & attacker:v_5746 -> 
attacker:sign(v_5747,v_5746) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_5748 -> attacker:host(v_5748) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_5749 -> attacker:pk(v_5749) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_5750,pk(y_5751)) & attacker:y_5751 -> 
attacker:x_5750 
Rule 9: attacker:v_5753 & attacker:v_5752 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_5753,v_5752) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_5755 & attacker:v_5754 -> attacker:(v_5755,v_5754) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_5757,v_5756) -> attacker:v_5757 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_5759,v_5758) -> attacker:v_5758 
Rule 13: mess:v_5761,v_5760 & attacker:v_5761 -> attacker:v_5760 
Rule 14: attacker:v_5763 & attacker:v_5762 -> mess:v_5763,v_5762 
Rule 15: attacker:c[] 
Rule 16: attacker:new_name[v_5764] 
Rule 17: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 18: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 19: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 20: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 21: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
 164 
Rule 22: attacker:v_5767 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_5767) 


















attacker:host(pk(skB[])) -> attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_5791) 
Rule 27: attacker:encrypt((v_5798,v_5799),pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skB[])),v_5799) 


















Rule 31: attacker:(v_5824,host(x_5825)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_5825,host(x_5825)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skS[] 
Starting query not attacker:secretANa[] 
RESULT not attacker:secretANa[] is true. 
Starting query not attacker:secretANb[] 
RESULT not attacker:secretANb[] is true. 
Starting query not attacker:secretBNa[] 
goal reachable: attacker:secretBNa[] 
rule 2 attacker:secretBNa[] 
  rule 29 
attacker:sencrypt(secretBNa[],Na[sign((pk(y_6312),host(pk(y_6312))),skS
[]),host(pk(y_6312)),sid_6309]) 

















            duplicate attacker:sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]) 
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            duplicate 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_6312),host(pk(y_6312))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_6312)),sid_6309],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(skB[])) 
          duplicate attacker:sign((pk(y_6312),host(pk(y_6312))),skS[]) 
          duplicate attacker:host(pk(y_6312)) 
        any attacker:y_6312 
      duplicate attacker:pk(skB[]) 
    rule 31 attacker:sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]) 
      2-tuple attacker:(v_6247,host(pk(skA[]))) 
        any attacker:v_6247 
        rule 6 attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
          rule 17 attacker:pk(skA[]) 
    rule 4 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_6312),host(pk(y_6312))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_6312)),sid_6309],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(skB[])) 
      duplicate 
attacker:(Na[sign((pk(y_6312),host(pk(y_6312))),skS[]),host(pk(y_6312))
,sid_6309],host(pk(skA[]))) 
      rule 18 attacker:pk(skB[]) 
  0-th 
attacker:Na[sign((pk(y_6312),host(pk(y_6312))),skS[]),host(pk(y_6312)),
sid_6309] 
    rule 8 
attacker:(Na[sign((pk(y_6312),host(pk(y_6312))),skS[]),host(pk(y_6312))
,sid_6309],host(pk(skA[]))) 
      rule 23 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_6312),host(pk(y_6312))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_6312)),sid_6309],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(y_6312)) 
        rule 31 attacker:sign((pk(y_6312),host(pk(y_6312))),skS[]) 
          2-tuple attacker:(v_6233,host(pk(y_6312))) 
            any attacker:v_6233 
            duplicate attacker:host(pk(y_6312)) 
        rule 6 attacker:host(pk(y_6312)) 
          rule 7 attacker:pk(y_6312) 
            any attacker:y_6312 
      any attacker:y_6312 
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A more detailed output of the traces is available with 
  param traceDisplay = long. 































































An attack has been found. 
RESULT not attacker:secretBNa[] is false. 
Starting query not attacker:secretBNb[] 
goal reachable: attacker:secretBNb[] 
rule 2 attacker:secretBNb[] 













      duplicate attacker:pk(skB[]) 
    duplicate attacker:sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]) 
    duplicate 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_6601),host(pk(y_6601))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_6601)),sid_6598],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(skB[])) 













        rule 31 attacker:sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]) 
          2-tuple attacker:(v_6515,host(pk(skA[]))) 
            any attacker:v_6515 
            duplicate attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
        rule 4 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_6601),host(pk(y_6601))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_6601)),sid_6598],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(skB[])) 




            0-th 
attacker:Na[sign((pk(y_6601),host(pk(y_6601))),skS[]),host(pk(y_6601)),
sid_6598] 
              rule 8 
attacker:(Na[sign((pk(y_6601),host(pk(y_6601))),skS[]),host(pk(y_6601))
,sid_6598],host(pk(skA[]))) 
                rule 23 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((pk(y_6601),host(pk(y_6601))),skS[]),host(pk(
y_6601)),sid_6598],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(y_6601)) 
                  duplicate 
attacker:sign((pk(y_6601),host(pk(y_6601))),skS[]) 
                  duplicate attacker:host(pk(y_6601)) 
                any attacker:y_6601 
            rule 6 attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
              rule 17 attacker:pk(skA[]) 
          rule 18 attacker:pk(skB[]) 
      rule 31 attacker:sign((pk(y_6601),host(pk(y_6601))),skS[]) 
        2-tuple attacker:(v_6493,host(pk(y_6601))) 
          any attacker:v_6493 
          duplicate attacker:host(pk(y_6601)) 
      rule 6 attacker:host(pk(y_6601)) 
        rule 7 attacker:pk(y_6601) 
          any attacker:y_6601 
    any attacker:y_6601 
 
A more detailed output of the traces is available with 
  param traceDisplay = long. 
































































An attack has been found. 
RESULT not attacker:secretBNb[] is false. 
Listing 24: ProVerif NS Full 2 Observed Correctness Test Data 
Listing 25 is the collected data for Proverif for the full version of the NSL 
protocol. The gray background portions of the listing show that Proverif identified that 
the NSL protocol is secure. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_40,v_40 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_42,y_43) -> attacker:x_42 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_44,y_45) & attacker:y_45 -> attacker:x_44 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_46,y_47) & attacker:pk(y_47) -> attacker:x_46 
Rule 4: attacker:v_49 & attacker:v_48 -> attacker:encrypt(v_49,v_48) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_51 & attacker:v_50 -> attacker:sign(v_51,v_50) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_52 -> attacker:host(v_52) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_53 -> attacker:pk(v_53) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_54,pk(y_55)) & attacker:y_55 -> 
attacker:x_54 
Rule 9: attacker:v_57 & attacker:v_56 -> attacker:sencrypt(v_57,v_56) 
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Rule 10: attacker:v_60 & attacker:v_59 & attacker:v_58 -> 
attacker:(v_60,v_59,v_58) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_63,v_62,v_61) -> attacker:v_63 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_66,v_65,v_64) -> attacker:v_65 
Rule 13: attacker:(v_69,v_68,v_67) -> attacker:v_67 
Rule 14: attacker:v_71 & attacker:v_70 -> attacker:(v_71,v_70) 
Rule 15: attacker:(v_73,v_72) -> attacker:v_73 
Rule 16: attacker:(v_75,v_74) -> attacker:v_74 
Rule 17: mess:v_77,v_76 & attacker:v_77 -> attacker:v_76 
Rule 18: attacker:v_79 & attacker:v_78 -> mess:v_79,v_78 
Rule 19: attacker:c[] 
Rule 20: attacker:new_name[v_80] 
Rule 21: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 22: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 23: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 24: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 25: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 26: attacker:v_83 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_83) 

























attacker:sign((v_109,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]) & attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
-> attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_111) 




_126,v_127),skS[]),encrypt((v_128,v_127),pk(skB[])),sid_129]), ms_26 = 
sign((v_126,v_127),skS[]), m_23 = encrypt((v_128,v_127),pk(skB[])), 









pk(skB[])),sid_135]), m3_28 = 
encrypt(Nb[sign((v_133,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]),encrypt((v_134,host(pk(s
kA[]))),pk(skB[])),sid_135],pk(skB[])), ms_26 = 
sign((v_133,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]), m_23 = 









pk(skB[])),sid_138]), m3_28 = 
encrypt(Nb[sign((v_136,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]),encrypt((v_137,host(pk(s
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kA[]))),pk(skB[])),sid_138],pk(skB[])), ms_26 = 
sign((v_136,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]), m_23 = 





Rule 36: attacker:(v_144,host(x_145)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_145,host(x_145)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skS[] 







kB[])),sid_506]), ms_26 = sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]), m_23 
= 
encrypt((Na[sign((pk(skB[]),host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]),host(pk(skB[])),end






RESULT evinj:endAfull(x1_34,x2_35,x3_36,x4_37,x5_38,x6_39) ==> 
evinj:beginAfull(x1_34,x2_35,x3_36,x4_37,x5_38,x6_39) is true. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_524,v_524 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_526,y_527) -> attacker:x_526 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_528,y_529) & attacker:y_529 -> 
attacker:x_528 
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Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_530,y_531) & attacker:pk(y_531) -> 
attacker:x_530 
Rule 4: attacker:v_533 & attacker:v_532 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_533,v_532) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_535 & attacker:v_534 -> attacker:sign(v_535,v_534) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_536 -> attacker:host(v_536) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_537 -> attacker:pk(v_537) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_538,pk(y_539)) & attacker:y_539 -> 
attacker:x_538 
Rule 9: attacker:v_541 & attacker:v_540 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_541,v_540) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_544 & attacker:v_543 & attacker:v_542 -> 
attacker:(v_544,v_543,v_542) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_547,v_546,v_545) -> attacker:v_547 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_550,v_549,v_548) -> attacker:v_549 
Rule 13: attacker:(v_553,v_552,v_551) -> attacker:v_551 
Rule 14: attacker:v_555 & attacker:v_554 -> attacker:(v_555,v_554) 
Rule 15: attacker:(v_557,v_556) -> attacker:v_557 
Rule 16: attacker:(v_559,v_558) -> attacker:v_558 
Rule 17: mess:v_561,v_560 & attacker:v_561 -> attacker:v_560 
Rule 18: attacker:v_563 & attacker:v_562 -> mess:v_563,v_562 
Rule 19: attacker:c[] 
Rule 20: attacker:new_name[v_564] 
Rule 21: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 22: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 23: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 24: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 25: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 26: attacker:v_567 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_567) 























attacker:sign((v_593,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]) & attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
-> attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_595) 
Rule 32: begin:beginAparam(v_603), m_23 = 
encrypt((v_602,v_603),pk(skB[])), sid_112 = sid_604 & 
attacker:encrypt((v_602,v_603),pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skB[])),v_603) 
Rule 33: attacker:sign((v_610,v_611),skS[]) & begin:beginAparam(v_611), 
ms_26 = sign((v_610,v_611),skS[]), m_23 = 








begin:beginAparam(host(pk(skA[]))), m3_28 = 
encrypt(Nb[sign((v_617,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]),encrypt((v_618,host(pk(s
kA[]))),pk(skB[])),sid_619],pk(skB[])), ms_26 = 
sign((v_617,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]), m_23 = 








begin:beginAparam(host(pk(skA[]))), m3_28 = 
encrypt(Nb[sign((v_620,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]),encrypt((v_621,host(pk(s
kA[]))),pk(skB[])),sid_622],pk(skB[])), ms_26 = 
sign((v_620,host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]), m_23 = 




Rule 36: attacker:(v_628,host(x_629)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_629,host(x_629)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skS[] 
Starting query evinj:endAparam(x_523) ==> evinj:beginAparam(x_523) 
goal reachable: begin:beginAparam(host(pk(skA[]))), ms_26 = 
sign((pk(skA[]),host(pk(skA[]))),skS[]), m_23 = 
encrypt((Na[sign((pk(skB[]),host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]),host(pk(skB[])),end
sid_973],host(pk(skA[]))),pk(skB[])), sid_112 = sid_974 -> 
end:endsid_973,endAparam(host(pk(skA[]))) 
RESULT evinj:endAparam(x_523) ==> evinj:beginAparam(x_523) is true. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_987,v_987 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_989,y_990) -> attacker:x_989 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_991,y_992) & attacker:y_992 -> 
attacker:x_991 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_993,y_994) & attacker:pk(y_994) -> 
attacker:x_993 
Rule 4: attacker:v_996 & attacker:v_995 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_996,v_995) 
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Rule 5: attacker:v_998 & attacker:v_997 -> attacker:sign(v_998,v_997) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_999 -> attacker:host(v_999) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_1000 -> attacker:pk(v_1000) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_1001,pk(y_1002)) & attacker:y_1002 -> 
attacker:x_1001 
Rule 9: attacker:v_1004 & attacker:v_1003 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_1004,v_1003) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_1007 & attacker:v_1006 & attacker:v_1005 -> 
attacker:(v_1007,v_1006,v_1005) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_1010,v_1009,v_1008) -> attacker:v_1010 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_1013,v_1012,v_1011) -> attacker:v_1012 
Rule 13: attacker:(v_1016,v_1015,v_1014) -> attacker:v_1014 
Rule 14: attacker:v_1018 & attacker:v_1017 -> attacker:(v_1018,v_1017) 
Rule 15: attacker:(v_1020,v_1019) -> attacker:v_1020 
Rule 16: attacker:(v_1022,v_1021) -> attacker:v_1021 
Rule 17: mess:v_1024,v_1023 & attacker:v_1024 -> attacker:v_1023 
Rule 18: attacker:v_1026 & attacker:v_1025 -> mess:v_1026,v_1025 
Rule 19: attacker:c[] 
Rule 20: attacker:new_name[v_1027] 
Rule 21: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 22: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 23: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 24: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 25: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 26: attacker:v_1030 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_1030) 





k(skA[])),v_1047,v_1046,pk(skA[]),v_1049), m_32 = 
encrypt((Na[sign((v_1046,v_1047),skS[]),v_1047,sid_1048],v_1049,v_1047)
,pk(skA[])), ms_30 = sign((v_1046,v_1047),skS[]), hostX_29 = v_1047, 
sid_81 = sid_1048 & 
attacker:encrypt((Na[sign((v_1046,v_1047),skS[]),v_1047,sid_1048],v_104
9,v_1047),pk(skA[])) & attacker:sign((v_1046,v_1047),skS[]) & 







51],v_1052,host(pk(skB[]))),pk(skA[])), ms_30 = 
sign((v_1050,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]), hostX_29 = host(pk(skB[])), 












54],v_1055,host(pk(skB[]))),pk(skA[])), ms_30 = 
sign((v_1053,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]), hostX_29 = host(pk(skB[])), 




attacker:host(pk(skB[])) -> attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_1055) 
Rule 31: attacker:encrypt((v_1062,v_1063),pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skB[])),v_1063) 


























Rule 36: attacker:(v_1091,host(x_1092)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_1092,host(x_1092)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 













)),pk(skB[])),endsid_1432],host(pk(skB[]))),pk(skA[])), ms_30 = 
sign((pk(skB[]),host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]), hostX_29 = host(pk(skB[])), 







RESULT evinj:endBfull(x1_981,x2_982,x3_983,x4_984,x5_985,x6_986) ==> 
evinj:beginBfull(x1_981,x2_982,x3_983,x4_984,x5_985,x6_986) is true. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_1450,v_1450 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_1452,y_1453) -> attacker:x_1452 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_1454,y_1455) & attacker:y_1455 -> 
attacker:x_1454 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_1456,y_1457) & attacker:pk(y_1457) -> 
attacker:x_1456 
Rule 4: attacker:v_1459 & attacker:v_1458 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_1459,v_1458) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_1461 & attacker:v_1460 -> 
attacker:sign(v_1461,v_1460) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_1462 -> attacker:host(v_1462) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_1463 -> attacker:pk(v_1463) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_1464,pk(y_1465)) & attacker:y_1465 -> 
attacker:x_1464 
Rule 9: attacker:v_1467 & attacker:v_1466 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_1467,v_1466) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_1470 & attacker:v_1469 & attacker:v_1468 -> 
attacker:(v_1470,v_1469,v_1468) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_1473,v_1472,v_1471) -> attacker:v_1473 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_1476,v_1475,v_1474) -> attacker:v_1475 
Rule 13: attacker:(v_1479,v_1478,v_1477) -> attacker:v_1477 
Rule 14: attacker:v_1481 & attacker:v_1480 -> attacker:(v_1481,v_1480) 
Rule 15: attacker:(v_1483,v_1482) -> attacker:v_1483 
Rule 16: attacker:(v_1485,v_1484) -> attacker:v_1484 
Rule 17: mess:v_1487,v_1486 & attacker:v_1487 -> attacker:v_1486 
Rule 18: attacker:v_1489 & attacker:v_1488 -> mess:v_1489,v_1488 
Rule 19: attacker:c[] 
Rule 20: attacker:new_name[v_1490] 
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Rule 21: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 22: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 23: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 24: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 25: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 26: begin:beginBparam(v_1493), hostX_29 = v_1493, sid_81 = 
sid_1494 & attacker:v_1493 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_1493) 
Rule 27: attacker:sign((v_1500,v_1501),skS[]) & 
begin:beginBparam(v_1501), ms_30 = sign((v_1500,v_1501),skS[]), 





2,v_1510),pk(skA[])) & attacker:sign((v_1509,v_1510),skS[]) & 
begin:beginBparam(v_1510), m_32 = 
encrypt((Na[sign((v_1509,v_1510),skS[]),v_1510,sid_1511],v_1512,v_1510)
,pk(skA[])), ms_30 = sign((v_1509,v_1510),skS[]), hostX_29 = v_1510, 





begin:beginBparam(host(pk(skB[]))), m_32 = 
encrypt((Na[sign((v_1513,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]),host(pk(skB[])),sid_15
14],v_1515,host(pk(skB[]))),pk(skA[])), ms_30 = 
sign((v_1513,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]), hostX_29 = host(pk(skB[])), 







begin:beginBparam(host(pk(skB[]))), m_32 = 
encrypt((Na[sign((v_1516,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]),host(pk(skB[])),sid_15
17],v_1518,host(pk(skB[]))),pk(skA[])), ms_30 = 
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sign((v_1516,host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]), hostX_29 = host(pk(skB[])), 
sid_81 = sid_1517 & attacker:host(pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_1518) 
Rule 31: attacker:encrypt((v_1525,v_1526),pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skB[])),v_1526) 























Rule 36: attacker:(v_1554,host(x_1555)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_1555,host(x_1555)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skS[] 
Starting query evinj:endBparam(x_1449) ==> evinj:beginBparam(x_1449) 





)),pk(skB[])),endsid_1901],host(pk(skB[]))),pk(skA[])), ms_30 = 
sign((pk(skB[]),host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]), hostX_29 = host(pk(skB[])), 
sid_81 = sid_1900 & begin:beginBparam(host(pk(skB[]))), ms_30 = 
sign((pk(skB[]),host(pk(skB[]))),skS[]), hostX_29 = host(pk(skB[])), 
sid_81 = sid_1900 -> end:endsid_1901,endBparam(host(pk(skB[]))) 
RESULT evinj:endBparam(x_1449) ==> evinj:beginBparam(x_1449) is true. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_1914,v_1914 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_1916,y_1917) -> attacker:x_1916 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_1918,y_1919) & attacker:y_1919 -> 
attacker:x_1918 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_1920,y_1921) & attacker:pk(y_1921) -> 
attacker:x_1920 
Rule 4: attacker:v_1923 & attacker:v_1922 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_1923,v_1922) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_1925 & attacker:v_1924 -> 
attacker:sign(v_1925,v_1924) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_1926 -> attacker:host(v_1926) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_1927 -> attacker:pk(v_1927) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_1928,pk(y_1929)) & attacker:y_1929 -> 
attacker:x_1928 
Rule 9: attacker:v_1931 & attacker:v_1930 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_1931,v_1930) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_1934 & attacker:v_1933 & attacker:v_1932 -> 
attacker:(v_1934,v_1933,v_1932) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_1937,v_1936,v_1935) -> attacker:v_1937 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_1940,v_1939,v_1938) -> attacker:v_1939 
Rule 13: attacker:(v_1943,v_1942,v_1941) -> attacker:v_1941 
Rule 14: attacker:v_1945 & attacker:v_1944 -> attacker:(v_1945,v_1944) 
Rule 15: attacker:(v_1947,v_1946) -> attacker:v_1947 
Rule 16: attacker:(v_1949,v_1948) -> attacker:v_1948 
Rule 17: mess:v_1951,v_1950 & attacker:v_1951 -> attacker:v_1950 
Rule 18: attacker:v_1953 & attacker:v_1952 -> mess:v_1953,v_1952 
Rule 19: attacker:c[] 
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Rule 20: attacker:new_name[v_1954] 
Rule 21: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 22: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 23: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 24: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 25: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 26: attacker:v_1957 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_1957) 





6,v_1974),pk(skA[])) & attacker:sign((v_1973,v_1974),skS[]) & 



















attacker:host(pk(skB[])) -> attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_1985) 





























Rule 36: attacker:(v_2018,host(x_2019)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_2019,host(x_2019)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 
















RESULT ev:endAfull(x1_1908,x2_1909,x3_1910,x4_1911,x5_1912,x6_1913) ==> 
ev:beginAfull(x1_1908,x2_1909,x3_1910,x4_1911,x5_1912,x6_1913) is true. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_2368,v_2368 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_2370,y_2371) -> attacker:x_2370 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_2372,y_2373) & attacker:y_2373 -> 
attacker:x_2372 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_2374,y_2375) & attacker:pk(y_2375) -> 
attacker:x_2374 
Rule 4: attacker:v_2377 & attacker:v_2376 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_2377,v_2376) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_2379 & attacker:v_2378 -> 
attacker:sign(v_2379,v_2378) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_2380 -> attacker:host(v_2380) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_2381 -> attacker:pk(v_2381) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_2382,pk(y_2383)) & attacker:y_2383 -> 
attacker:x_2382 
Rule 9: attacker:v_2385 & attacker:v_2384 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_2385,v_2384) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_2388 & attacker:v_2387 & attacker:v_2386 -> 
attacker:(v_2388,v_2387,v_2386) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_2391,v_2390,v_2389) -> attacker:v_2391 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_2394,v_2393,v_2392) -> attacker:v_2393 
Rule 13: attacker:(v_2397,v_2396,v_2395) -> attacker:v_2395 
Rule 14: attacker:v_2399 & attacker:v_2398 -> attacker:(v_2399,v_2398) 
Rule 15: attacker:(v_2401,v_2400) -> attacker:v_2401 
Rule 16: attacker:(v_2403,v_2402) -> attacker:v_2402 
Rule 17: mess:v_2405,v_2404 & attacker:v_2405 -> attacker:v_2404 
Rule 18: attacker:v_2407 & attacker:v_2406 -> mess:v_2407,v_2406 
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Rule 19: attacker:c[] 
Rule 20: attacker:new_name[v_2408] 
Rule 21: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 22: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 23: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 24: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 25: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 26: attacker:v_2411 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_2411) 





0,v_2428),pk(skA[])) & attacker:sign((v_2427,v_2428),skS[]) & 

















attacker:host(pk(skB[])) -> attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_2439) 
Rule 32: begin:beginAparam(v_2446) & 
attacker:encrypt((v_2447,v_2446),pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skB[])),v_2446) 
Rule 33: attacker:sign((v_2454,v_2455),skS[]) & 




















Rule 36: attacker:(v_2472,host(x_2473)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_2473,host(x_2473)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skS[] 
Starting query ev:endAparam(x_2367) ==> ev:beginAparam(x_2367) 
goal reachable: begin:beginAparam(host(pk(skA[]))) -> 
end:endAparam(host(pk(skA[]))) 
RESULT ev:endAparam(x_2367) ==> ev:beginAparam(x_2367) is true. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_2764,v_2764 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_2766,y_2767) -> attacker:x_2766 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_2768,y_2769) & attacker:y_2769 -> 
attacker:x_2768 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_2770,y_2771) & attacker:pk(y_2771) -> 
attacker:x_2770 
 191 
Rule 4: attacker:v_2773 & attacker:v_2772 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_2773,v_2772) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_2775 & attacker:v_2774 -> 
attacker:sign(v_2775,v_2774) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_2776 -> attacker:host(v_2776) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_2777 -> attacker:pk(v_2777) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_2778,pk(y_2779)) & attacker:y_2779 -> 
attacker:x_2778 
Rule 9: attacker:v_2781 & attacker:v_2780 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_2781,v_2780) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_2784 & attacker:v_2783 & attacker:v_2782 -> 
attacker:(v_2784,v_2783,v_2782) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_2787,v_2786,v_2785) -> attacker:v_2787 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_2790,v_2789,v_2788) -> attacker:v_2789 
Rule 13: attacker:(v_2793,v_2792,v_2791) -> attacker:v_2791 
Rule 14: attacker:v_2795 & attacker:v_2794 -> attacker:(v_2795,v_2794) 
Rule 15: attacker:(v_2797,v_2796) -> attacker:v_2797 
Rule 16: attacker:(v_2799,v_2798) -> attacker:v_2798 
Rule 17: mess:v_2801,v_2800 & attacker:v_2801 -> attacker:v_2800 
Rule 18: attacker:v_2803 & attacker:v_2802 -> mess:v_2803,v_2802 
Rule 19: attacker:c[] 
Rule 20: attacker:new_name[v_2804] 
Rule 21: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 22: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 23: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 24: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 25: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 26: attacker:v_2807 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_2807) 







6,v_2824),pk(skA[])) & attacker:sign((v_2823,v_2824),skS[]) & 

















attacker:host(pk(skB[])) -> attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_2832) 
Rule 31: attacker:encrypt((v_2839,v_2840),pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skB[])),v_2840) 


























Rule 36: attacker:(v_2868,host(x_2869)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_2869,host(x_2869)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 















RESULT ev:endBfull(x1_2758,x2_2759,x3_2760,x4_2761,x5_2762,x6_2763) ==> 
ev:beginBfull(x1_2758,x2_2759,x3_2760,x4_2761,x5_2762,x6_2763) is true. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_3215,v_3215 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_3217,y_3218) -> attacker:x_3217 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_3219,y_3220) & attacker:y_3220 -> 
attacker:x_3219 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_3221,y_3222) & attacker:pk(y_3222) -> 
attacker:x_3221 
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Rule 4: attacker:v_3224 & attacker:v_3223 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_3224,v_3223) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_3226 & attacker:v_3225 -> 
attacker:sign(v_3226,v_3225) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_3227 -> attacker:host(v_3227) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_3228 -> attacker:pk(v_3228) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_3229,pk(y_3230)) & attacker:y_3230 -> 
attacker:x_3229 
Rule 9: attacker:v_3232 & attacker:v_3231 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_3232,v_3231) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_3235 & attacker:v_3234 & attacker:v_3233 -> 
attacker:(v_3235,v_3234,v_3233) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_3238,v_3237,v_3236) -> attacker:v_3238 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_3241,v_3240,v_3239) -> attacker:v_3240 
Rule 13: attacker:(v_3244,v_3243,v_3242) -> attacker:v_3242 
Rule 14: attacker:v_3246 & attacker:v_3245 -> attacker:(v_3246,v_3245) 
Rule 15: attacker:(v_3248,v_3247) -> attacker:v_3248 
Rule 16: attacker:(v_3250,v_3249) -> attacker:v_3249 
Rule 17: mess:v_3252,v_3251 & attacker:v_3252 -> attacker:v_3251 
Rule 18: attacker:v_3254 & attacker:v_3253 -> mess:v_3254,v_3253 
Rule 19: attacker:c[] 
Rule 20: attacker:new_name[v_3255] 
Rule 21: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 22: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 23: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 24: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 25: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 26: begin:beginBparam(v_3258) & attacker:v_3258 -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_3258) 
Rule 27: attacker:sign((v_3265,v_3266),skS[]) & 





7,v_3275),pk(skA[])) & attacker:sign((v_3274,v_3275),skS[]) & 
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begin:beginBparam(host(pk(skB[]))) & attacker:host(pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_3283) 
Rule 31: attacker:encrypt((v_3290,v_3291),pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skB[])),v_3291) 
























Rule 36: attacker:(v_3319,host(x_3320)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_3320,host(x_3320)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skS[] 
Starting query ev:endBparam(x_3214) ==> ev:beginBparam(x_3214) 
goal reachable: begin:beginBparam(host(pk(skB[]))) -> 
end:endBparam(host(pk(skB[]))) 
RESULT ev:endBparam(x_3214) ==> ev:beginBparam(x_3214) is true. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_3606,v_3606 
Rule 1: attacker:sign(x_3608,y_3609) -> attacker:x_3608 
Rule 2: attacker:sencrypt(x_3610,y_3611) & attacker:y_3611 -> 
attacker:x_3610 
Rule 3: attacker:sign(x_3612,y_3613) & attacker:pk(y_3613) -> 
attacker:x_3612 
Rule 4: attacker:v_3615 & attacker:v_3614 -> 
attacker:encrypt(v_3615,v_3614) 
Rule 5: attacker:v_3617 & attacker:v_3616 -> 
attacker:sign(v_3617,v_3616) 
Rule 6: attacker:v_3618 -> attacker:host(v_3618) 
Rule 7: attacker:v_3619 -> attacker:pk(v_3619) 
Rule 8: attacker:encrypt(x_3620,pk(y_3621)) & attacker:y_3621 -> 
attacker:x_3620 
Rule 9: attacker:v_3623 & attacker:v_3622 -> 
attacker:sencrypt(v_3623,v_3622) 
Rule 10: attacker:v_3626 & attacker:v_3625 & attacker:v_3624 -> 
attacker:(v_3626,v_3625,v_3624) 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_3629,v_3628,v_3627) -> attacker:v_3629 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_3632,v_3631,v_3630) -> attacker:v_3631 
Rule 13: attacker:(v_3635,v_3634,v_3633) -> attacker:v_3633 
Rule 14: attacker:v_3637 & attacker:v_3636 -> attacker:(v_3637,v_3636) 
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Rule 15: attacker:(v_3639,v_3638) -> attacker:v_3639 
Rule 16: attacker:(v_3641,v_3640) -> attacker:v_3640 
Rule 17: mess:v_3643,v_3642 & attacker:v_3643 -> attacker:v_3642 
Rule 18: attacker:v_3645 & attacker:v_3644 -> mess:v_3645,v_3644 
Rule 19: attacker:c[] 
Rule 20: attacker:new_name[v_3646] 
Rule 21: attacker:pk(skA[]) 
Rule 22: attacker:pk(skB[]) 
Rule 23: attacker:pk(skS[]) 
Rule 24: attacker:host(pk(skA[])) 
Rule 25: attacker:host(pk(skB[])) 
Rule 26: attacker:v_3649 -> attacker:(host(pk(skA[])),v_3649) 





8,v_3666),pk(skA[])) & attacker:sign((v_3665,v_3666),skS[]) & 












attacker:host(pk(skB[])) -> attacker:sencrypt(secretANb[],v_3674) 
Rule 31: attacker:encrypt((v_3681,v_3682),pk(skB[])) -> 
attacker:(host(pk(skB[])),v_3682) 


















Rule 35: attacker:(v_3707,host(x_3708)) -> 
attacker:sign((x_3708,host(x_3708)),skS[]) 
Completing... 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skA[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skB[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:skS[] 
Starting query not attacker:secretANa[] 
RESULT not attacker:secretANa[] is true. 
Starting query not attacker:secretANb[] 
RESULT not attacker:secretANb[] is true. 
Starting query not attacker:secretBNa[] 
RESULT not attacker:secretBNa[] is true. 
Starting query not attacker:secretBNb[] 
RESULT not attacker:secretBNb[] is true. 
Listing 25: ProVerif NSL Full 2 Observed Correctness Test Data 
Listing 26 is the collected data for ProVerif for the Kerberos protocol. The 
gray background portions of the listing show that ProVerif identified an authentication 
attack on the Kerberos protocol. These results were reviewed manually, and it was 
determined that the weakness found by ProVerif is in fact false; i.e., ProVerif was 
incorrect. Additionally, the gray background portions show that ProVerif verified the 
confidentiality characteristic of Kerberos. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
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Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_37,v_37 
Rule 1: attacker:v_40 & attacker:v_39 -> attacker:ShareEnc(v_40,v_39) 
Rule 2: attacker:ShareEnc(Msg_41,SharedKey_42) & attacker:SharedKey_42 
-> attacker:Msg_41 
Rule 3: attacker:v_45 & attacker:v_44 & attacker:v_43 -> 
attacker:(v_45,v_44,v_43) 
Rule 4: attacker:(v_48,v_47,v_46) -> attacker:v_48 
Rule 5: attacker:(v_51,v_50,v_49) -> attacker:v_50 
Rule 6: attacker:(v_54,v_53,v_52) -> attacker:v_52 
Rule 7: attacker:v_55 -> attacker:(v_55) 
Rule 8: attacker:(v_56) -> attacker:v_56 
Rule 9: attacker:v_60 & attacker:v_59 & attacker:v_58 & attacker:v_57 -
> attacker:(v_60,v_59,v_58,v_57) 
Rule 10: attacker:(v_64,v_63,v_62,v_61) -> attacker:v_64 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_68,v_67,v_66,v_65) -> attacker:v_67 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_72,v_71,v_70,v_69) -> attacker:v_70 
Rule 13: attacker:(v_76,v_75,v_74,v_73) -> attacker:v_73 
Rule 14: attacker:v_78 & attacker:v_77 -> attacker:(v_78,v_77) 
Rule 15: attacker:(v_80,v_79) -> attacker:v_80 
Rule 16: attacker:(v_82,v_81) -> attacker:v_81 
Rule 17: mess:v_84,v_83 & attacker:v_84 -> attacker:v_83 
Rule 18: attacker:v_86 & attacker:v_85 -> mess:v_86,v_85 
Rule 19: attacker:TicServA[] 
Rule 20: attacker:AppServX[] 
Rule 21: attacker:UserA[] 
Rule 22: attacker:chnl[] 
Rule 23: attacker:new_name[v_87] 
























































ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:ltkAKAS[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:ltkKASTGS[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:ltkAPSTGS[] 
Starting query evinj:ProtocolAppServ(User_35,Kuaps_36) ==> 
evinj:ProtocolTicServ2(User_35,Kuaps_36) 


















































































































































































































          duplicate attacker:UserA[] 
          any attacker:v_905 
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                rule 20 attacker:AppServX[] 

















                1-th 
attacker:ShareEnc((UserA[],Kxt[(UserA[],TicServA[],Nak[sid_931]),sid_94
3],Tk[(UserA[],TicServA[],Nak[sid_931]),sid_943]),ltkKASTGS[]) 






















                      duplicate attacker:(UserA[]) 
                      hypothesis attacker:v_935 
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          1-tuple attacker:(UserA[]) 
            duplicate attacker:UserA[] 
          hypothesis attacker:v_900 









              3-tuple attacker:(UserA[],TicServA[],Nak[sid_931]) 
                rule 21 attacker:UserA[] 
                rule 19 attacker:TicServA[] 
                2-th attacker:Nak[sid_931] 
                  rule 24 attacker:(UserA[],TicServA[],Nak[sid_931]) 
 
Could not find an attack corresponding to this derivation. 
RESULT evinj:ProtocolAppServ(User_35,Kuaps_36) ==> 
evinj:ProtocolTicServ2(User_35,Kuaps_36) cannot be proved. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_1081,v_1081 
Rule 1: attacker:v_1084 & attacker:v_1083 -> 
attacker:ShareEnc(v_1084,v_1083) 
Rule 2: attacker:ShareEnc(Msg_1085,SharedKey_1086) & 
attacker:SharedKey_1086 -> attacker:Msg_1085 
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Rule 3: attacker:v_1089 & attacker:v_1088 & attacker:v_1087 -> 
attacker:(v_1089,v_1088,v_1087) 
Rule 4: attacker:(v_1092,v_1091,v_1090) -> attacker:v_1092 
Rule 5: attacker:(v_1095,v_1094,v_1093) -> attacker:v_1094 
Rule 6: attacker:(v_1098,v_1097,v_1096) -> attacker:v_1096 
Rule 7: attacker:v_1099 -> attacker:(v_1099) 
Rule 8: attacker:(v_1100) -> attacker:v_1100 
Rule 9: attacker:v_1104 & attacker:v_1103 & attacker:v_1102 & 
attacker:v_1101 -> attacker:(v_1104,v_1103,v_1102,v_1101) 
Rule 10: attacker:(v_1108,v_1107,v_1106,v_1105) -> attacker:v_1108 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_1112,v_1111,v_1110,v_1109) -> attacker:v_1111 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_1116,v_1115,v_1114,v_1113) -> attacker:v_1114 
Rule 13: attacker:(v_1120,v_1119,v_1118,v_1117) -> attacker:v_1117 
Rule 14: attacker:v_1122 & attacker:v_1121 -> attacker:(v_1122,v_1121) 
Rule 15: attacker:(v_1124,v_1123) -> attacker:v_1124 
Rule 16: attacker:(v_1126,v_1125) -> attacker:v_1125 
Rule 17: mess:v_1128,v_1127 & attacker:v_1128 -> attacker:v_1127 
Rule 18: attacker:v_1130 & attacker:v_1129 -> mess:v_1130,v_1129 
Rule 19: attacker:TicServA[] 
Rule 20: attacker:AppServX[] 
Rule 21: attacker:UserA[] 
Rule 22: attacker:chnl[] 
Rule 23: attacker:new_name[v_1131] 



























































ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:ltkAKAS[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:ltkKASTGS[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:ltkAPSTGS[] 















    any attacker:v_1803 
    any attacker:v_1804 
    1-th 
attacker:ShareEnc((UserA[],Kxt[(UserA[],TicServA[],Nak[sid_1783]),sid_1
795],Tk[(UserA[],TicServA[],Nak[sid_1783]),sid_1795]),ltkKASTGS[]) 
























          1-tuple attacker:(UserA[]) 
            duplicate attacker:UserA[] 
          any attacker:v_1787 










              3-tuple attacker:(UserA[],TicServA[],Nak[sid_1783]) 
                rule 21 attacker:UserA[] 
                rule 19 attacker:TicServA[] 
                2-th attacker:Nak[sid_1783] 
                  rule 24 attacker:(UserA[],TicServA[],Nak[sid_1783]) 
 





Additional knowledge of the attacker: 
      chnl 
      UserA 
      AppServX 
      TicServA 
      a_24 
      a_25 




      new ltkAKAS; 
      new ltkKASTGS; 
      new ltkAPSTGS; 
      ( 
          ! 
          new Nak; 
          out(chnl, (UserA,TicServA,Nak)); 
          in(chnl, (UserX_25,AuthServTicServ_26,AuthServUser_27)); 
          let (=UserA) = UserX_25 in 
          let (=TicServA,Kat_28,=Nak,Tk_29) = 
ShareDec(AuthServUser_27,ltkAKAS) in 
          new Nat; 
          new Tat; 
          out(chnl, 
(AppServX,Nat,AuthServTicServ_26,ShareEnc((UserA,Tat),Kat_28))); 
          in(chnl, (=UserA,TicServAppServ_30,TicServUser_31)); 
          let (=AppServX,Kab_32,=Nat,Tt_33) = 
ShareDec(TicServUser_31,Kat_28) in 
          new Tab; 
          out(chnl, (TicServAppServ_30,ShareEnc((UserA,Tab),Kab_32))); 
          in(chnl, AppServUser_34); 
          let (=Tab) = ShareDec(AppServUser_34,Kab_32) in 
          event ProtocolCompleteUser(UserA,Kab_32); 
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          out(chnl, ShareEnc(AttackSuccess,Kab_32)); 
          0. 
      ) | ( 
          ( 
              ! 
              in(chnl, UserAuthServ_21); 
              let (UserX_22,TicServX_23,Nxk_24) = UserAuthServ_21 in 
              new Kxt; 
              new Tk; 
              out(chnl, 
(UserX_22,ShareEnc((UserX_22,Kxt,Tk),ltkKASTGS),ShareEnc((TicServX_23,K
xt,Nxk_24,Tk),ltkAKAS))); 
              event ProtocolAuthServ(UserX_22,Kxt); 
              0. 
          ) | ( 
              ( 
                  ! 
                  in(chnl, 
(AppServX_13,Nxt_14,AuthServTicServ_15,UserTicServ_16)); 
                  let (UserX_17,Kxt_18,Tk_19) = 
ShareDec(AuthServTicServ_15,ltkKASTGS) in 
                  let (=UserX_17,Txt_20) = 
ShareDec(UserTicServ_16,Kxt_18) in 
                  event ProtocolTicServ1(UserX_17,Kxt_18); 
                  new Kxaps; 
                  new Tt; 
                  out(chnl, 
(UserX_17,ShareEnc((UserX_17,Kxaps,Tt),ltkAPSTGS),ShareEnc((AppServX_13
,Kxaps,Nxt_14,Tt),Kxt_18))); 
                  event ProtocolTicServ2(UserX_17,Kxaps); 
                  0. 
              ) | ( 
                  ! 
                  in(chnl, (TicServAppServ_7,UserAppServ_8)); 
                  let (UserX_9,Kxaps_10,Tx_11) = 
ShareDec(TicServAppServ_7,ltkAPSTGS) in 
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                  let (=UserX_9,Txaps_12) = 
ShareDec(UserAppServ_8,Kxaps_10) in 
                  out(chnl, ShareEnc(Txaps_12,Kxaps_10)); 
                  event ProtocolAppServ(UserX_9,Kxaps_10); 
                  0. 
              ) 
          ) 
      ) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
1st process: New ltkAKAS creating ltkAKAS_31 
 
1st process: New ltkKASTGS creating ltkKASTGS_30 
 
1st process: New ltkAPSTGS creating ltkAPSTGS_34 
 
1st process: Reduction | 
 
2nd process: Reduction | 
 
3rd process: Reduction | 
 
4th process: Reduction ! 0 copy(ies) 
 
3rd process: Reduction ! 1 copy(ies) 
 
2nd process: Reduction ! 1 copy(ies) 
 
1st process: Reduction ! 1 copy(ies) 
 
1st process: New Nak creating Nak_27 
 
1st process: Out(chnl, (UserA,TicServA,Nak_27)) done 
 
Additional knowledge of the attacker: 





      in(chnl, (UserX_1829,AuthServTicServ_1830,AuthServUser_1831)); 
      let (=UserA) = UserX_1829 in 
      let (=TicServA,Kat_1832,=Nak_27,Tk_1833) = 
ShareDec(AuthServUser_1831,ltkAKAS_31) in 
      new Nat; 
      new Tat; 
      out(chnl, 
(AppServX,Nat,AuthServTicServ_1830,ShareEnc((UserA,Tat),Kat_1832))); 
      in(chnl, (=UserA,TicServAppServ_1834,TicServUser_1835)); 
      let (=AppServX,Kab_1836,=Nat,Tt_1837) = 
ShareDec(TicServUser_1835,Kat_1832) in 
      new Tab; 
      out(chnl, (TicServAppServ_1834,ShareEnc((UserA,Tab),Kab_1836))); 
      in(chnl, AppServUser_1838); 
      let (=Tab) = ShareDec(AppServUser_1838,Kab_1836) in 
      event ProtocolCompleteUser(UserA,Kab_1836); 
      out(chnl, ShareEnc(AttackSuccess,Kab_1836)); 
      0. 
 
| 
      in(chnl, UserAuthServ_1824); 
      let (UserX_1825,TicServX_1826,Nxk_1827) = UserAuthServ_1824 in 
      new Kxt; 
      new Tk; 
      out(chnl, 
(UserX_1825,ShareEnc((UserX_1825,Kxt,Tk),ltkKASTGS_30),ShareEnc((TicSer
vX_1826,Kxt,Nxk_1827,Tk),ltkAKAS_31))); 
      event ProtocolAuthServ(UserX_1825,Kxt); 
      0. 
 
| 
      in(chnl, 
(AppServX_1815,Nxt_1816,AuthServTicServ_1817,UserTicServ_1818)); 
      let (UserX_1819,Kxt_1820,Tk_1821) = 
ShareDec(AuthServTicServ_1817,ltkKASTGS_30) in 
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      let (=UserX_1819,Txt_1822) = ShareDec(UserTicServ_1818,Kxt_1820) 
in 
      event ProtocolTicServ1(UserX_1819,Kxt_1820); 
      new Kxaps; 
      new Tt; 
      out(chnl, 
(UserX_1819,ShareEnc((UserX_1819,Kxaps,Tt),ltkAPSTGS_34),ShareEnc((AppS
ervX_1815,Kxaps,Nxt_1816,Tt),Kxt_1820))); 
      event ProtocolTicServ2(UserX_1819,Kxaps); 
      0. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
2nd process: In(chnl, UserAuthServ_1824) done with message 
(UserA,TicServA,Nak_27) 
 
2nd process: Let (UserX_1841,TicServX_1842,Nxk_1843) = 
(UserA,TicServA,Nak_27) succeeds 
 
2nd process: New Kxt creating Kxt_28 
 
2nd process: New Tk creating Tk_29 
 




Additional knowledge of the attacker: 
      ShareEnc((TicServA,Kxt_28,Nak_27,Tk_29),ltkAKAS_31) 
      ShareEnc((UserA,Kxt_28,Tk_29),ltkKASTGS_30) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 




      in(chnl, (UserX_1829,AuthServTicServ_1830,AuthServUser_1831)); 
      let (=UserA) = UserX_1829 in 
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      let (=TicServA,Kat_1832,=Nak_27,Tk_1833) = 
ShareDec(AuthServUser_1831,ltkAKAS_31) in 
      new Nat; 
      new Tat; 
      out(chnl, 
(AppServX,Nat,AuthServTicServ_1830,ShareEnc((UserA,Tat),Kat_1832))); 
      in(chnl, (=UserA,TicServAppServ_1834,TicServUser_1835)); 
      let (=AppServX,Kab_1836,=Nat,Tt_1837) = 
ShareDec(TicServUser_1835,Kat_1832) in 
      new Tab; 
      out(chnl, (TicServAppServ_1834,ShareEnc((UserA,Tab),Kab_1836))); 
      in(chnl, AppServUser_1838); 
      let (=Tab) = ShareDec(AppServUser_1838,Kab_1836) in 
      event ProtocolCompleteUser(UserA,Kab_1836); 
      out(chnl, ShareEnc(AttackSuccess,Kab_1836)); 
      0. 
 
| 
      in(chnl, 
(AppServX_1815,Nxt_1816,AuthServTicServ_1817,UserTicServ_1818)); 
      let (UserX_1819,Kxt_1820,Tk_1821) = 
ShareDec(AuthServTicServ_1817,ltkKASTGS_30) in 
      let (=UserX_1819,Txt_1822) = ShareDec(UserTicServ_1818,Kxt_1820) 
in 
      event ProtocolTicServ1(UserX_1819,Kxt_1820); 
      new Kxaps; 
      new Tt; 
      out(chnl, 
(UserX_1819,ShareEnc((UserX_1819,Kxaps,Tt),ltkAPSTGS_34),ShareEnc((AppS
ervX_1815,Kxaps,Nxt_1816,Tt),Kxt_1820))); 
      event ProtocolTicServ2(UserX_1819,Kxaps); 
      0. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
1st process: In(chnl, 




1st process: Let (=UserA) = (UserA) succeeds 
 




1st process: New Nat creating Nat_32 
 
1st process: New Tat creating Tat_33 
 
1st process: Out(chnl, 
(AppServX,Nat_32,a_26,ShareEnc((UserA,Tat_33),Kxt_28))) done 
 
Additional knowledge of the attacker: 
      ShareEnc((UserA,Tat_33),Kxt_28) 




      in(chnl, (=UserA,TicServAppServ_1871,TicServUser_1872)); 
      let (=AppServX,Kab_1873,=Nat_32,Tt_1874) = 
ShareDec(TicServUser_1872,Kxt_28) in 
      new Tab; 
      out(chnl, (TicServAppServ_1871,ShareEnc((UserA,Tab),Kab_1873))); 
      in(chnl, AppServUser_1875); 
      let (=Tab) = ShareDec(AppServUser_1875,Kab_1873) in 
      event ProtocolCompleteUser(UserA,Kab_1873); 
      out(chnl, ShareEnc(AttackSuccess,Kab_1873)); 
      0. 
 
| 
      in(chnl, 
(AppServX_1815,Nxt_1816,AuthServTicServ_1817,UserTicServ_1818)); 
      let (UserX_1819,Kxt_1820,Tk_1821) = 
ShareDec(AuthServTicServ_1817,ltkKASTGS_30) in 
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      let (=UserX_1819,Txt_1822) = ShareDec(UserTicServ_1818,Kxt_1820) 
in 
      event ProtocolTicServ1(UserX_1819,Kxt_1820); 
      new Kxaps; 
      new Tt; 
      out(chnl, 
(UserX_1819,ShareEnc((UserX_1819,Kxaps,Tt),ltkAPSTGS_34),ShareEnc((AppS
ervX_1815,Kxaps,Nxt_1816,Tt),Kxt_1820))); 
      event ProtocolTicServ2(UserX_1819,Kxaps); 
      0. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 










2nd process: Let (=UserA,Txt_1891) = 
ShareDec(ShareEnc((UserA,Tat_33),Kxt_28),Kxt_28) succeeds 
 
2nd process: Event(ProtocolTicServ1(UserA,Kxt_28)) is the goal 
 
New processes: 
      in(chnl, (=UserA,TicServAppServ_1871,TicServUser_1872)); 
      let (=AppServX,Kab_1873,=Nat_32,Tt_1874) = 
ShareDec(TicServUser_1872,Kxt_28) in 
      new Tab; 
      out(chnl, (TicServAppServ_1871,ShareEnc((UserA,Tab),Kab_1873))); 
      in(chnl, AppServUser_1875); 
      let (=Tab) = ShareDec(AppServUser_1875,Kab_1873) in 
      event ProtocolCompleteUser(UserA,Kab_1873); 
      out(chnl, ShareEnc(AttackSuccess,Kab_1873)); 
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      0. 
 
| 
      new Kxaps; 
      new Tt; 
      out(chnl, 
(UserA,ShareEnc((UserA,Kxaps,Tt),ltkAPSTGS_34),ShareEnc((a_24,Kxaps,a_2
5,Tt),Kxt_28))); 
      event ProtocolTicServ2(UserA,Kxaps); 
      0. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
An attack has been found. 
RESULT evinj:ProtocolTicServ1(User_1079,Kutgs_1080) ==> 
evinj:ProtocolAuthServ(User_1079,Kutgs_1080) is false. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_1899,v_1899 
Rule 1: attacker:v_1902 & attacker:v_1901 -> 
attacker:ShareEnc(v_1902,v_1901) 
Rule 2: attacker:ShareEnc(Msg_1903,SharedKey_1904) & 
attacker:SharedKey_1904 -> attacker:Msg_1903 
Rule 3: attacker:v_1907 & attacker:v_1906 & attacker:v_1905 -> 
attacker:(v_1907,v_1906,v_1905) 
Rule 4: attacker:(v_1910,v_1909,v_1908) -> attacker:v_1910 
Rule 5: attacker:(v_1913,v_1912,v_1911) -> attacker:v_1912 
Rule 6: attacker:(v_1916,v_1915,v_1914) -> attacker:v_1914 
Rule 7: attacker:v_1917 -> attacker:(v_1917) 
Rule 8: attacker:(v_1918) -> attacker:v_1918 
Rule 9: attacker:v_1922 & attacker:v_1921 & attacker:v_1920 & 
attacker:v_1919 -> attacker:(v_1922,v_1921,v_1920,v_1919) 
Rule 10: attacker:(v_1926,v_1925,v_1924,v_1923) -> attacker:v_1926 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_1930,v_1929,v_1928,v_1927) -> attacker:v_1929 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_1934,v_1933,v_1932,v_1931) -> attacker:v_1932 
Rule 13: attacker:(v_1938,v_1937,v_1936,v_1935) -> attacker:v_1935 
Rule 14: attacker:v_1940 & attacker:v_1939 -> attacker:(v_1940,v_1939) 
Rule 15: attacker:(v_1942,v_1941) -> attacker:v_1942 
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Rule 16: attacker:(v_1944,v_1943) -> attacker:v_1943 
Rule 17: mess:v_1946,v_1945 & attacker:v_1946 -> attacker:v_1945 
Rule 18: attacker:v_1948 & attacker:v_1947 -> mess:v_1948,v_1947 
Rule 19: attacker:TicServA[] 
Rule 20: attacker:AppServX[] 
Rule 21: attacker:UserA[] 
Rule 22: attacker:chnl[] 
Rule 23: attacker:new_name[v_1949] 


































































ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:ltkAKAS[] 
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ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:ltkKASTGS[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:ltkAPSTGS[] 
Starting query evinj:ProtocolCompleteUser(User_1896,Kuaps_1897) ==> 
(evinj:ProtocolTicServ2(User_1896,Kuaps_1897) & 
evinj:ProtocolAuthServ(User_1896,Katgs_1898)) 
RESULT evinj:ProtocolCompleteUser(User_1896,Kuaps_1897) ==> 
(evinj:ProtocolTicServ2(User_1896,Kuaps_1897) & 
evinj:ProtocolAuthServ(User_1896,Katgs_1898)) is true. 
-- Secrecy & events. 
Starting rules: 
Rule 0: equal:v_2551,v_2551 
Rule 1: attacker:v_2554 & attacker:v_2553 -> 
attacker:ShareEnc(v_2554,v_2553) 
Rule 2: attacker:ShareEnc(Msg_2555,SharedKey_2556) & 
attacker:SharedKey_2556 -> attacker:Msg_2555 
Rule 3: attacker:v_2559 & attacker:v_2558 & attacker:v_2557 -> 
attacker:(v_2559,v_2558,v_2557) 
Rule 4: attacker:(v_2562,v_2561,v_2560) -> attacker:v_2562 
Rule 5: attacker:(v_2565,v_2564,v_2563) -> attacker:v_2564 
Rule 6: attacker:(v_2568,v_2567,v_2566) -> attacker:v_2566 
Rule 7: attacker:v_2569 -> attacker:(v_2569) 
Rule 8: attacker:(v_2570) -> attacker:v_2570 
Rule 9: attacker:v_2574 & attacker:v_2573 & attacker:v_2572 & 
attacker:v_2571 -> attacker:(v_2574,v_2573,v_2572,v_2571) 
Rule 10: attacker:(v_2578,v_2577,v_2576,v_2575) -> attacker:v_2578 
Rule 11: attacker:(v_2582,v_2581,v_2580,v_2579) -> attacker:v_2581 
Rule 12: attacker:(v_2586,v_2585,v_2584,v_2583) -> attacker:v_2584 
Rule 13: attacker:(v_2590,v_2589,v_2588,v_2587) -> attacker:v_2587 
Rule 14: attacker:v_2592 & attacker:v_2591 -> attacker:(v_2592,v_2591) 
Rule 15: attacker:(v_2594,v_2593) -> attacker:v_2594 
Rule 16: attacker:(v_2596,v_2595) -> attacker:v_2595 
Rule 17: mess:v_2598,v_2597 & attacker:v_2598 -> attacker:v_2597 
Rule 18: attacker:v_2600 & attacker:v_2599 -> mess:v_2600,v_2599 
Rule 19: attacker:TicServA[] 
Rule 20: attacker:AppServX[] 
Rule 21: attacker:UserA[] 
Rule 22: attacker:chnl[] 
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Rule 23: attacker:new_name[v_2601] 






















































ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:ltkAKAS[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:ltkKASTGS[] 
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker:ltkAPSTGS[] 
Starting query not attacker:AttackSuccess[] 
RESULT not attacker:AttackSuccess[] is true. 
Listing 26: ProVerif Kerberos Observed Correctness Test Data 
2. Performance Criteria 
a. Execution Time 
Table 35 presents the execution time data collected for the full version of 
the NS Protocol 2 as discussed in [NEED1978] for ProVerif. From this the CI+ value for 


















0 0.09 10 0.09 20 0.09 30 0.09 40 0.09 
1 0.09 11 0.09 21 0.09 31 0.09 41 0.09 
2 0.09 12 0.09 22 0.09 32 0.09 42 0.09 
3 0.08 13 0.09 23 0.09 33 0.08 43 0.09 
4 0.09 14 0.09 24 0.09 34 0.09 44 0.09 
5 0.09 15 0.09 25 0.09 35 0.09 45 0.09 
6 0.09 16 0.09 26 0.09 36 0.09 46 0.09 
7 0.09 17 0.09 27 0.09 37 0.09 47 0.09 
8 0.09 18 0.09 28 0.09 38 0.09 48 0.09 
9 0.09 19 0.09 29 0.09 39 0.09 49 0.09 
- - - - - - - - 50 0.09 
Table 35: ProVerif NS Full 2 Execution Time Criterion Test Data 
Table 36 presents the execution time data collected for the full version of 
the NSL Protocol 2 as discussed in [LOWE1996] for ProVerif. From this the CI+ value 


















0 0.05 10 0.05 20 0.05 30 0.05 40 0.05 
1 0.05 11 0.05 21 0.05 31 0.05 41 0.05 
2 0.05 12 0.05 22 0.05 32 0.05 42 0.05 
3 0.05 13 0.05 23 0.05 33 0.05 43 0.05 
4 0.05 14 0.05 24 0.05 34 0.05 44 0.05 
5 0.05 15 0.05 25 0.05 35 0.05 45 0.05 
6 0.05 16 0.05 26 0.05 36 0.05 46 0.05 
7 0.05 17 0.05 27 0.05 37 0.05 47 0.05 
8 0.05 18 0.05 28 0.05 38 0.05 48 0.05 
9 0.05 19 0.05 29 0.05 39 0.05 49 0.05 
- - - - - - - - 50 0.05 
Table 36: ProVerif NSL Full 2 Execution Time Criterion Test Data 
Table 37 presents the execution time data collected for the Kerberos 
protocol as discussed in [RFC4120] for ProVerif. From this the CI+ value for the 


















0 0.03 10 0.03 20 0.03 30 0.03 40 0.03 
1 0.03 11 0.03 21 0.03 31 0.03 41 0.03 
2 0.03 12 0.03 22 0.03 32 0.03 42 0.03 
3 0.03 13 0.03 23 0.03 33 0.03 43 0.03 
4 0.03 14 0.03 24 0.03 34 0.03 44 0.03 
5 0.03 15 0.03 25 0.03 35 0.03 45 0.03 
6 0.03 16 0.03 26 0.03 36 0.03 46 0.03 
7 0.03 17 0.03 27 0.03 37 0.03 47 0.03 
8 0.03 18 0.03 28 0.03 38 0.03 48 0.03 
9 0.04 19 0.03 29 0.03 39 0.03 49 0.03 
- - - - - - - - 50 0.03 
Table 37: ProVerif Kerberos Execution Time Criterion Test Data 
b. Secondary Memory Requirement 
Listing 27 presents the secondary memory requirement data collected for 




























Listing 27: ProVerif Secondary Memory Requirement Criterion Test Data 
c. Main Memory Requirement 
Table 38 presents the main memory requirement data collected for the full 
version of the NS Protocol 2 as discussed in [NEED1978] for ProVerif. From this the CI+ 

















0 0 10 0 20 0 30 0 40 0 
1 0 11 0 21 0 31 0 41 0 
2 0 12 0 22 0 32 0 42 0 
3 0 13 0 23 0 33 0 43 0 
4 0 14 0 24 0 34 0 44 0 
5 0 15 0 25 0 35 0 45 0 
6 0 16 0 26 0 36 0 46 0 
7 0 17 0 27 0 37 0 47 0 
8 0 18 0 28 0 38 0 48 0 
9 0 19 0 29 0 39 0 49 0 
- - - - - - - - 50 0 
Table 38: ProVerif NS Full 2 Main Memory Requirement Criterion Test Data 
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Table 39 presents the main memory requirement data collected for the full 
version of the NSL Protocol 2 as discussed in [LOWE1996] for ProVerif. From this the 
CI+ value for the main memory requirement was calculated; the Main Memory CI+ value 
















0 0 10 0 20 0 30 0 40 0 
1 0 11 0 21 0 31 0 41 0 
2 0 12 0 22 0 32 0 42 0 
3 0 13 0 23 0 33 0 43 0 
4 0 14 0 24 0 34 0 44 0 
5 0 15 0 25 0 35 0 45 0 
6 0 16 0 26 0 36 0 46 0 
7 0 17 0 27 0 37 0 47 0 
8 0 18 0 28 0 38 0 48 0 
9 0 19 0 29 0 39 0 49 0 
- - - - - - - - 50 0 
Table 39: ProVerif NSL Full 2 Main Memory Requirement Criterion Test Data 
Table 40 presents the main memory requirement data collected for the 
Kerberos protocol as discussed in [RFC4120] for ProVerif. From this the CI+ value for 


















0 0 10 0 20 0 30 0 40 0 
1 0 11 0 21 0 31 0 41 0 
2 0 12 0 22 0 32 0 42 0 
3 0 13 0 23 0 33 0 43 0 
4 0 14 0 24 0 34 0 44 0 
5 0 15 0 25 0 35 0 45 0 
6 0 16 0 26 0 36 0 46 0 
7 0 17 0 27 0 37 0 47 0 
8 0 18 0 28 0 38 0 48 0 
9 0 19 0 29 0 39 0 49 0 
- - - - - - - - 50 0 
Table 40: ProVerif Kerberos Main Memory Requirement Criterion Test Data
 235 
APPENDIX D: LIST OF PROTOCOL ANALYSIS SYSTEMS 
Here we present a list of protocol analysis systems. This list is by no means 
exhaustive. 



















No public website. 
Isabelle Isabelle http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/HVG/Isabelle/ 
Maude Maude http://maude.cs.uiuc.edu/ 
µCRL Micro CRL http://homepages.cwi.nl/~mcrl 









Murφ Murφ http://verify.stanford.edu/dill/murphi.html 
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Table 41: List of Protocol Analysis Systems 
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